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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is concerned with the concept of personal identity. It aims to 
identify a simple formulation of what it is for a person x at time t1 to be the 
same as person y at time t2. In pursuit of this aim, it addresses several 
metaphysical questions: What are we? Do we have a persistent identity? If 
so, how does our identity persist? In contemporary debate, there are two 
established ways of answering these questions. Advocates of biological 
continuity answer that we are essentially human organisms and that our 
persistence over time is reducible to biological continuity. Advocates of the 
rival, psychological view answer that we are essentially persons, whose 
persistence is reducible to our psychological continuity. Against both of 
these mainstream views, certain recent works have pointed to the possibility 
of a new account of personal identity that brings the rival accounts together 
in a hybrid notion of personal identity. This thesis elaborates and argues for 
such a hybrid theory of personal identity. 
 The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 begins with an 
inquiry into the historical roots of the problem of personal identity. It 
addresses the metaphysical questions of personal identity drawn from early 
modern philosophers and from contemporary discussions. Chapter 2 builds 
on Aristotle’s pre-modern, hylomorphic theory to suggest that the hybrid 
notion of identity is best grounded in Aristotle’s metaphysics and embedded 
in his substance ontology. Chapter 3 proposes that the most reasonable 
conception of what we are and how we persist is based on non-reductionist 
aspects of identity. This chapter draws on and extends Chapter 2’s 
Aristotelian account of identity by focusing on how the principle of 
individuation functions within contemporary debate. It argues that 
constructing and using Aristotle’s non-reductionist model warrants a 
contemporary hylomorphic view of identity, which renders the hybrid 
conception plausible. Chapter 4 brings both Eric Olson’s animalism and 
Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view into consideration, arguing that 
their theoretical innovations can be accommodated by the hybrid view. 
	 vi	
The hybrid view proposes that we are essentially embodied, thinking beings. 
It is thus both non-reductionist and non-dualistic. This thesis supports the 
case for this view by moving from its Aristotelian foundations to 
contemporary debate, and by arguing for the view’s rational superiority over 
its philosophical rivals. 
	 vii	
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INTRODUCTION 
When we think about ourselves we must contemplate numerous related-yet- 
distinct subjects that are included in inquiry into personal identity. This 
examination starts with the first metaphysical question of what we are; 
biological beings, or immaterial entities, or both? Or perhaps we are entirely 
distinct sorts of beings, something like an immaterial entity. It is equally 
crucial to know what types of changes our bodies and minds can undergo 
without causing us to become a new person (if that is possible), or to cease 
to exist.1 This inquiry also includes various conditions, where the body 
remains alive, but the brain permanently terminates its high functions in 
cases, such as is the case of a persistent vegetative state, dementia, a brain-
swap thought experiments and so on.  
 Second set of metaphysical questions could be directed under the 
limitation of whether we have a persistent identity. In contemporary debate, 
there are two established ways of answering these questions for those who 
favour the idea that we have a persistent identity under certain conditions. 
These two ways presuppose that we have a persistent identity through time. 
In order to limit the scope of our inquiry here I take this assumption as a 
constraint marking the boundary between those who reject the idea of a 
persistent self altogether, such as neo-Humeans2 who strictly follow the 
neuroscientific explanation of the self, and those who agree that there is a 
notion of personal identity to a certain extent and this identity traits are 
taken to be persistent to a certain degree. The latter presupposition is 
represented as the initial premise of both reductionist and non-reductionist 
accounts. And so, it will be the initial statement of our concern. 
 Persons are natural objects. We live in a physical world, and we are 
material and physical objects, just like any other living beings exist in space 
and time. Undoubtedly, we believe neuroscientific explanation in principle 
                                                        
1In this thesis I treat death as the end of a person’s existence, the end of biological life. This 
is an Aristotelian standpoint and also excludes the notion of resurrection and after life in the 
discussion of the persistence of personal identity.   2Churcland (2013), Dennett (1996;2014) and Metzinger (2003). Parfit is also a neo-
Humean from one perspective, yet he does not reject the idea of the self altogether; rather, 
his argument is significant in terms of survival and this is what matters. 	
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could account for human nature, or we can promote the exclusivity of 
identity relations when we are prompting the continuation of self and 
identity. This almost amounts to describing the notion of human nature at 
different levels. Here, what we mean by “levels” is crucial. Human beings 
not only explain things and what happens to them, but also understand them 
and relate to them as a part of our conscious lives. We can use different 
concepts in order to understand a single object or event. Understanding our 
nature is similar to understanding concepts not entirely conceivable through 
scientific theories, such as the concept of freedom or of free will. We may 
find difficult to translate the terms “personal identity”, “free will”, 
“responsibility” and “accountability” into scientific terms. Therefore, 
neuroscientific findings may remain controversial while these terms require 
more insight.3 Looking from this specific angle, it is not difficult to see that 
the question of what we are could be treated as a metaphysical problem, and 
the persistence conditions for our existence through time are directly related 
to this question. This thesis does not directly answer the question of what 
we are; rather, it proposes a new way of understanding our nature.  
As much as the question of persistence presents a demanding 
starting point for our investigation, the inquiry into the question of “What 
are we?” remains pressing in the debate and we must still address the 
challenge directly. If we are animals, a kind that Olson defends, or 
psychological continuers, as reductionist neo-Lockeans assert, then why do 
we still concern with persistence in every day cases and hypothetical 
scenarios, such as fusion and fission? What does happen when we apply this 
fusion to dogs, for instance? One might say that the dog goes with the brain, 
or more specifically, the dog goes where the cerebrum goes. This inquiry is 
more about any creature that has a sufficient psychological capacity, and 
provides enough evidence for us to distinguish the dog’s persistence 
conditions. Dogs are animals in an obvious and perfectly good sense, and to 
                                                        
3For instance, one may be quite critical of the exact role of consciousness in decision 
making. However, Dennett (2014, p.355.), who is critical towards the idea of self and a 
continuous identity, believes that making any sort of decision requires consciousness in 
most stages. He says that the current work in neuroscience supports the conceptions of free 
will, human agency and moral responsibility. 
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a certain extent, we are animals in the same sense as dogs. There is no doubt 
that if we talk about the persistence conditions of a dog, and if our concern 
is about whether the dog I saw a week ago is the same dog that is sitting 
next to me now, then we know that this inquiry is substantially different 
than asking how does a person and a person’s identity persist over time.  
Personal identity requires a revision, and the implications of 
prudential concerns are highly demanding for us to question our views of 
ourselves and of what matters. Regardless how some philosophers develop 
their identity claims as a transitive and possibly as a branching relation4 (or 
for some there is no self or identity as such to ascribe human beings), 
plausible alternatives could still maintain the significance of identity 
relations, which are mainly categorised into two major groups: 
psychological continuity defenders5 (such as neo-Lockeanism) and 
biological continuity defenders6 (such as animalism) who claim that we 
persist iff we have either psychological continuity or biological continuity. 
Taking a wider perspective, we also have the hybrid view in the 
contemporary debate, which affords a whole new approach to personal 
identity. How does the unifying notion of the hybrid view bring two major 
groups of identity claims together? How is this view a sort of challenge to 
any identity theory that purports to preserve a tight reductionist relation 
between identity and continuity conditions? The hybrid view’s rational 
superiority over its philosophical rivals on these particular questions will be 
detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, along with the contemporary defenders of the 
view, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. For now, we can touch upon the 
general trend within these accounts.  
The hybrid view has been defended by Wiggins,7 McDowell,8 
Langford9 and Noonan10 (in more of a neo-Lockean trend) most recently. As 
                                                        
4 Parfit (1970) and (1984).  
5 Defenders of this approach include Lewis (1976); Parfit (1984); Shoemaker (1984); and 
Unger (1990).  
6 Defenders of this approach include most notably Olson (1997); Snowdon (1990); and Van 
Inwagen (1990).  
7 Wiggins (1967; 2001). 
8 McDowell (1997). 
9 Langford (2014).		
10 Noonan (2003).  
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my inquiry unfolds, I will conclude that these theories of personal identity 
introduce a similar paradigm to non-reductionist hybrid view, which can 
successfully propose an account that embodies an idea of a persistent 
identity through time regardless the changes may occur in a person’s life. 
There is also a perspective that brings Aristotelian hylomorphism and the 
hybrid view together. Wiggins, in particular, uses neo-Aristotelianism to 
articulate his metaphysics of persons, and he explores the unity of a person 
by differentiating the terms “substance sortal” and “phase sortal”.11 He 
approaches the explanation of human nature by using the framework of 
phase kinds and substance kinds, which will be explored in Chapters 3 and 
4.12  
Following from this specific outlook, the task of this thesis is to 
identify our substance kind (our essence), to which all human beings belong. 
If we take this terminology into consideration, then the defence of a 
substance kind rests on the claim that the concept of a substance signifies 
exactly what the object is and determines the persistence conditions that 
apply to all members of the same kind. Prima facie, our substance kind 
represents the unity of being a human animal (human being) and having 
certain rational capacities. Accordingly, person is the concept that best 
answers the question of what we most fundamentally are. Hence, 
personhood, as well as being a human, is a substance sortal. We are persons 
in the most fundamental and simplistic way. Yet, we know that the notion of 
being a person no longer falls under a simplistic description. We begin to 
exist in the womb as human organisms, where we are potentially persons if 
no distractions arise during growth, then we actualise this potential and 
develop certain capacities that classify us as persons, and finally we cease to 
exist at some point. These points in life at which personhood starts and ends 
are extremely puzzling, and they require a deeper understanding towards the 
                                                        
11	Wiggins (2001).	
12 Roughly, substance kinds determine when the entity begins and ceases to exist, whereas 
phase kinds determine the accidental features that are subject to change through time. 
Someone could go from being a non-trainer to a trainer and back to being a non-trainer. In 
that sense, being a trainer is a phase kind, as nothing could go from being abstract to being 
concrete or vice-versa, the entity itself that goes through changes is a substance kind. 	
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nature of human beings, especially when we attempt to establish a 
functional account for the persistence conditions of personal identity. 
Nevertheless, we can assert quite confidently that giving up on the claim 
that “We are fundamentally biological organisms of a certain kind” (where 
“a certain kind” explicitly refers to being a rational animal) certainly faces 
some major obstacles. Theoretical challenges arise for some neo-Lockeans 
who rejects the idea of a “thinking animal” entirely and claim that we are 
essentially thinking parts.13 
So, how exactly are we supposed to make sense of a view about our 
persistence conditions, where we are told that personal identity is either a 
biological or a psychological issue? What should we consider to have a clear 
understanding of how this identification is supposed to explain our complex 
nature? How do we comprehend the underlying principle of our being and 
its continuant existence? To answer these questions, we ultimately can 
develop a new form of understanding, which I refer to as “the hylomorphic 
model of identity.” The hybrid view I defend derives from the hylomorphic 
model, where the sufficient requirements from both continuity views are 
combined within a hybrid unity. The hylomorphic model originates from 
terms, such as essence, substance and ontological dependence. Both the 
account of essence and that of substance are the best candidate for a 
persistent identity, which does not solely rely on one view, contrary to the 
general perspective in the field.  
The hylomorphic notion of identity has been recently discussed by 
some academics,14 but how the view is supported has not been explored 
much further. Toner,15 for instance, develops a Thomistic hylomorphist 
technic to defend his animalist approach. By contrast, the hylomorphist 
Hershenov16 takes a new approach and states that hylomorphists do not need 
to endorse animalism or the psychological criterion. Their identity claim, 
which will be discussed extensively in section 3.5, offers a middle way 
                                                        
13 Parfit (2012). 
14 See Hershenov (2008), Langford (2014) and Toner (2011).  
15 Toner (2011).  
16 Hershenov (2008) and (2011).  
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between animalism and neo-Lockeanism, and offers an extended 
clarification that is based on the notion of intuition.  
Bringing the conceptual framework of hylomorphism motivates us 
to investigate why we suppose that the persistence of identity requires a 
necessary and sufficient condition. Along the same lines, the hybrid view I 
attempt to articulate as a new or emerging understanding purposes a third 
way that we can conceive of identity as a unity of what animalism and neo-
Lockeans claim to be the exclusive criterion for persistence. In return, this 
method advocates the unity (a unity of animalist and neo-Lockean aspects of 
identity) and individuality of human being as a person.   
I speculate that a possible perplexity over the transitivity of these 
terms (hylomorphism and the hybrid view) can only grow as that suspicion 
is progressively adjusted to the thought that they indicate different concepts 
and require different analyses. I have chosen the term “hybrid” for the view 
I have defended over the term “hylomorphic” only because in the 
contemporary debate, the hybrid identity is represented as the third way of 
explaining the persistence conditions for personal identity, although how 
this hybrid unity is generated has not been clarified. I claim that a more 
convincing interpretation of hylomorphism represents a unique model to 
articulate this third way by bringing the discussion of substance into our 
inquiry, and it shows how the hybrid identity view can be plausibly 
established. My hybrid view applies hylomorphism to several long-standing 
questions of personal identity, such as the way we come into existence and 
the changes we can survive. It might seem as if I am introducing a new 
substance kind, yet the superiority of my claim depends merely upon the 
idea that both being animals and being neo-Lockean persons together within 
a unity comprises our substance kind, even though these components are 
claimed to manifest themselves (independently from each other) as phase 
kinds. 
Furthermore, I offer a better understanding of hylomorphism without 
committing myself to several claims, such as the idea of a persistent identity 
is intuitive and based on common sense, or the notion of soul in our 
discussion of a person and personhood is permissible, or the claim that 
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personal identity could be something that survives after death. The 
advantage of my thesis over other hylomorphist accounts is that my thesis 
combines the fundamental features of the neo-Lockean view and animalism, 
and it avoids the pitfalls that are unescapable for those who defend the 
power of intuitive reasoning, eternity of soul, and resurrection, which are 
unfounded and vulnerable to a severe criticism. I endorse hylomorphism as 
it is indicating the basic relation between body and mind. However, I 
believe the most plausible interpretation of how hylomorphic notion of 
identity should be read is profoundly an omitted subject. The reason is that 
in the case of human beings or persons the soul is only to be taken as 
activity, which includes mental activities of various kinds. In that sense I 
agree with Williams’ supposition that “hylomorphism might be better 
expressed by saying that there was no such a thing as the soul at all.”17  
How human being persists through time can be interpreted within 
the formulation of “x is at t1 is the same being with y at t2 iff (i) x is 
biologically continuous with y, and (ii) x is psychologically continuous with 
y in virtue of biological continuity”. I will examine the importance of “in 
virtue of” and its implication to personal identity and brain transplantation 
cases in Chapters 3 and 4, extensively. For now, we can declare that this 
strand of the view suggests that hylomorphism may seem as materialist 
(according to Williams Aristotle is a “polite materialist” even if he is a non-
reductionist in nature).18 At this point, we will see that animalism is 
favoured by these hylomorphists (see Hershenov, Toner). Whereas the 
psychological continuity view is the idealised view among most 
philosophers, yet it is incompatible with animalism in various ways. Neo-
Lockeans’ intended goal is to capture the idea that one could persist as a 
non-animal (such as a brain-in- a vat). Most neo-Lockeans deny that we are 
animals and stress that our substance kind is that of a Lockean person: We 
are rational and conscious beings. As such, neo-Lockeanism implies that we 
begin to exist when human animals become rational and conscious and 
cease to exist when those qualities are lost. I explore the proposed 
                                                        
17 Williams (2006) p. 219.  
18 See Williams (2006), especially Chapter 14.		
	 8	
application of animalism and neo-Lockeanism in the fetus problem and the 
vegetative state puzzle in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.4.2.   
In order to justify the suitability of this reasoning, I will here explain 
the terminology I use in different chapters. In Chapter 1 I raise the mind-
body distinction, as personal identity has been widely discussed in the 
context of this particular distinction (of lack thereof), along with the 
biological and psychological connectedness or continuity, consciousness, 
memory, and so on. In Chapters 2 and 3, however, I use the Aristotelian 
concept of the individual, and in order to discuss the notion of an individual, 
his ontological terminology is useful, including his distinctions between the 
relations of soul and body, form and matter, and potentiality and actuality, 
as well as the notion of essence and the relation between substance and 
subject as ousia.  In Chapter 4 I turn back to the contemporary lexicon.  
Throughout the thesis, I use the terms “person”, “self”19, “subject”, 
“individual” and “underlying subject” interchangeably. The reason for this 
terminology flexibility is that these terms, as I use them, all indicate the 
same thing, and they all are referring to different aspects of a human being. 
This multiplicity is a presupposition of the condition that a human being is a 
person20, individual, subject and the self. Specifically, however, the ongoing 
debate concentrates on the distinction between the terms “human being” and 
“person”. Undoubtedly, these two terms refer to the same being, while how 
we use them varies based on the context (in terms of associated qualities for 
the term “person” attributes are dictated by the things outside of the 
individual herself, and for the term “human being”, qualities are purely 
scientific variables).  
I aim to set up an analogy between the mind-body (matter-form) 
relation and the relation between psychological and bodily continuity. This 
project draws attention to contemporary issues in the personal identity 
debate in which the unity of persons inevitably requires an interpretation, 
                                                        
19In the Lockean terminology, the term “self” represents exclusively the holder of 
psychological states, such as having a continuant consciousness, memory traits and first-
person perspective.  
20It applies when we indicate that certain qualities contribute to the variables that allow a 
human being to be referred to as a person. 
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and this project thus employs the neo-Aristotelian solution of such a 
dualism. The hybrid theory I defend not only accommodates the most 
supported neo-Lockean claim that the causal relation of psychological states 
is sufficient in a person’s life, it also entails that a human being starts as 
organisms (as a non-rational embryo) in the womb, and if she happens to be 
in a vegetative state after severe brain-damage, she will remain the same 
person, regardless of the disconnectedness of her psychological states. One 
significant implication of the hybrid view that seems appealing is that 
undoubtedly such severe brain damage results in a remarkable change in a 
person’s life, but it does not entail that the person ceases to exist. In the 
hybrid view, one can accept that both claims are true. In that sense, what is 
sufficient for a neo-Lockean in accounting for personal identity and what is 
sufficient according to the animalist are both true. Where both sides err is in 
their insistence that their premises are necessary. If we accept the sufficient 
conditions and reject the necessary conditions, we are committed to a result 
in which we can accept both views.  
To support the hybrid view is to accept the sufficient conditions for 
a case in which at a later stage a later person who is connected to an earlier 
person by the sufficient psychological conditions, and there is a later person 
who is connected to an earlier person by the sufficient biological conditions. 
While both animalism and neo-Lockeanism appeal to a certain degree, we 
will see in the following chapters that neither view is completely clear in 
drawing distinctions between persons and animals (in Olson’s case), or 
persons and human beings (in Baker’s case), as they tend to differentiate 
these concepts in their terminology. I propose that we are both human 
animals and neo-Lockean persons, and the unity of these views constitutes 
our substance kind.  
One may claim that bringing the substance kind into our persistence 
question creates a worry about the hybrid view, as it might create an utterly 
mysterious outlook for a person. As I will point out extensively in the 
following chapters, facts about the substance kind that hylomorphism and 
the hybrid theory assign follow from neo-Lockean persons and Olsonian 
animals. The hybrid view employs the hylomorphist method to assert how 
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these reductionist accounts could be combined within a non-reductionist 
unity. Accordingly, at the beginning, we exist as human animals, then grow 
into Lockean persons throughout our lives. We could cease to be persons in 
a neo-Lockean sense, yet it does not follow that our self, the subject itself, 
ceases to exist altogether. 
With this reasoning in the background, in Chapter 1 I outline the 
questions of personal identity, how we should direct certain questions, and 
the ways of categorising leading contemporary accounts. After outlining 
Parfit’s distinction between reductionism and non-reductionism (he points it 
out as the distinction between the simple view and complex views), I 
dedicate a substantial amount of space to the historical background of the 
discussion. In doing so, we gain insight into the historical background of the 
topic, but we also clarify why it is frequently assumed that the personal 
identity debate only begins with Locke. The argument of this section is that 
empiricists like Locke and Hume offered a new insight about the notion of 
personhood, especially after Descartes. Prior to their discussions, there was 
Descartes’ substance dualism, in which he assumed that persons have a 
primitive conception. Although Descartes has no precise discussion of 
personal identity, his substance dualism causes – but also avoids – 
complications that the later empiricist philosophers raised.  
Later in the chapter, I point out historical objections to Locke and 
Hume, and show how their concerns created a debate over the notion of 
personhood. Subsequently, I review several representative accounts of 
personal identity that relate to the distinction between reductionism and 
non-reductionism, suggesting that each view clashes incompatibly with 
plausible views about our existence through time. Proponents of these views 
claim that these counterintuitive results are worth the cost of the theoretical 
advantages their views provide. I widely outline and justify my position in 
the second and third chapters. Within the scope of the first chapter, I 
highlight my interpretation, in which I conclude that due to the 
discrepancies they indicate, these accounts do not capture the persistence 
condition on their own. This identification of gaps these theories have, is the 
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initial concern of this project. Avoiding any means of intuitive reasoning 
and adopting a specific scientific explanation (such as the one that claims 
there is no persistent notion of personal identity) seems preferable in the 
contemporary debate, but given how these accounts radically differ from 
each other does not pay credit to their value either. In Chapter 2, I focus 
mainly on Aristotle’s metaphysics21 and evaluate the foundations of the 
hylomorphic account of personal identity within the Aristotelian conception 
of individuation, identity of substance and essence. I highlight that there is 
nothing more substantial in a person’s being than her being per se. That is to 
say, a person is a person in virtue of herself and her essence. Aristotle does 
not explicitly address the questions of personal identity, but fortunately, a 
neo-Aristotelian reconstruction of this matter is possible. This task requires 
a realisation that there are historical divergences in concepts, such as mind, 
individual, and the persistence of identity. These challenges allow us to 
think about the notion of a person in a wider perspective. 
The project of this thesis is the result of an attempt to understand 
why such an inquiry should not be considered controversial and what 
exactly it means to explain our own existence within a hybrid notion. The 
degree of resistance with which the hybrid view has been met really merits 
some investigation. The real advantage of this interpretation is to afford 
straightforward link between the mind/soul–body/matter distinction and the 
relation between psychological and biological traits of personal identity. I 
dedicate an entire chapter to the possibility of employing the ontological 
status of an individual in order to account for the persistence conditions for 
a person as a hybrid unity due to one’s being as ousia, and how this 
substantial being undergoes change and alteration, yet persists to exist as the 
same person in virtue of being considered within the relation of actuality 
and potentiality. 
First, I look at how neo-Aristotelianism sets up the notion of 
hylomorphic unity and how I further this as a non-reductionist approach for 
                                                        
21 I follow Barnes (1991) for English translations of Aristotle’s texts. 
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the issue of ontological dependence, suggesting that devoting ontological 
independence to the unity of form and matter does not commit a 
controversial claim. Rather, it classifies the essential notion of a composed 
unity. Furthermore, I contrast mainstream views regarding their struggle to 
explain the principle of individuation. There is an on-going debate regarding 
neo-Aristotelian notion of individuation, whether the individuation principle 
for a human being is matter or form. The commonly held interpretation 
claims matter to be the principle of individuation. Yet some commentators 
grant form as the principle of individuation. More radically, some even may 
suggest that there is no such a principle, so an adequate notion of identity 
cannot be found in Aristotle's works. This view has been unsuccessful to 
attain a satisfying result through its failure to provide an answer for our 
concern about personal identity. I develop an interpretation that does not 
suffer from such an unnecessary dispute over the notion of universality and 
the particularity of forms, and the difficulty of whether either matter or form 
is the individuating principle. First, I argue that Aristotle was a non-
reductionist, in principle. Nevertheless, for him there was no one type of 
solution to the problem of persistence and individuation. The ontological 
alignment of a unity with its parts was set and fixed. Yet, it was impossible 
to account for the persistence of the unity without the continuity of its 
components. This feature enables me to endorse the mutual ontological 
dependence between psychological and biological continuity in the 
explanation of the notion of personal identity.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss objections, as these oppositions capture the 
basic resistance raised against both biological continuity and psychological 
continuity views. I take Olson’s animalism – and his biological approach – 
and Baker’s constitution view as stand points. Some reasons behind this 
method are that both represent the unique aspect of the category which they 
fall under. Olson’s defense of animalism relies on the claim that the term 
“animal” is more appropriate to define human beings than the term “person” 
to tell us what are we and what determines our persistence conditions. 
Baker’s constitution view, on the other hand, accepts animalism’s initial not 
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as a determinate relation, but only as a constitution. She suggests that our 
first-person perspective is constituted by an animal. Their reductionist 
methodology is unique on their own merits in terms of determining 
personhood as only a condition at some point of a human being’s existence. 
I must admit that I agree with both accounts in terms of their theoretical 
schema, yet their strategies are not the sole and sufficient way to figure out 
the criterion of personal identity, if we consider the supposition that persons 
have a continuous self. My divergence from psychological and biological 
continuity theorists and my arguments for the advantage of the hybrid 
theory I defend will be the focus of the final chapter of this work. After 
reviewing the above accounts, I come to the conclusion that animalism and 
the constitution view do not seriously undermine the hybrid view. On the 
contrary, once the general picture is made clear for the biological approach 
and the constitution view, the debate between the two dissolves. In this final 
chapter, I sketch out some of the significances that acceptance of my 
interpretation would have. I argue that the hybrid view does not entail the 
acceptance of any specific theory regarding metaphysical questions, so this 
new emerging interpretation can be accepted without favouring any 
particular side. The hybrid view gives the expected consequences in typical 
situations, and also it is comparable to the views of its competitors, as it 
provides more plausible results in everyday cases, such as the fetus problem 
and dementia, and finally in hypothetical scenarios, such as split-brain 
cases, duplication, and teleportation.  
The initial outcome of a hybrid composition for the survival in the 
Parfitian sense will be touched upon, yet it is not within the scope of interest 
in this thesis. One reason for this delamination is that the continuity and 
persistence conditions of one’s identity are prior to our interest. 
Hierarchically, these criteria are fundamental in comparison to any 
consideration upon survival of identity and even to discussions of 
resurrection. Nevertheless, I use theories in the contemporary literature as a 
sort of tool to show that neo-Aristotelian idea of personal identity can 
explain or at least can give some insight into the issue at hand. To canvass 
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the field of philosophical contributions to such a topic would far exceed the 
scope of this thesis, and the scope is set in the interest of keeping exegesis 
manageable and limiting the discussion of prior issues to only those sections 
in which it is necessary for our context. If my suggested approach, which is 
the strategy of defining identity using hylomorphism, is ultimately 
successful, it should impart the added bonus of an account of persistence 
through time that entertains identity within the hybrid notion and is free of 
the dispute between mainstream views and the resulting debates.  
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Chapter 1: Problems of Personal Identity and Initial Questions 
 
At the most fundamental level, my concern is to scrutinize the notion of 
numerical identity, specifically a second metaphysical question: What does 
it take for the person x at time t1 to be the same person as the person y at 
time t2 if there is a continuous identity relation between x and y? Any 
answer must provide not only a way of determining whether x and y are the 
same persons, but of explaining what we are and the persistence conditions 
for one to remain the same person through time. According to some, the 
nonaligned way of examining the term person and the persistence conditions 
of a person might seem quite delusional. I will consider such a possibility 
within Hume’s and neo-Humean explanations in particular, yet an inquiry 
for criteria of personal identity over time is a chance worth taking, if it gives 
us more insight.   
For most philosophers after Locke, the term “person” rests on a 
forensic and moral meaning. Accordingly, persons are rational agents, who 
are committed to achieving the rationality. The focus here is rather on the 
properties that make an individual a morally responsible agent who stands in 
a relation to that agent and to the other. The person is someone who has 
specific capacities. This type of explanation has some certain limitations, as 
individuals with dementia or a severe brain damage, for example, are 
thought to possess a lesser degree of personhood than a healthy person. This 
line of argument makes it hard to explain persistence, just because those 
who are entirely incapacitated would not be forensic persons. Of course, this 
explanation contradicts our common sense.22 
Another type of explanation for the term “person” comes from 
neuroscience in identifying “self” and “person” along with several 
questions, such as What does make us persons rather than mere organisms? 
or When a person has gone through remarkable mental changes, should we 
treat that person as the same person as before? What are the moral 
implications of such a radical change in one’s mental states? Neuroscience 
                                                        
22 By common sense, I mean the ways the term “person” is employed in everyday language 
without implying that the commonly held view is better or worse than other explanations. 
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agrees that persons are more than organisms, yet having a human body and 
a certain degree of connectedness in psychological states are necessary parts 
of being a person. If it were possible to conclude that an individual with a 
severe dementia or a person in a vegetative state were less a person than a 
healthy individual, clinicals would still have to treat that individual properly 
without reflecting the degrees of personhood. Crucially, one may imply that 
“neuroscientists do not need to employ the notion of personal identity in 
order to work in the field of neuroscience”23. In philosophy, the notion of 
person requires specified concepts. Of course, if we apply the discussion of 
personal identity to clinical cases, we need to connect the pathological 
process of the brain with the changes in psychological states that we 
observe. If this application requires an account in which some properties of 
a person cannot be fully explained within the biological terms, then we need 
a further explanation of identity and persistence conditions. Advances in 
neuroscience may or may not affect philosophers’ theories, yet undoubtedly, 
this is where philosophical theories have much to draw from neuroscience 
without having to submit to the notion that the self is an illusion.  
In more detail, the most significant aspect of metaphysics of 
personal identity that is still debatable between neuroscience and philosophy 
is the persistence of identity. Why does the question of persistence arise in 
the first place? What is the reason for our inquiry into whether we are the 
same person over time, or whether one survives after transplant cases, such 
as fusion or fission? At first glance, these metaphysical concerns create a 
dynamic between our philosophical interests and recent developments in 
neuroscience in terms of determining the link between the brain and the 
person. In current literature terms “person” and “self” are investigated by 
several approaches. Neo-Humean bundle theorists24 advocate that there is no 
                                                        
23 Mathews, D. J. H., Bok, H., Rabins, P. V. (2009), p. 4.  
24Churcland (2013); Dennett (1996;2014); Metzinger (2003) are the defenders of 
eliminative materialism (neo-Humean bundle theory of the self) claim that the subject of all 
experience is the only condition to have those experiences. The idea of self as a unity is a 
mere illusion, and more precisely, it is created by functions of our brains. The idea of self is 
a first-person disposition of experiences and it stems from the causal relation between 
experience and the brain, which is represented by the activation of certain brain networks. 
Namely, the self is a product of the complex physical operating of the brain. The concept of 
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continuous notion of self that owns the unity of our experience; rather the 
unity is constructed out of continuities in our mind. This line of the 
argument is out of our interest in this paper due to several reasons. First of 
all, the aim here is to investigate the motives behind the psychological and 
biological continuities, which are already presuppose that persons hold 
identity as the subject of experience. Secondly, the constructive claim of the 
hybrid view truly accepts the unity of identity over time, as the unity  is 
constructed out of continuities. Still, these continuities occur not only in 
one’s mental life, but also in one’s material being, the body, where one 
constructs a sense of identity with its own distinctive characteristics. The 
hybrid view I favour accommodates the persistence of a human being as 
something rather relative, which is applicable to both psychological and 
biological continuities. This is a hybrid perspective, grounds the point that 
identity of a person has more than one aspect. 
  Moreover, some neuroscientists have claimed although there this 
thing called self, neurotechnologies as a whole challenge our sense of a 
persistent identity/self under several circumstances.25 This group presuppose 
that there is this notion of the self that is identical to the material we are 
composed of at a particular time. The experience of the self is naturalised as 
a physical entity rather than conceptual construction, and characterised as a 
phenomenal experience that could be caused by several sources, such as 
cognitive functions, neurons, or certain properties that arise out of the 
relation between brain and experience, and more importantly the experience 
emerges from the direct interaction with the outer world, rather than 
introspection. Hence, they do not reject personal identity altogether, yet 
claim that the notion of self emerges from a causal relation between 
subjective conscious experience and neuronal activity.26 This could also 
                                                                                                                                             
self only appears through conscious experience, which represents a phenomenal self as an 
ongoing process, rather than something exists in this world. 		25	See, Illes and Racine (2005) p.10. Some neuroscientists suggest that in cases of severe 
amnesia and dementia, for instance, the loss of memory causes a distraction in the 
persistence of personal identity. See Clark (2010) and Klein and Nichols (2012).  	
26Therefore, personal identity as a subjective experience is the result of a process by which 
information from outer experience goes beyond nonconscious processing and gains access 
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mean that personal identity is characterised at each moment of experience as 
a succession of earlier experiences that are inherited from past momentary 
occasions. Personal identity shifts through life as a collection of temporal 
parts.27 This account, however, could be taken to the extreme as if it 
suggests that if I am shown a picture of a little girl who others claim is me, 
my respond could be, “No, that’s not me. I was never a little girl. I only 
began to exist a moment ago, and I will cease to exist a moment from now”. 
Accordingly, there is no “self” as such that continuously persists through 
time as a unity. Therefore, there is no causal relation between two states of 
the self through time. 
However, Allhoff and Buford28 claim that it is even debatable 
whether the implications of personal identity and the idea of self might 
reasonably be thought to follow from neuroscience. This approach 
contributes to our understanding of the mental representations of personal 
identity.29 This outlook contends that contrary to popular critiques, 
neuroscience poses no threat to the persistence conditions of identity in the 
                                                                                                                                             
to consciousness thanks to the transition by the existence of a subjective experience. (See, 
Compiani (2019). 	
27 Persons, as all other material entities, are kinds of four-dimensional space-time worms 
composed of temporal parts related to each other. Their persistence conditions through time 
represent some specific relations, which unify determinate temporal parts into an individual 
persisting person. See D. Lewis (1971).  
28	Allhoff, F. and Buford, C. (2005) pp. 34–36. 	
29 One reason could be that even if we bring the biological continuity into our persistence 
question and claim that the persistence conditions of a person requires more than a causal 
psychological relation between A at t1 and B at t2 - in a condition in which A and B are the 
same person if and only if A at t1 stands in a certain relationship to B at t2 - than according 
to Allhoff and Buford neuroscience will be completely irrelevant to this metaphysical 
debate. More to that, Allhoff and Buford raise their scepticism for the metaphysical 
implications that neuroscience supposedly contains: “It is even debatable whether 
neuroimagery could confirm psychological connectedness since it could at best identify 
neural activity associated with the cognitive process of remembering, not the contents of 
the memories themselves. So how could neuroimagery show whether two people in fact 
had memories with the same contents? We could try to show them pictures which 
represented the content of some memory and see whether the “memory recollection centre” 
of the brain was activated. But now problems of underdetermination would be profound as 
would could not tell, for example, whether the stimulus (e.g., a red car with a certain license 
plate) triggered the same memory or not (e.g., A might have owned the car and B might 
have seen it, thus both would “remember” it, but the context of the memories would be 
different). Obviously, we would try to control for alternative interpretations of similar 
stimuli, but the pragmatics would be onerous to say the least. Ultimately, then, we think it 
is probably impossible for neuroimagery to disconfirm diachronic identity claims, and 
highly unlikely for it to confirm them”. Allhoff, F. and Buford, C. (2005) p35. 
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way that the defenders of persistence suggests. As such, there is no conflict 
between the manifest image of a persistent identity and the findings of 
neuroscientific disciplines. Although neuroscientific explanations are 
dominating the debate, metaphysical competence is also demanding. The 
neuroscientific portrayal of persons may seem easily manipulatable, object-
like beings misses much that we each know of the interior life of the mind. 
On the one hand, there is an explanation, which is highly scientific and 
dominated by biology and neuroscience; on the other hand, there is a 
humanistic theory, which focuses on reasoning and lived experience as well 
as naturalistic explanation. Bennett and Hacker30 discuss the necessity of 
philosophical inquiry within the neuroscientific approach of understanding 
the human nature. According to them, the neuroscientist’s desire to 
understand neural phenomena, their relation to psychological capacities, and 
having a deliberation towards the conceptual schema greatly matters; “For 
irrespective of the brilliance of the neuroscientist’s experiments and the 
refinement of his techniques, if there is conceptual confusion about his 
questions or conceptual error in the descriptions of the results of his 
investigations, then he will not have understood what he set out to 
understand.”31 
 Now we can examine several questions that arise after the above 
discussion. It has been always tempting to ask, If we suppose that we have a 
persistent identity what constitutes it? Is it our body or the causally related 
mental states of our minds, or are we constituent of some sort of immaterial 
substance, which could underlie our persistence through time? To what 
extent can our minds or bodies undergo changes without causing us to cease 
to exist? What does happen to our identity in between various conditions, 
for instance in cases where the body remains alive but the brain permanently 
stops functioning?  
 There are also questions which are not directly related to personal 
identity, but whose concerns seem to depend on the issue of personal 
identity, such as, To what extent is it appropriate to hold one responsible in 
                                                        
30	Bennett and Hacker (2003).	
31 Bennett and Hacker (2003) p. 46.  
	 20	
the present for one’s past actions? This question alone can be directed either 
backwards, for the past actions or forwards to the future possibilities. 
Undoubtedly, there is a need for the idea of a person who took the action in 
the past to be responsible for that action, and presumably the crucial 
elements of this person’s identity must thus remain unchanged.  
The main aim of this chapter is to investigate this crucial aspect of 
identity, which underlies every possible condition and, in its basic form, 
could allow us to articulate a coherent account of the persistence through 
time. The persistence conditions always encourage philosophers to ask what 
exactly makes one the same individual one once was and will become. The 
identity condition will characterise what constitutes a person’s persistence 
over time within a certain formulation that we could apply to any identity 
claim: “an earlier individual is continuous with herself as a later individual 
if and only if the identity is linked by the same x”. The term “continuity” 
here implies the identification question and the relation of past selves to our 
present selves. The term also postulates a way to determine whether one’s 
past self and future self are united under the same identity. In other words, 
our continuity conditions can be informative in determining what constitutes 
our identity, as the question of what constitutes our identity can be about our 
continuity conditions. Therefore, at a fundamental level, the search for the 
criterion of personal identity is to develop a theory to answer these 
questions and to develop a structure for a criterion that determines our 
persistence conditions and finally pursues the above line of inquiry.  
In that sense, the problem of personal identity initially concerns the 
following questions: What constitutes a person? What makes our identity 
the same from one moment to another, which for an individual, is to exist as 
the same being at different times? The assumption that “we are persons” still 
remains as the problem of what it is to be the sort of thing that we are. 
Methodologically, developing an account of our identity, which is initially 
concerned about “what we are”, is a metaphysical question from a certain 
perspective as I have discussed above. This creates a central difficulty in 
characterising the problem of personal identity. The difficulty first occurs 
when we try to determine whether we are human beings (rational animals), 
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or whether there is something more to our existence, our being as a 
“person”, which also highlights our rationality. In order to avoid this 
difficulty, the discussion in this thesis is carried out under the assumption 
that all human beings are persons, at least at some point in their life.32 If the 
term “person” is taken only as a synonym for the term “human being” in a 
biological sense (human beings as human animals33), then the persistence 
conditions of persons are related to only the continuity of human animals, 
whose identity conditions are determined by the same type of criteria as 
those of other animals. Undoubtedly, denying that we are human animals 
would amount to an absurdity, so is not a plausible option to pursue. 
However, the term “human being” is not the only sense of “person” to take 
into account. The term “person” can be understood in an inquiry that 
ascribes more to the term “person” along with the biological explanation: 
being a person is determined not only by membership in a species – in the 
Olsonian sense, where he claims we are nothing but human animals – but 
also by having a certain capacity for rational thought and consciousness. By 
the relevant interrogative, “What makes person x at time t1 the same person 
as person y at time t2?” we refer the term “person” in a metaphysical sense 
(along with the questions “What are we? And “How is personal identity 
persist?). It cannot be assumed that the answer to the question necessarily 
follows the continuity conditions of animals, because personhood does not 
only have to do with being a human animal, but with possession of 
particular rational faculties. Some conditions, such as whether these rational 
faculties and consciousness are persistent in persons, or whether the mental 
states alone or being an organism in its simplistic meaning is the sufficient 
condition for the persistence of personal identity are highly problematic for 
many cases in the debate, yet do not pose any general problem for our 
understanding of the notion of persons. 
There are some initial questions which they form a basis for a 
general inquiry into the notion of personal identity: Who am I? What is it to 
                                                        
32 There are cases that not all human beings are accounted as persons, but I will give more 
insight about the topic in the last chapter.		
33 Olson (1997) in particular. 
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be a person? What makes me now the same person who presumably existed 
in the past? In order to avoid contributing an almost circular explanation for 
our initial formulation – “An earlier individual is continuous with herself as 
a later individual if and only if they are linked by the same x” – we should 
presume that the metaphysical question of what we are is closely associated 
with the continuity of our identity, and further to that, being linked by “the 
same x” throughout time. If it were possible to determine what we are 
without reference to the continuity, then it would be reasonable to define the 
continuity condition on the basis of what we are from a biological 
perspective exclusively. If the only way to answer the philosophical 
question of what we are is to refer to our continuity conditions, then in 
return, the continuity conditions can also define our assumptions about what 
we are. 
 
1.1 Contemporary Approaches: Conflicts in The Mainstream View 
We can discern a conflict grows out of the distinction between two main 
identity accounts: reductionist (complex) and non-reductionist (simple) 
views. The contemporary philosopher Parfit, who has made vital 
contributions to the debate, presented his fullest account of identity in his 
book Reasons and Persons and introduces these categories, around which 
certain questions and concepts of personal identity revolve. Parfit 
summarises the debate by claiming that all identity theories can be 
categorised as either reductionist or non-reductionist.34 Reductionist 
approaches reduce personal identity to the collection of mental states or the 
persistence of a biological body. According to reductionism, an earlier 
individual is continuous with a later individual iff the same psychological 
states or the same physical parts link them together under the same 
individual. From the reductionist perspective, there are inevitable difficulties 
in claiming that a person’s identity over time consists only in the holding of 
certain qualities, either mental states or physical parts of the body.35 In other 
words, whether or not biological or psychological continuity is maintained 
                                                        
34 Parfit (1984) pp. 209–12.   
35 Parfit (1984) p. 209. 
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to a sufficient degree, within the reductionist framework these qualities are 
described without presupposing the persistent identity criterion of 
personhood, which underlies the mental states and physical properties of a 
human. Yet, such an approach comes with certain difficulties. Since, the 
continuity of identity is limited to the persistence or sameness of certain 
qualities, such as memory, consciousness, character, and intention. 
Therefore, there is a sense in which the continuity of these qualities is prior 
to the continuity of a person’s identity.  
Whereas the non-reductionist view represents a claim where it is true 
that personal identity refers to the continuity of those properties mentioned 
above, it also contends that the essential criterion of identity, which is also 
described along with the psychological properties of a person, is non-
reducible. Therefore, the initial properties of a person are not reducible to 
any further examination. For non-reductionism, Parfit claims, “personal 
identity does not only consist in these continuities, but it is a ‘further fact’”, 
which does not just consist in the physical and psychological continuity of a 
person.36 Thus, non-reductionism manifests two types of criteria for 
persistence: the idea of a separately existing entity and a “further fact”37, 
which, Parfit argues, both seem unknown to us.   
However, adherents of the non-reductionist approach, such as, Butler 
and Reid, and more recently Swinburne, Chisholm and Madell, argue that in 
Parfit’s examination of the persistence of a person, he was not very clear 
whether this “further fact” requires deeper analysis or not. Since, the 
essential criterion of identity might indicate a metaphysical question 
regarding the persistence of an independent entity – which could also be a 
sort of immaterial substance – and the notion of an independent entity might 
refer to the idea of a subject, which can provide suitable foundations for the 
essential conditions of a person. The identity of a subject might be 
independent of any attribution to the mental and physical events, yet forms a 
basis for these conditions. However, when we consider Chisholm, 
Swinburne and Madell’s formulation of the persistence criterion, we will see 
                                                        
36 Parfit (1982) p. 227; (1984) pp. 209–10.   
37 The further fact and separately existing entity subjects will be extensively discussed in 
4.3. 
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that their adoption of the persistence of identity solely rely on a “soul-
identity” criterion. The claim recognises our being as essentially souls, 
which is classified as the acceptance of sort of a supernatural substance that 
constitutes persons and determines their persistence conditions.38 
 
1.2 Reductionism vs. Non-Reductionism 
When we look at the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism 
more closely, we see that the most prevalent form of reductionism is the 
view that our identity traits are largely based on empirical theories, in which 
the identity of a person represents a composite notion.39 This composite is 
made up of certain properties and qualities, which are the basic constituents 
of a person, such as the states of consciousness, memories, character traits, 
intentions, and the physical parts of a person’s body, held together by causal 
relations. Within the general framework of the reductionist view, the 
continuity of these constituents is divided into two major accounts: the 
psychological continuity view and the biological continuity view. 
Psychological continuity indicates that there are causal connections between 
earlier and later stages of a person, such as remembering past actions, 
forming intentions and holding beliefs over time.40 These states represent a 
causal relation between a person’s psychological states at t1 and t2. 
Therefore, the question of personal identity entails a search for whether 
these states of the same person at different times are directly connected. If 
they are, this sameness raises the question of whether personal identity is 
definable over time as something reducible to an appropriate relation of 
causal dependence between these states.  
Before pointing out what physical continuity (also known as the 
biological approach) amounts to, I would like to draw attention to Parfit’s 
category of relations. Parfit combines relations in one unity. He calls it 
“Relation-R”, where psychological connectedness (i.e., having direct 
psychological connections as a matter of degree) and psychological 
continuity (i.e., having an extended strong psychological connectedness) is 
                                                        
38 Chisholm (1976), Swinburne (1984, 2012).  
39 Parfit (1984) pp. 210–11. 
40 Parfit (1984) pp. 206–208; G. Gasser and M. Stefan (2012) p. 7.  
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syndicated into one type of relation. Thus, the two relations are together 
known as Relation-R.41 Psychological connectedness is in this sense 
associated with various connections of psychological states, which are 
included in memories, intentions, beliefs, and so on, and psychological 
continuity consists in extended strong psychological connections through 
time. The degree of connectedness between the person at t1 and t2 depends 
on the number and significance of the direct psychological connections 
between the person’s identity at different times.  
For illustrative purposes, I can easily say that the degree of closeness 
I have with my yesterday-self is greater than my closeness to my years ago-
self. This difference is explained by the number and strength of the 
psychological connections between myself now and myself at those two 
different times. This account does not rule out the possibility that I am the 
same person now as I was ten years ago. For Parfit, the reason for the 
possibility of this continuity is that there are intermediate selves between 
myself at different times, which are psychologically connected with each 
other in the right way (i.e., only if we suppose that I still hold my short time 
memory). There is a continuous chain of intermediate selves from t1 to t2 
that are all connected together to form one person as the unity of these 
causal relations.  
Following Parfit’s reasoning I can only allege that I am the same 
person from t1 and t2 if the degree of continuity is strong, and only one 
existing person has this strong connection. If the degree is weak, or if more 
than one person can legitimately claim such a connection, then obviously I 
am not that person. There is another important characteristic as a result of 
Relation-R that we should note here, which is that psychological 
connectedness, in particular, is non-transitive, which means if there is a 
psychological connectedness between x and y, and y and z, then it does not 
necessarily follow that x and z are psychologically connected with one other. 
Parfit admits that Relation-R does not directly indicate personal identity,42 
                                                        
41 Parfit (1984) pp. 206–207.  
42 Parfit also claims that if a person is walked into a teleporter and duplicated and then the 
duplicate destroyed right after the duplication takes place, then the duplicate, even for a 
split second, would have the same psychological connectedness and continuity as the 
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yet he is quite certain of the claim that it does not matter whether Relation-R 
attains the continuity as a result of physical continuity. Parfit believes that 
Physical continuity is the least important element in a 
person’s continued existence. What we value, in ourselves 
and others, is not the continued existence of the same 
particular brains and bodies. I believe that what 
fundamentally matters is Relation R, even if it does not have 
its normal cause.43 
 
For him, what matters is the continuance of a psychological life through the 
continuation of Relation-R, irrespective of the cause of this continuation.  
The physical continuity view, on the other hand, maintains that 
personal identity is constituted in the continued existence of one’s physical 
body, being the same individual regardless of one’s continuous 
psychological traits through time.44 The term “same” here can indicate 
either being the same individual over time, or two things that are 
qualitatively identical respect to their physical qualities (accidental qualities 
of a person, such as colour, height, size, or intentions, values, etc.). Yet, 
these qualities can be both psychological and biological. The relation of 
sameness, in terms of numerical identity – which can only be held between 
a thing and itself – might indicate a unique empirical criterion. However, it 
is needless to consider a person’s being as the same at different times in 
virtue of one’s qualitative features. Undeniably, some qualities of a person 
may change drastically over time. However, there must be some certain 
conditions that are required for the particular sameness relation in order to 
hold the person physically identical to herself. Therefore, the claim “the 
composite notion of a person holds the continuity of identity over time, as 
the continuity of certain properties and qualities classified differently in 
biological and psychological accounts” is not obscure altogether to put 
forward. 
According to reductionism, personal identity through time only 
consists in certain facts about properties and qualities. So the identity of a 
                                                                                                                                             
original person, then Relation-R holds between the original person and the duplicate, even 
though continuity of the physical traits do not hold any causal relation, and therefore there 
would not be any continuant identity.	43	Parfit (1984) p. 217.	
44 Parfit (1984) pp. 203–4. 
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person is reducible to these qualities, which are necessary and sufficient for 
persistence conditions. Parfit describes these properties as they represent 
direct psychological connections and direct causal relations between 
experience and memory.45 There is nothing more in the identity of a person 
further than causal interrelations between physical and mental events. As 
Parfit states: 
I believe, that certain views must be held together. We cannot 
defensibly believe that our identity involves a further fact, 
unless we also believe that we are separately existing entities 
[which involves the possibility of an immaterial substance 
that could lead us to the idea of an underlying subject], 
distinct from our brains and bodies. And we cannot 
defensibly believe that our identity must be determinate, 
unless we believe that the existence of these separate entities 
must be all-or-nothing.46  
 
By now, the general trend in reductionism should be apparent. The ultimate 
criterion of continuity is reducible to either psychological or biological 
traits. Either of these traits is necessary and sufficient to accommodate a 
person’s persistence through time. However, a suspicion arises as to 
whether any empirical evidence can be given to support the claim that one 
now is the same person who was in the past. Could this evidence be given 
from a first-person perspective and with reference to states of 
consciousness, or perhaps the persistence of physical parts and the physical 
connectedness of the body through time? More specifically, the question is 
whether empirical evidence related to personal identity is necessary and 
sufficient for applying the continuity criteria to the notion of personal 
identity.  
This analysis leads us to tackle more specific questions, such as what 
are the necessary and sufficient elements of being a person? Is numerical 
identity a necessary component of our continuity? Regardless of any sort of 
change in psychological and biological continuity, could we still hold onto 
the claim that x, who exists at t1, is continuously identical to herself as x at 
t2? Is there a single property – mental state or capacity – that explains the 
                                                        
45 Parfit (1982) pp. 227–41. 
46 Parfit (1982) p. 231.  
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persistence of a person through time? Or is it a set of properties that might 
contingently belong to the same individual?  
The reductionist view attempts to determine our persistence 
conditions as empirically evidential and reducible to empirical evidence. 
Now, a reductionist should be able to successfully account for the question 
of evidence, in which the empirical conditions of being the same individual 
through time directly refers to the question of whether the person is in the 
present the same as the one who was in the past. It is within the reductionist 
reasoning that the identity of a person is reducible either to the first-person 
perspective (or memory) alone, or one’s physical continuity through time. 
These conditions should be accountable as evidence when we determine the 
persistence conditions for identity. If we raise the persistence question in 
terms of the memory criterion, then the formulation will be as follows: x at 
t1 is identical to y at t2 if and only if y at t2 remembers experiencing events at 
t1.  
As it will appear clearly in the following sections of the current 
chapter, certain mental states of a person, such as the states of consciousness 
and memory, bear evidential truth about one’s identity. Consciousness and 
memory are empirical conditions of a person’s identity and might describe 
how one remembers, or seems to remember, completing a particular action 
in the past, or seem to remember, or whether this person really performed 
the action. According to the defenders of biological continuity, one’s 
physical continuity – whether x at t1 is physically or spatio-temporally 
continuous with the same person y at t2 – remains as a source of evidence 
for one’s identity through time. However, it is important to point out that 
physical evidence of one’s persistence cannot explain what it takes for one’s 
identity to persist over time.  In general, any empirical evidence of the 
continuity of one’s identity – either through the continuity of mental states 
or physical aspects – can be conclusive in describing what is it for a past 
being to be the same person as existing in the present. As such, then, an 
identity claim should (i) identify the persistence conditions of a person, (ii) 
clarify the mystery surrounding the metaphysical question of what we are, 
and makes it more comprehensible, and finally (iii) successfully accounts 
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for the continuity of a person’s identity along with the notion of being the 
same subject through time.  
At face value, the distinction between reductionism and non-
reductionism offers a basis for a further enquiry into personal identity, 
which revolves around the problem whether the initial conditions of identity 
are analysable into a combination of factors that make up psychological and 
physical continuity. Or it might be simple and unanalysable. A number of 
difficulties arise in both accounts and will be introduced in due course. At 
this point, however, the overall conflict between two accounts is simply 
intended to indicate the extent to which we sympathise with non-
reductionism. Moreover, a “further fact”, which is assumed as some sort of 
underlying subject, remains under scrutiny. The following sections of this 
chapter will show how we can take this “further fact” to be, to some extent, 
compatible with the metaphysical question of “what we are”, as it does not 
take the identity beyond empirical conditions and remains as mysterious.   
 
1.3 Historical Background of the Problem of Personal Identity   
In order to maintain a ground for personal identity, any valuable discussion 
should initially address the historical significance of the problem, showing 
how the contemporary discussion has developed from an extended series of 
philosophical debates that arose in the early modern period. The early form 
of the discussion was characterised by Descartes’ dualism, Locke’s 
psychological continuity criterion and Hume’s bundle theory. Examining 
these philosophers’ treatment of the problem will expose a less specialised, 
yet more focused approach. Not only it is valuable to discover the outcome 
of the historical discussion, but it also forces us to reconsider the initial 
problem of personal identity as posed in Descartes, Locke and Hume. This 
exercise will be a valuable exercise, as their prominence of these thinkers in 
the literature makes them ideal candidates for determining whether a view 
that calls for the continuity of an underlying subject of our experience can 
satisfactorily fit with our inquiry into what we are. 
The discussion in the next sections of the current chapter will 
examine historical and contemporary theories and clarify the merits of each 
	 30	
account in characterising the notion of an underlying subject – essentially 
non-property-based – in which the persistence conditions of our identities 
are constituted. An examination, as such, will elucidate how these 
philosophers in the early modern period had attempted to characterise 
problems of personal identity. 
 
1.3.1 Descartes on Substance Dualism and Personal Identity 
Although Descartes has no explicit discussion of personal identity, his 
discussions on dualism and res cogitans (the soul, the mind and the self as 
essentially a thinking thing) remarkably differentiate him from the 
traditional Aristotelian scholastic doctrine. Descartes’ terminology in his 
cogito47 is significantly important to the notion of personal identity for two 
reasons. Firstly, the idea of a res cogitans is the prime example of an 
underlying subject within the conception of personal identity, raising the 
central question of this thesis I am aiming to find out.  Supposing that every 
thought demands a thinker, Descartes presupposes a clear example of a 
separately existing entity that is distinct from the physical properties of a 
person. Secondly, although Descartes inherited the idea of a human as a 
union – in virtue of neither parts of this union on its own being able to 
constitute a human being – he separated mind (soul) and body as two 
independent and essentially distinguishable categories, by which the concept 
of a person is described both as the union of mind and body (the experience 
of the union of mind and body is always combined with our thought) and an 
independent complete substance. 
In the Scholastic tradition, the term “person” was regarded as a 
rational being in essence, which is a composite of body and soul in nature.48 
Under the Aristotelian influence, this composite was understood in terms of 
the hylomorphic union of form and matter, in which form and matter are 
unified in a single substance.49 Descartes adopted the Aristotelian notion of 
                                                        
47 Descartes’ famous proposition “I am thinking, therefore I exist” is regarded as the Cogito 
Argument. 
48 For Descartes there is a strict distinction between our essence, which belongs to us by 
being an incorporeal substance, and our nature, which refers to the set of laws that is 
ordained by God. 
49 See Aristotle’s Metaphysics Zeta and Physics I. 
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the unity of mind and body, yet distinguished himself by presenting the idea 
that soul and body are related not like as form is related to matter, but as two 
distinct substances are brought together into one union. Descartes believed 
that we would not face any difficulty in terms of explaining the notion of an 
immaterial substance, such as soul or mind. This explanation is possible 
only as long as we think that the principle of thinking and the principle of 
human nature (which is the principle of nourishment and growth) are 
distinguished in a sense that we use the term “mind” not as a part of soul, or 
something attached to it, but as a res cogitans, a thinking thing.50 He 
contrasts his use of the term mind with the Aristotelian scholastic tradition’s 
treatment of the term “soul”, which applies to nourishment and thinking 
principles.51 However, Descartes says: 
I by contrast, realizing that the principle by which we are 
nourished is wholly different - different in kind - from that in 
virtue of which we think, have said that the term ‘soul’, when 
it is used to refer to both these principles, is ambiguous. If we 
are to take ‘soul’ in its special sense, as meaning the ‘first 
actuality’ or ‘principal form of man’52, then the term must be 
understood to apply only to the principle in virtue of which 
we think; and to avoid ambiguity I have as far as possible 
used the term ‘mind’ for this.53  
 
Allowing the term “soul” to represent such a distinct feature – being a 
thinking thing – Descartes places great importance upon the role of a 
thinking thing, which is clearly a complete substance in itself. Less 
importantly, the body of a man is something that is attached to the self, to 
which it is closely joined.  
By examining the nature of res cogitans, Descartes investigated the 
relation between the mind and body in the second and sixth meditations. 
The fundamental difference between the mind and body is supported by the 
belief that the mind (soul) is an immaterial substance, which is not extended 
in space, whereas the body is a material substance that the self merely “has”. 
                                                        
50 Descartes (1984) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, trans. by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, pp. 246:356. 
51 Descartes (1984) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, trans. by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, pp. 246:356. 
52 Terms are derived from Aristotle De Anima, 11:2. 
53 Descartes (1984) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, trans. by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, pp. 246:356. 
	 32	
The mind–body relationship requires a detailed search for what we can 
know with certainty beyond doubt. Descartes’ eagerness to search for 
certainty is rooted in his thought that the scholastic philosophy was 
suffering from the opinions, uncertainties and multiple and diverse views: 
he thus became convinced that only doubting could lead him to certainty.54 
For Descartes, the soul is not the form of man but a complete, individual, 
and independent substance. 
Descartes’ argument results from the method of doubt, by which he 
questions everything that allows the slightest cause to doubt until there is 
something remains indubitable. His examination starts with determining one 
thing that he cannot doubt. He claims that our beliefs about the experience 
of the external world can be doubtable, as everything can be a mere 
deception. However, he continues, he cannot doubt the fact that he is 
doubting, which implies that there is something that thinks and doubts. This 
means “I existed without doubt, by the fact that I was persuaded, or indeed 
by the mere fact that I thought at all.”55 This is a sign of awareness that our 
conscious experience requires a res cogitans, thinking thing, by which we 
are also aware of ourselves as thinker. It is a persisting and underlying 
subject of thought that can be known with certainty: “But what, then, am I? 
A thing that thinks. What is a thing that thinks? That is to say, a thing that 
doubts, perceives, affirms, desires, wills, does not will, that imagines also 
and which feels.”56 This introspection illuminates clearly that Descartes 
cannot doubt his own existence. The thought of his existence leads him to 
the assumption that he necessarily exists under one specific condition, “I 
am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or 
convinced in my mind”.57  His notion of “I”, as a res cogitans, is the mind, 
intelligent, intellect or reason, which also doubts, understands, affirms, 
                                                        
54 Descartes (1968) Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe 
Introduction pp. 15–6.  
55 Descartes (1968) Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe 
Introduction pp. 15-6. p. 103.  
56 Descartes (1996) Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. by John Cottingham, pp.18–
19:27,28. 
57 Descartes (1996) Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. by John Cottingham, p.17:25. 
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denies, imagines and perceives.58  
His findings from the first step of realisation allow him to go on to a 
further search, which involves the notion of a subject as a unity. There are, 
clearly, various aspects of the unity of a human being. Surely, Descartes 
claims, res cogitans cannot only identical with the body, however, he claims 
“I am not that structure of limbs which is called a human body”.59 His real 
being, his essence, cannot be attributed to his bodily characteristics, which 
are, after all, subject to change.  This “I”, whose essence is only thinking, is 
clearly a thing that has mental states and can exist without the body. Since 
the body is not essential to the notion of res cogitans, insofar as bodies are 
extended, non-thinking things. The question of “how minds could exist 
without bodies?” was Descartes’ main motivation behind his emphasis on 
the mind’s ability to interact with the body. Accordingly, “I am not merely 
present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but I am very closely 
joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a 
unit”.60 There is a causal interaction between the mind and body, two 
distinct substances. This interaction justifies that there is no means of a 
subject without the capacity to experience. The body, posits Descartes, is 
only contingently associated with the person. A person will continue to exist 
as the same being if and only if she is connected by the same soul, mind, or 
self. No human being who can exist continuously unchanged unless her 
body is united with the same soul or immaterial substance.  
Now it is clear from the above argument that, for Descartes, the 
essence of our existence is that of a thinking thing, yet strictly speaking the 
essence is not the thought itself. As Descartes points out, “I do not observe 
that any other thing belongs necessarily to my nature of essence except that 
I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this 
alone, that I am a thinking thing, or a substance whose whole essence or 
nature consists in thinking.”61 In the Sixth Set of Replies he explicitly 
                                                        
58 Descartes (1996) Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. by John Cottingham, pp.18–
19:27,28.  
59 Descartes (1996) Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. by John Cottingham, p.19:28. 
60 Descartes (1996) Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. by John Cottingham, p. 45:81. 
61 Descartes (1968) Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe, p. 
156. 
	 34	
defines a human being:  
I have never seen or perceived that human bodies think; all I 
have seen is that there are human beings, who possess 
thought and body. This happens as a result of a thinking 
thing’s being combined with a corporeal thing: I perceived 
this from the fact that when I examined a thinking thing on its 
own, I discovered nothing in it which belongs to body, and 
similarly when I considered corporeal nature on its own I 
discovered no thought in it.62 
 
At this point, it is tempting to pose one crucial question: What exactly 
makes a person the same individual she was once and will become? Within 
the Cartesian perspective, being the same person or the same self from one 
moment to another is associated with the mind’s capacity to think 
continuously. The essence of being the same person is constituted by the 
persistence of a thinking being. In other words, the continuity of a person’s 
identity depends on the ability to think and the persistence of this ability. 
Even, Descartes adds, “it might perhaps happen, if I ceased to think, that I 
would at the same time cease to be or to exist.”63  As a result, a thinking 
thing (soul – mind – self), for Descartes, is complete and continuous as the 
same substance. Hence, regardless of the cases in which drastic changes 
may occur, human bodies also remain the same “so long as they are united 
with the same soul”.64 In that sense, the persistence condition for personal 
identity seems quite clear for Descartes. It is the underlying notion of a 
thinker, a subject that continuously exists from one moment to another. 
Referring back to the modern formulation of the persistence condition, 
Descartes’ characterisation is something like, “An earlier individual is 
continuous with the same person as a later individual if and only if they are 
linked by the same res cogitans.” There is a sense in which one could argue 
that Descartes seems to be offering a sort of reductionist view, by virtue of 
claiming that the continuity in a person’s identity is reducible to one’s 
thinking being. However, his notion of a thinking being applies to an 
                                                        
62 Descartes (2006) Meditations, Objections and Replies, trans. and ed. by R. Ariew and D. 
Cress, p. 179:444.  
63 Descartes (1968) Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe, p. 
105. 
64  Descartes (1968) Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe, p. 
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immaterial substance, adopted as a separate entity by non-reductionism.  
Nevertheless, Descartes’ postulation leads us to contemplate further 
issues, which Descartes’ dualism could not possibly clarify. First of all, his 
thesis of the incorporeality of the self (or mind), and its distinction from the 
body allows him to realise his ability to think about the essence of a person, 
as it is distinct from the primary attribute of a corporeal substance, res 
extensa. The metaphysical question of what I am is thus answered:  I am a 
substance, whose whole essence is to think. Here, the question arises as to 
whether the supposition of the continuity of a res cogitans without a body 
(res extensa) is coherent and satisfactory. First of all, Descartes thought that 
as long as he distinguished himself from the Aristotelian scholastic tradition, 
his method of doubt on its own successfully leads him to the proposition “I 
am thinking, therefore I exist”,65 which indeed shows that the essence of “I” 
consists only in thinking. However, there is still a need for further 
qualifications whether the body, after all, is essential for our thoughts to 
occur. Even Descartes himself explicitly raises some doubts in the Fourth 
Set of Objections:  
[If] the body is not unconditionally excluded from my 
essence, but only insofar as I am precisely a thinking thing, it 
seems there is good reason for fear lest someone entertain the 
suspicion that perhaps the knowledge of myself insofar as I 
am a thinking thing is not the knowledge of something 
completely and adequately conceived, but only inadequately 
and with a certain abstraction on the part of the 
understanding.66  
 
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, Descartes inherited the idea of the unity of 
mind (soul) and body, yet he regarded the human mind as something that is 
incapable of forming a union of two distinct substances, which involves 
comprehending their unity and distinctiveness.67 In his letters to Princess 
Elizabeth, Descartes admits that “Everyone feels that he is a single person 
with both body and thought so related by nature that the thought can move 
                                                        
65 Descartes (1985) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, trans. by John 
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66 Descartes (1985) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, trans. by John 
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the body and feel the things which happen to it.”68 On the one hand the 
Cartesian system and the proposition of a res cogitans represent a concern 
about the distinction. On the other hand, Descartes attempts to reconcile this 
distinction by claiming that, our nature, as human beings, is the unity of 
mind and body. 
How Descartes explains this unity by referring to the substance 
theory shows that a “substance can be complete or incomplete insofar as it is 
referred to some other substance in conjunction with which it forms 
something which is a unity in its own right. The mind and the body are 
incomplete substances when they are referred to a human being which 
together they make up."69 Normally, this statement is taken to be highly 
paradoxical. Descartes claims that by “substance” we are to understand 
something that needs no other thing for its existence. Although this 
independence commitment has to undergo some qualification (i.e. that all 
substances are dependent on God), it seems that a substance cannot be both 
independent and incomplete. What Descartes realises is that instead of 
regarding human beings, as they are incomplete substances, he embraces 
what is unique about a man, which is the union of extended matter with a 
mind. Descartes acknowledges that demonstrating the interrelation of mind 
and body after the manner of with the relation of form and matter is 
impossible. Instead, each must be independently conceived as substances in 
their own right. 
Nevertheless, for Descartes, the distinction is quite clear. By their 
nature human beings are the unity of mind and body, whereas “I”, the 
subject of the question of “what I am”, refers to a thinking thing, which is 
the bearer of mental qualities and properties, such as thinking, memory, 
consciousness, and first-person perspective. In that sense, we are inclined to 
consider that Descartes was able to exclude some certain problems about 
personal identity (such as the persistence conditions of self and being the 
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same person over time) from his discussion of the persistence conditions of 
an underlying subject. Otherwise, Descartes’ intention to insist on 
articulating the cogito argument in the Meditations on First Philosophy, 
even though he offers more controversial arguments elsewhere,70 would be 
quite paradoxical. Locke and Hume introduce strong criticisms of 
Descartes’ theories in their empirical philosophy. It has been addressed that 
the conclusions of dualist theories, as with that of the cogito argument, 
move beyond the realm of empirical evidence.  
 
1.3.2 Locke on Psychological Continuity  
It was with Locke that the explicit debate concerning personal identity was 
taken as an independent and significant deliberation in its own right. His 
empiricist position diverged from the notion of immaterial substance. 
Rather, he focused on the significance of memory and consciousness in 
describing the problem of personal identity. Throughout his work, for Locke 
substance is something entirely immaterial and unknown to us. While his 
theory can avoid the problems created by the concept of immaterial 
substance, it generates other kinds of issues regarding the continuous notion 
of identity. Nevertheless, his account of the memory criterion of identity 
highly influenced his successors Reid and Butler. Locke’s idea of 
consciousness and memory have a crucial role to play in the discussion of 
personal identity. His ideas have become some of the most influential 
contributions to the debate. In his book An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding,71 Locke developed a fundamentally differentiated theory 
from the Cartesian solution of the mind–body problem, regarding personal 
identity as something exclusively empirical. 
Locke begins his examination with the claim that the appropriate 
criterion of identity – that is, a search for what constitutes identity over time 
– depends on the type of being we are addressing. If we are considering the 
matter of a single indivisible unit, a non-living thing, then the identity of this 
particle, at any rate, simply refers to its matter. So long as this single 
                                                        
70 In his letters to Princes Elizabeth. 
71 Especially Book II Chapter 27. 
	 38	
indivisible unit is continuous in existence, it will remain self-identical 
through time.72 In other words, A at t1 and A at t2 represent the same unit of 
matter iff there is a continuous history connecting A at t1 and t2. A lump of 
clay, for instance, has the same body of matter over time if and only if it is 
the same collection of particles, the same unity, even if the lump is arranged 
differently compared to its initial condition. If we suppose that this 
particular lump is divided and that different parts of the lump had a distinct 
history for a limited time, then when the lump is reconstituted, it would not 
be the same lump of clay as it was in the beginning. Since the divided parts 
would not share the same history, as they might be combined with different 
particles. Locke applies this “continuity of history” criterion to the 
persistence of the identity of material things, as there is a strict identification 
in spatio–temporal continuity between various stages of the same thing over 
time.73  
Locke’s explanatory point in the case of living things carries 
exclusively empirical implications but nothing else. What constitutes the 
persisting identity of an entity is the organisation of its parts in one coherent 
body, in which these parts partake of a common history.74 Locke believes 
that any change in the matter of a living thing, even if the change is a major 
shift, does not change its identity. That is to say “in the state of living 
creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on 
something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not 
the identity”.75 The reason for this dependence, Locke acknowledges 
further, is that “in these two cases of mass of matter, and a living body, 
identity is not applied to the same thing”.76 For a living body, the identity is 
connected through the continuity of the same history.77 To illustrate this 
reasoning, we can illustrate the case of a tree. Although the mass of a tree 
changes from year to year, it continues to hold the same common life and 
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preserve its identity. One point that is fairly obvious here is that the logic of 
statements follows: (i) all living things – including human beings – 
necessarily and without exception change their properties over time in 
systematic ways, and (ii) their identity is continuous and they preserve this 
continuity over time, or at least their identity through times stands in an 
explanatory relationship from one moment to another. 
A further distinction Locke underlines a further distinction between 
the terms “man” (i.e., a human being or human animal) and “person”, along 
with the distinctions between being the same man and the same person over 
time. According to Locke, “it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being 
alone that makes the idea of a man in most people’s sense; but of a body, so 
and so shaped, joint to it; and not shifted at all at once, must, as well as the 
same immaterial sprit, go to the making of the same person”.78 Along the 
same line, he adds, at this stage – in terms of being a living body or animate 
object – that man remains identical with a biological body. The reason why 
Locke distinguishes the term “man” from “person” is quite clear. He 
attempts to account for the immaterial aspects of humans – if there are any. 
Here, Locke agrees with the Cartesian notion of man that is partly a 
biological body. He also agrees with the Cartesians on the notion of a 
person that is a thinking intelligent being. Yet, Locke clearly distinguishes 
his view from the Cartesian account by virtue of not equating persons with 
immaterial substances, since Descartes uses the terms “person”, “soul”, 
“mind” and “thinking thing” interchangeably. Locke holds onto the claim 
that persons have an identity of the same kind as other living things in virtue 
of their continuous life history.79 He opposes dualists and claims that even 
though the term “person” is something that belongs to the notion of 
immaterial substance and persons that are characterised under this 
conception, its nature depends only on itself. As such, persons exist through 
time as one and the same as long as they carry the same consciousness. 
Thus, “person” is a term that he uses interchangeably with the term “self”, 
                                                        
78 Locke (1690/1964), II, 27:8. 
79 Locke (1690/1964), II, 27:6. 
	 40	
which is “a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection.”80 
Persons can consider themselves as the same thinking beings at different 
times, which is possible only through consciousness.81 It seems that the term 
person (self) is associated with the continuity of mental states, mostly with 
memory, and this continuity is supposed to be causal.  
This relationship clearly shows that Locke's theory refers to persons 
as non-substantial psychological entities. Since, from his empiricist 
perspective, the question of whether consciousness is composed of a single 
thinking substance seems unproblematic. It is irrelevant to the question of 
personal identity and it does not pose any general problem for the 
persistence conditions of persons. So long as the consciousness is 
continuous as one and the same, the same consciousness can unite persons 
into the same person. Therefore, consciousness, but strictly speaking not the 
other sort of substances that are supposed to underlie consciousness, (such 
as the physical body or an immaterial thinking substance) can truly present 
what we are. The criterion of persistence ultimately depends on how we are 
to understand persons within empirical terms. According to Locke’s 
proposition “an earlier individual is continuous with the same person as a 
later individual iff they are linked by the same consciousness”. Locke’s 
emphasis on consciousness as the criterion of identity makes him truly 
reductionist: Locke would claim that the continuity of a person’s identity is 
reducible to the continuity of consciousness.   
There are several aspects of this theory to note here. Firstly, the way 
Locke attempts to solve the problem of personal identity seems exclusively 
related to the empirical attributions of a person (such as consciousness and 
memory, since experience is the only way to be aware of ourselves as 
conscious beings), due to our restricted knowledge about the identity of 
substances. This reductionism explicitly amounts to the claim that Locke 
takes identity (such as the identity of living organisms and human beings) as 
a problem by virtue of holding the same question of what makes one’s 
earlier self continuous with one’s later self, but the technique he uses to 
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define the notion of personal identity is rigorously empiricist. Secondly, 
Locke not only denies that persons are substances, he is also unwilling to 
accept that persons are identical with an immaterial substance or underlying 
subject, such as the Cartesian self, res cogitans, or soul. The term “person” 
in the Lockean sense and the Cartesian account of res cogitans could both 
indicate the same entity, as they constitute “a thinking intelligent being”.82  
By excluding the Cartesian notion of immaterial substance, Locke aims to 
assert that the nature of substances cannot be known well enough to equate 
persons with immaterial substances. While this particular point seems to be 
widely accepted in philosophical inquiry, yet it still requires a great deal of 
justification as to why it is the case. 
In this regard, the question arises quite naturally: If the notion of 
immaterial substance cannot differentiate the concept of “person” from that 
of “man” or “human being”, what defines the notion of personhood? As 
mentioned above, the Lockean idea of a person refers to the self that 
presents an immediate awareness of its own knowledge, and is also 
distinguished from other selves. This explanation also shows how Locke 
accounts for individuation. Accordingly, “it is always as to our present 
situations and perceptions: and by this everyone is to himself that which he 
calls self; since consciousness makes everyone to be what he calls self, and 
thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things.”83  
Initially, it seems as if Locke uses the term “self” as a criterion of 
individuation or self-identity. His understanding on the term “self” arises for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the term “person” may apply to another man 
(another body), as it appears in Locke’s thought-experiment of body 
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exchange between the prince and the cobbler.84Persons are self-knowers, 
possessing the knowledge of their selves: Locke contends, “ [person] as I 
take it, is the name for this self, whenever a man finds what he calls himself, 
I think, another may say is the same person.”85 On the other hand, what 
Locke means in the background of this quotation (Essay, Chapter 27, 
passage 9) is that one’s self from another’s because of the unique way in 
which one has direct access to one’s own part and memory. Locke states, 
“had I the same consciousness I saw that Ark and Noah’s flood, as that I 
saw an overflowing of the Themes last winter I could no more doubt that ‘I’ 
that saw the Themes overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the 
general deluge, was the same self.”86 The above discussion suggests that  
Locke thinks that he is able to avoid the unempirical and unknown concept 
of immaterial substance by explaining the distinction between man and 
person.  
Locke proceeds to the endpoint of his characterisation, where the 
persistence condition of a person appears to be explained in the light of 
psychological continuity. Since the notion of consciousness is inseparable 
from thinking and, in a way, consciousness is central to thinking. It is 
underspecified with respect to each of its features. As he points out, it is 
through consciousness that one comes to know the self. The indication of 
this notion of the self in Locke’s account is possible only through thinking 
and experiencing. In that sense, the idea of self has an empirically 
observable attribution, as we can know the self empirically within the unity 
of certain perceptions at the conscious level, such as seeing, smelling, 
tasting and feeling. As Locke states, “It is always as to our present 
sensations and perceptions, and by this everyone is to himself that which he 
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calls self.”87  
Referring back to the difference between person and man, as Locke 
assumes, we can say that although a man can have one body and although 
the same human body can never make two men, persons are conjoined by 
consciousness (or memory), and if the consciousness is somehow divided – 
as appears in the thought experiment of the prince and the cobbler – there is 
no absurdity involved in thinking of two different selves within one and the 
same man. Although Locke attempts to explain the continuity conditions of 
personal identity by bringing consciousness (as a mental state) into question, 
there is an apparent contradiction in his discussion of what is meant by 
“Socrates” and “the same individual man.”88 First of all, Locke claims that 
if one loses some parts of his past history, then one would not be the same 
person, yet one is the same man.89 In the same vein, “If Socrates’ [as a man] 
awakening does not partake of the same consciousness as Socrates sleeping, 
they are not the same person.”90 This claims presents a rejection of the idea 
that a man’s conscious self can be continuous with the same man’s later 
conscious self regardless of the gap that may occur between these two 
mental states of the same person. Here, Locke rejects the role of both 
physical continuity and the continuity of an immaterial substance as the 
components of one’s identity.91 The result, Locke concludes, is that being 
the same man is constituted only by having the same consciousness, and 
what makes one the same person as she was in the past is to have continuity 
of consciousness mediated by memory. 
In that sense, on the one hand, Locke seems to be taking a position, 
by which he claims that the phrase “the same man” is the unity of the same 
body and the same thinking thing. As he states elsewhere in the Essay 
“Everyone finds himself, that his soul can think, will, and operate on his 
body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a body, or in a place, 
an hundred miles distant from it. No body can imagine, that his soul can 
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think, or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London.”92 On the other 
hand, for the account of the “same man”, Locke claims, “it is impossible for 
personal identity to consist in anything but consciousness, or reach any 
further than that does.”93 Here, the distinction Locke attempts to draw 
between the concepts of “man” and “person” is not very clear. Apparently, 
one of the reasons for this ambiguity is that what is for a man to bear the 
same identity at different times is for that man to have the same 
manifestation of the same unity – regardless of slight changes in their 
properties. It will be the same man as long as it partakes of the same unity 
(the unity of particular body and particular consciousness). In making this 
assertation, Locke clearly denies what he says earlier in his thought-
experiment about the prince and the cobbler. Another reason for the 
ambiguity is that Locke asks the reader to believe that it could be possible 
for a man to exist without a person existing. I will discuss this possibility 
extensively during my consideration of person-without-animal and animal-
without-person Chapter 4. For now, it seems Locke would admit the 
difficulty in separating persons from substances, as he claims that a person 
might survive after a change of immaterial substance, and “that cannot be 
resolved but by those who know what kind of substances they are that think; 
and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one 
thinking substance to another.”94  
Locke still claims that the term “person” (or self) has a constant 
interaction with substance, but this link is only contingent, not necessary. In 
that sense, from Locke’s point of view, any attempt to explain the identity of 
a person through time could depend upon the idea of an underlying subject, 
which is the ultimate subject of all predicates, and yet such a definition 
would face the reduction of the notion of persistence to the unity of 
consciousness. As Locke argues,  
It is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—
should it be to ages past—unites existences and actions very 
remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the 
existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: 
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so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past 
actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.95  
 
Therefore, it follows from the fact discussed above that x at t1 is the same 
person as y at t2 iff x at t2 remembers the past actions of y at t1. Despite its 
underspecified nature in its prototypical sense, the idea Locke proposes 
highly influential among the proponents of the neo-Lockean reductionist 
approach. That being said, the question remains as to what type of condition 
holds in a case where a person could embrace the required amount of 
Relation-R for a persistence of identity, yet could not meet the requirements 
of physical continuity? I think it is safe to consider these one-sided 
requirements to be empirical conditions, rather than ontological ones, but 
the question remains as to whether they are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for one’s identity to persist over time. 
The forensic notion of identity appears to be as problematic as the 
concerns I have noted above. When Locke announces that “person” is a 
forensic term,96 he uses a legal term to explain pragmatic and moral 
considerations of reward and punishment. For Locke, punishment should 
apply to the person but not the man, as the person has consciousness and 
commits the action. Thus, it should be the person who is responsible for past 
actions. However, for practical reasons, Locke’s idea of holding persons 
(exclusively) responsible for their past actions does not seem convincing 
due to his distinction between man and person. The question of whether the 
same “person” is identical with the “same man” will remain unanswered, as 
consciousness can only presuppose identity, rather than identify it.  
If personal identity is the successful succession of conscious states, 
then the self must have a concern about its own actions in the past, and that 
will naturally create a kind of awareness concerning responsibility for past 
actions. In that sense, responsibility is linked to the self, regarding the 
recollections of past events or actions that one’s memory represents as it 
owns. The question then arises, however, of how can the self or its own 
consciousness can distinguish true beliefs from false ones, which might be 
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represented in memory? Apparently, memory can apply to false beliefs and 
may not convey ta true representation of past events. However, Locke 
claims, whether the belief about past events is true or false, the main aspects 
of memory also remain the same. As a result, our concern with past events 
will remain the same. In that sense, our attitudes towards past actions are 
shaped without regarding factual events, as memory directs the present self 
to respond. At this stage, however, there might yet be no sign of 
responsibility, because there will be a lack of relation between past events 
and memory of the present self, and even a lack of a persisting subject that 
endures through every possible change in memory.    
In the way Locke addresses the problem above, responsibility for 
past actions is described using subjective terms from a first-person 
perspective97 as far as consciousness reaches. By that means, persons 
become accountable for their thoughts and actions only to the extent that 
they can remember. However, a first-person perspective or testimony clearly 
does not seem credible if we consider the possibility that personal testimony 
can be based on false beliefs. The primary objection here is that the self can 
be deceived about the accurateness of its own memory, and can thus create 
false beliefs about past events.  
Inevitably, addressing personal identity and its continuity requires a 
further criterion. Locke’s account depends primarily on the continuity of 
psychological states, in particular consciousness that is certainly subject to 
change over time – as one may face memory loss or have false beliefs about 
past events. As discussed above, the continuity of consciousness (and 
reducing personal identity to the continuity of mental states) may not 
provide an accurate understanding of persistence over time. It would seem 
then, that in order to consider the history of a person, we must shift the 
empirical criteria of unification. This shift is required because addressing 
the criterion of personal identity by relying upon changing and possibly 
inaccurate properties will bring more difficulties. One could miss the crucial 
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point according to which these properties apparently may not be analysable 
even by a first-person perspective.  
As a result, some significant conflicts in Locke’s account of securing 
a definite theory of personal identity were enough to convince Hume to 
deny the notion of self and personal identity completely. Personal identity, 
for Hume, “had become so great a question in philosophy, especially of late 
years in England, where all the abstruse sciences are studied with a peculiar 
ardor and application.”98 Before stating the main criticisms of Reid and 
Butler, I will briefly present Hume’s discussion of personal identity.  
 
1.3.3 Hume’s Bundle Theory  
Hume’s treatment of the problem of personal identity is remarkable for two 
reasons. Firstly, Hume was sceptical about the possibility of a definite 
criterion of identity. For Hume the idea of a persistent identity can only be a 
creation of imagination, something like a perception of a continuant self, 
which is nothing but the unity of our sense perceptions. His concern was 
about our imagination and the reason why we think that our self 
continuously exists from one moment to another. Secondly, he explicitly 
admits his confusion over the issue. Hume made a very crucial contribution 
to the personal identity debate, as his rejection of an immaterial, non-
property-based idea of self fits into none of the personal identity accounts 
neither reductionist nor non-reductionist. 
In the opening paragraph of section IV, book I in A Treatise of 
Human Nature, Hume addresses the traditional accounts of personal 
identity. He starts his treatment of the topic by criticising his 
contemporaries, who claimed that we are, one way or another, aware of our 
self. As noted earlier, Descartes held the belief that the nature of the self is 
accessible through self-observation, and Locke claimed that the self holds 
the relation of continuity of consciousness and that a person has a 
continuous, conscious and reflective self, which is constituted by thinking 
and experiencing. Hume gives an explicit explanation of what is involved in 
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providing evidence for the existence of self. As others traditionally believed, 
Hume accuses, “it must be one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. 
But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several 
impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. It cannot, therefore, 
be from any of these impressions, or from any other that the idea of self is 
divided; and consequently, there is no such idea.”99  
Hume insists on the idea that the self is neither a Cartesian 
immaterial substance nor the continuity of certain mental states as asserted 
by the Lockean account. Instead, the idea of a self is a kind of illusion, 
which we supposedly have through the continuous sense of perception. In 
the case of a total removal of these perceptions (such as pain, pleasure, grief 
and joy, or passion and sensation100) there will be nothing left, but 
annihilation or non-entity.101 The resemblance of the objects, Hume 
contends, creates an apparent illusion about the idea of immaterial 
substance. In fact, he posits, there is no empirical justification to support the 
concept of immaterial substance – the idea of an underlying subject as the 
subject of predicates.  
Unsurprisingly, Hume, as an empiricist, suggests that the idea of self 
remains beyond any empirical evidence. For him, merely apprehending the 
empirical evidence suggests there is an equally a good reason to believe that 
we are talking about the self. Hume states that there is a kind of compromise 
condition here. The idea of “self” is understandable only through regarding 
our sense perceptions.  
To explain briefly, perceptions are for him always present to the 
mind, and each perception differs from others. There is a causal connection 
between perceptions, rather than a logical one, in which one perception 
necessarily entails the other. It is imagination that perfectly separates 
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perceptions and conceives each perception as it separately exists.102 
Depending on their force and vividness, perceptions are either impressions 
or ideas, as impressions are the most forceable and violent impressions, 
while ideas represent only the fainter perceptions. Impressions are related to 
feeling or sensing, whereas ideas are linked to thinking. Hume divides 
impressions into those of sensation that is derived from our senses, and 
those of reflection originating from our experience of our mind, such as 
emotions. In contrast, ideas are less forcible and faint copies of 
impressions.103 Impressions and ideas can be simple and complex in turn. 
Complex perceptions consist of other perceptions as their parts, and simple 
perceptions are derived from a relevant simple impression.104  
In his denial of the idea of a continuous self, Hume claims that the 
self has no continuous perception of a simple and identical impression. In 
the Appendix to A Treatise he ultimately suggests that:  
When we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea 
annexed to these terms, otherwise they are altogether 
unintelligible. Every idea is derived from preceding 
impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, 
as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no 
idea of them in that sense.105  
 
There is, also, no idea of a self that is corresponding to substance. Since, all 
ideas are derived from our impressions, the concept of a simple and 
identical self can be derived only from continuous simple and identical 
impressions. In fact, Hume argues, there is no contradiction in claiming that 
it is impossible to locate such an impression.  
By appealing to the idea of a self that does not have a continuous 
existence, Hume means that the self ceases to exist during the periods of 
deep sleep, unconsciousness, and death. It is not surprising to the reader that 
Hume’s initial rejection of the self is supported by the above assumption, 
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which allows the self to exist only intermittently – as far as our perception 
of the self reaches. The idea of a person that ceases to exist seems quite 
controversial here, however, compared to the notions of Descartes and 
Locke’s accounts. Hume’s motivation for his discussion on this topic was 
quite different from other reductionist accounts. Hume considers the idea 
that removing our perceptions from the mind causes its annihilation, yet the 
mind can function only as long as particular impressions and ideas are 
present in it. Therefore, he concludes, there can be no idea of identity or 
self-existing over and above perceptions.106 These perceptions seem to be 
more like mental occurrences. Hume’s theory thus becomes strikingly 
radical compared to Descartes and Locke. Especially in Abstract 28 in 
Treatise, where he criticizes Descartes for accounting thoughts as the 
essence of mind. Hume states, “it must be our several particular perceptions, 
that compose the mind, I say, compose the mind, not belonging to it.”107,108 
For Hume, 
Setting aside some metaphysics of this kind [any idea of 
immaterial substance] I may venture to affirm of the rest of 
mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and 
movement.109  
 
Much of his criticism stems from what he considers to be confusion about 
the logic of misleading considerations. The passage above suggests that the 
collection of different perceptions that constitute what is called self can only 
temporarily present as a bundle of relevant impressions. According to 
Hume’s bundle theory, the self is simply a bundle of separate perceptions, 
which are unified by imagination. It is the imagination’s faculty to represent 
the bundle of sense perceptions. As Hume suggests, “identity is nothing 
really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; 
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but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of 
their ideas in the imagination.”110  
Hume’s acceptance of the Bundle Theory shows that the idea of self 
is understandable by regarding its notion along with the principles of 
contiguity, causation, and resemblance, which are the uniting principles of 
our perception of self:111  
Our notions of personal identity, proceed entirely from the 
smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a 
train of connected ideas, according to the principles above-
explained. With the principle of resemblance, memory 
discovers an identity among past perceptions, and 
contributes to its production (which is the continuous idea 
of identity).112  
 
However, within the relation of causation, memory unites perceptions and 
offers the idea of a temporarily extended being. According to the relation of 
causation, certain impressions create certain ideas. These ideas then produce 
other impressions, and this chain causes perceptions to influence each other. 
Hume claims that a philosophically respectable idea of the human mind 
should be able to hold different perceptions and existences as they bear 
relations of causation.113 These causally linked perceptions “mutually 
produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other.”114 In the same manner, 
Hume claims, a person can have divergent character traits over time, and her 
impressions and ideas change accordingly, without the loss of her 
identity.115 In this respect, memory is a phenomenon that contributes to the 
idea of persistent identity. In the absence of memory, there will be no 
relation of causation or the chain of cause and effect. Since, the mind 
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inhabits perceptions, which are all connected by causal relations.116 The 
relation of contiguity is necessary for one to conceive the idea of a single 
self, in which the same subject holds the knowledge of successive 
perceptions. However, Hume disregards the role of contiguity relations, as 
perceptions can exist only in space and time117, and as there is no notion of a 
principle that is accountable for something beyond our experience.  
For Hume, it was tempting to ask, Why do we form the idea of an 
enduring self in the first place, if self is just a bundle of separate 
perceptions? What is the reason for attributing the notion of sameness and 
persistence to the bundle of ideas? Our tendency to trust the notion of 
identity is the result of perceiving certain connections. Superficially, this 
account looks too simplistic. Firstly, Hume suggests, we must have a strong 
inclination to consider things around us, as they persist over time. There are 
cases, such as the alteration of a piece of matter, in which we attribute 
features to things and their continuant identity, even though things are 
combined together as a set of different impressions. Hume explains such 
cases, one of which, he says, is reconstruction of a church: 
Which was formally of brick, fell to ruin, and that the parish 
rebuilt the same church of free-stone, and according to 
modern architecture. Here, neither the form, nor materials are 
the same, nor is there anything common to the two objects, 
but their relation to the inhabitants of the parish; and yet this 
alone is sufficient to make us denominate them the same.118  
 
Another case is the replacement of the parts of a ship:  
A ship, of which a considerable part has been changed by 
frequent reparations, is still considered as the same; nor does 
the difference of the materials hinder us from ascribing an 
identity to it. The common end, in which the parts conspire, 
is the same under all their variations, and affords an easy 
transition of the imagination from one situation of the body to 
another.119  
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The same rule applies in living organisms, too. Accordingly, 
The effect of so strong a relation is, that those everyone 
must allow, that in a very few years both vegetables and 
animals endure a total change, yet we still attribute identity 
to them, while their form, size, and substance are entirely 
altered. An oak, that grows from a small plant to a large 
tree, is still the same oak.120  
 
The identity of self “which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a 
fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables 
and animal bodies.”121  
At face value, Hume’s treatment of the problem of personal identity 
and persistence through time seems ambiguous for several reasons. First of 
all, in the Appendix of A Treatise, Hume expresses his struggle boldly: 
“upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find 
myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know 
how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent.”122 
Secondly, as a result of his scepticism, Hume denies that a person can ever 
have the knowledge of a permanent self, which can be an underlying 
principle of our experience. Therefore, Hume leaves no room for the 
possibility of a subject – not necessarily in a Cartesian sense, but something 
at least which constitutes our idea of a persisting self – which is a thinking 
rational being. Although Hume rejects the idea of the persisting self, which 
stands beyond what one can know from experience, it is needless to say that 
he is a reductionist, as he thinks that what we mean by “self” is a collection 
of memory experiences.  
Under the guidance of Locke and Hume’s identity theories, further 
developments of their arguments attempt to modify the identity criteria as 
something objectively empirical. Defenders of modern reductionism123 – 
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they can be classified as the successors of Locke and Hume – attempt to 
advance an identity claim in which personal identity is considered to persist 
along with changes through time. The form of continuity through change 
must be either real, as it persists and is constituted by the essence of a 
persisting self, or it is imposed and constructed. The role of objective 
criteria and the value of empirical evidence become the primary focus. The 
aspect of personal identity evolves into a matter of qualitative concern. The 
reductionist view postulates the principle of personal identity as it is 
constituted by the list of qualities and properties – the continuity of physical 
parts, or the unity and continuity of conscious states and the connectedness 
of memory, as Locke claims. I think one will plausibly suspect that there is 
a failure of the reductionist view to indicate the gap between the properties 
of identity and the identity of a person. Since, these qualities and properties 
remain only as factual evidence for identity. Thus, it is insufficient for us to 
know the causal relations of these qualities and properties in determining 
one’s persisting identity. It is equally not sufficient for identity to persist 
through time as the same as if we were trying to account for the identity 
claim just by merely reducing identity to psychological states or causally 
related impressions and ideas of self. This is where the notion of non-
reductionism emerges in the debate, offering rather a satisfactory 
explanation of how a definition of an underlying element of identity, 
without committing to reductionism, can be posed. I here begin to explore 
the non-reductionist view by considering historical oppositions to Locke’s 
reductionist reasoning.  
 
1.3.4 Objections to Locke and Hume 
In opposition to Locke and Hume’s accounts, predecessors of the non-
reductionist view such as, Reid and Butler hold the belief that the account of 
identity through time can only be explained by a criterion that is beyond 
empirical properties. This view is clearly defended in Reid and Butler’s 
criticisms of Locke’s identity theory. The belief that memory is the main 
constituent of personal identity is challenged by Butler’s critique that 
                                                                                                                                             
as a series of overlapping perceptions that belong to the same life. 
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memory does not constitute personal identity, yet presupposes it. Reid and 
Butler both think that remembering having a certain thought or taking a 
certain action does not entail a necessary and sufficient condition for seeing 
ourselves as the person who owns the thought or takes the action. Reid 
states, “That relation to me which is expressed by saying that I did it, would 
be the same though I had not the least remembrance of it.”124 Butler also 
agrees with Reid, affirming that conscious states of past memories do not 
form a necessary and sufficient condition for one’s personal identity to be 
the same person involved in action and thought.125 What is important here is 
not the ability to remember, but the notion of a relation between the person 
and the thought or action we are taking into account. This relation represents 
a greater consideration in terms of accounting for the persistence conditions 
of persons, independently of their memory.  
A further consequence for Reid is that Locke’s account of memory 
and personal identity leaves no room for the transitivity of personal identity. 
According to Locke, if a person cannot remember past actions or thoughts 
she acquired in the past, then she will not be identical to the person who 
performed the actions or thoughts. Locke’s description, Reid argues, creates 
a confusion that “a man may be, and at the same time not be, the person that 
did a particular action.”126 Accordingly, the person at t2 could recall certain 
memories from t1 through she could not recall the same event when she is at 
t3, yet at t3 she could remember events from t2. However, her consciousness 
will remain uninterrupted throughout these states. The person at t2 will be 
connected to both persons at t1 and t3, even though the person at t1 is not 
connected to the person at t3. Consequently, Reid states, according to Locke 
the person at t2 would be the same person with both at t1 and t3, yet the 
person at t3 would not be the same person as that at t1.127  
                                                        
124 Reid (1975a) p. 110. 
125 Butler (1975) p. 100. 
126 Reid (1975b) p. 114. 
127 Reid expresses his concern for the transitive notion of identity in the Brave Officer 
Paradox, where he supposes “ a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, 
for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and 
to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be 
possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at 
school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had 
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Reid and Butler, as Locke, put emphasise on the notions of 
consciousness and thought. However, they reject the reduction of notion of 
self to the continuity of consciousness, as it cannot reveal the real notion of 
identity through time. According to their claim, a person is a subject, who is 
the centre of experience and action and is what individuals think is essential 
about who they are.128 Any definition should attribute strict identity to 
persons rather than an identity based on objective qualities that fluctuate 
over time. Hence, the reduction of the persistence of personal identity to 
consciousness can be unreliable. As Reid says,  
Our consciousness, our memory, and every operation of the 
mind, are still flowing like the water of a river, or like time 
itself. The consciousness I have this moment can no more be 
the same consciousness I had last moment. Identity can only 
be affirmed of things, which have a continued existence. 
Consciousness, and every kind of thought, are transient and 
momentary, and have no continued existence.129 
 
In the same vein, Reid claims, if remembrance is the only evidence of 
identity, there is a need for an underlying subject, which owns these 
properties. In this view, the difference between what makes persons and the 
changing properties of persons is strong. Therefore, the identity of a person 
is separable from that person’s properties. This separation can be made 
because, argues Reid, if any accidental property or quality belongs to 
persons, it would be tentative and subject to change.  
By the same token, Butler claims that we have a direct experience of 
ourselves, and that direct experience imparts direct knowledge of the self’s 
identity, in which no further evidence is required to justify the experience-
independent characteristic of identity. As Butler says, “one should really 
think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, 
                                                                                                                                             
absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, 
from Mr LOCKE's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took 
the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. 
When it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him 
who was flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so far back as 
his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE's doctrine, he is not the person who was 
flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person as him who 
was flogged at school.” Reid (2002) 3.5:276. 
128Reid (1975a) p. 103.  
129 Reid (1975b), p. 116. 
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and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge, 
in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.”130 In this 
regard, there is an immediate awareness of a persisting self, which carries 
the implications of self-awareness beyond the phenomenon of 
consciousness to the essentially non-property-based self, since empirical 
evidence can only support the continuity conditions of a person. Yet 
Butler’s arguments yield obscurities, as it seems Butler is suggesting that 
what could give a strict feature to the idea of an enduring self is that of 
being an empirically unknowable subject of experience.  
Last but not least, we see another objection raised by Butler, where 
he opposes Locke by stating that although memory can reveal our identity 
as persons who experienced some past event, the memory does not make 
these persons who or what they are. Thinking otherwise would lead us to 
circularity. If we suppose x has a so-called memory trait other than x’s own, 
then quite naturally we think that this trait is not a real memory of x. A real 
memory can only be x’s own memory. If, let’s say, the person y has this 
memory trait, it would still not be a real memory of x, as the subject of the 
experience who causes a memory trait is x.131 
In short, Butler and Reid both agree that only a continuous state of 
consciousness, which is constituted in continuous uninterrupted existence, 
allows us to define a “person” as a persisting self. At the same time, this 
continuous state allows us to know what constitutes personal identity.132 
                                                        
130 Butler (1975) p.100.  
131 Shoemaker introduces an objection against Butler’s memory critique through what he 
calls ‘quasi-memory’ (Shoemaker, 1999), which represents real memory traits but does not 
count on identity. It involves taking a quasi-memory of an experience in virtue of 
remembering such an experience, even though the experience happened to someone else. 
Can we say this is different from only thinking to remember if the experience is caused in 
the way as it supposed to be? This part is quite vague and left unclarified by Shoemaker, 
yet we can suppose that quasi-memory requires the cause of such a memory and, strictly 
speaking, the experience must be connected to the experience itself rather than connected to 
something else. Advocates of the Memory Theory thought that they are able to avoid 
Butler’s objection about circularity. So, for them it is definitely non-circular to suppose that 
the person who has the memory must already be the same person as the one who 
experienced the event in the first place. That means if ‘x quasi-remembers doing the action 
a, then it does not necessarily follow that x is the same person with the person who acted 
upon the action a. Since, Shoemaker’s quasi-memory does not require x herself for the 
continuity of identity, but requires x only to point out that someone did a, and quasi-
memory was caused by the experience itself. (Shoemaker, 1999). 
132 Reid (1975a) p.109; Butler (1975) p. 100.  
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Their interpretation of Locke’s personal identity theory reveals that it is the 
idea of an underlying subject that plays a fundamental role in addressing 
one’s identity. This subject hears, perceives, and thinks. These 
psychological or even intentional predicates require a subject, which 
essentially represents a persisting being to which states of consciousness are 
attributed. Therefore, it seems clear under the guidance of the above 
discussion that for Reid and Butler there should be no effort to reduce a 
person’s identity to her properties. The debate over the criteria of identity 
will face the demand for a fundamental and persisting idea of identity. Any 
theory that is inclined to reduce personal identity to the flux of properties 
would be rejected.  
 
1.4 Contemporary Objections to the Mainstream View: Is Non-
Reductionism Credible? 
Modern non-reductionism133 is highly influenced by Descartes’ intuition-
based account of personal identity, which rejects the idea that identity 
consists in the persistence of the same physical (biological) or psychological 
continuity. The initial claim of this view is that the reductionist view fails to 
accommodate our beliefs about past and future selves. The self, the subject, 
seems to be more than the collection of properties. It captures the sense of 
identity as something real. One contemporary philosopher, Chisholm, 
proposes a similar view, claiming that certain perceptions are initially 
accommodated within the subject. In his critique of Hume’s treatment of 
personal identity, Chisholm’s concern is directed to the subject, who is the 
bearer of impressions and perceptions: 
Our idea of 'a mind' (if by 'a mind' we mean, as Hume usually 
does, a person, or a self) is not an idea only of 'particular 
perceptions'. It is not the idea of the perception of love or 
hate and the perception of cold or warmth, much less an idea 
of love or hate and of heat or cold. It is an idea of that which 
loves or hates, and of that which feels cold or warm (and, of 
course, of much more besides). That is to say, it is an idea of 
an x such that x loves or x hates and such that x feels cold or x 
                                                        
133 Defenders of the modern non-reductionist view are Chisholm (1976); Lowe (1996; 
2009; 2012); Madell (1984); Swinburne (1984). 
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feels warm, and so forth. 134  
A non-reductionist would claim that we can have a direct experience of the 
subject from a first-person perspective, as we are aware that we are active in 
doing the action and aware of changes (within the Cartesian idea of 
introspection). This state of awareness can hold the idea of self, which 
suggests the existence of an underlying subject and its persistence through 
time. As a defender of the non-reductionist View, Swinburne agrees with 
Chisholm’s criticism adding that there is a constant recognition of this 
awareness that we are related to our self not only through experience, but 
also by being the bearers of experience.135 For Swinburne, the unity of 
experience warrants the enduring feature of identity, which is constantly 
aware of this unity, and thus aware of the underlying subject.  
Within the reductionist frame, psychological continuity defenders 
describe consciousness as something essentially subjective, initially 
requiring a first-person perspective. At the same time, according to the non-
reductionist account, it could be the case that the practical aspect of identity 
– being responsible for past actions – is decided only by a first-person 
perspective. If this is the case, then how far can we rely on the possibility of 
the fallibility of testimony? As mentioned earlier, a person can be mistaken 
about past memories and fail to accommodate appropriate feelings of 
responsibility for past actions. Furthermore, regardless of any memory loss 
or possible character change, the notion of responsibility is something that 
must be fixed. Since the action has been done irrespective of whether the 
person has true or false beliefs about her past actions. Therefore, the person 
will take responsibility for her actions regardless of the truth conditions of 
memory, as these actions are already attributed to the person. Such a view, 
non-reductionists claim, will also allow us to account for the persisting 
notion of identity, which forms the foundation for the responsibility of past 
actions.  
It is also clear that there is an inclination among non-reductionists to 
believe in the successive notion of present and past selves. A direct 
                                                        
134 Chisholm (1976) p. 39. 
135 Swinburne (1984) pp.43–7. 
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interaction with memory could impart a true belief regarding the person’s 
past and justify our knowledge of subject and self. However, there is a need 
for a further consideration. The subject is in a direct interaction with 
experience. In the meantime, however, non-reductionism presupposes that 
its existence is independent of the awareness of direct knowledge. In the 
reductionist view, the persistence of the subject is reducible and limited to 
consciousness. In this respect, personal identity is nothing but the 
unification of experience.  
Swinburne is against this view and claims that the subject’s direct 
knowledge of experience yields strong evidence for the existence of an 
underlying subject or self. Nevertheless, it cannot properly generate the idea 
of identity. The subject is the cause of experience and precedes it. If this is a 
plausible claim, the next non-reductionist argument should follow quite 
naturally, namely that certain changes in the subject’s properties are only 
comprehensible with reference to the current state of consciousness. Yet, it 
remains tempting to look for evidence of a subject that succeeds in 
persisting independently of knowledge of experience. Any knowledge of 
experience must be strictly related to the subject, which precedes and affects 
experience.  
As a defender of the non-reductionist view, Madell advocates the 
same point, claiming that without a direct knowledge of the subject, any 
attribution to its properties remains meaningless. The idea is that the notion 
of a persisting subject must be independent of the subject’s self-awareness. 
As Madell claims, “I can only know myself to be that one and the same 
person to whom these various descriptions apply, if I have knowledge of 
myself, an awareness of myself, which is independent of those 
descriptions.”136  
It seems, hence, that the subject is taken to be separate from any 
properties attributed to it. Here, the crucial question may therefore be 
whether is it possible to account for a self that is independent of its 
psychological and biological states? For Swinburne, Madell, and Chisholm 
such a distinction is possible. Contrary to the reductionist view, Chisholm 
                                                        
136 Madell (1984) p. 24.  
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asserts, “The sentences in which we seem to predicate properties of 
appearances can be paraphrased into other sentences in which we predicate 
properties only of the self or person who is said to sense those 
appearances.”137 Thus, Chisholm remarks, characterising experience, as 
something necessarily related to the possibility of an underlying subject, is 
vital. Along the same line, Swinburne agrees that the unity of experiences 
gives an awareness of the self as a subject. Accordingly, “the only way to 
bring out the sense in question in which the experiences are not distinct is to 
say that they are experiences of a common subject. One person is having 
both experiences. And he is often aware of doing so.”138 Based upon this 
line of reasoning, there is a need for the idea of a subject, which is known 
directly, derived from our experience of it, and which does not require any 
further consideration to know its existence. In his recent paper Swineburne 
expresses that a person at earlier time is the same person with a person at a 
later time regardless of any condition, such as whether the person holds the 
same metal or physical properties, or whether the body is possessed by each 
person at different times. A person may not hold a causal relation in her 
mental states, she may not have the causal relationship in her memory traits. 
A person possibly may have different character traits, or even may have 
entirely different body and different brain. Nevertheless, Swineburne adds, 
continuities as such are not necessary for personal identity.139 This sort of 
immediate apprehension would present a method of knowing the self 
without reference to its properties. In this regard, persons would be aware of 
themselves as having the non-reducible property of being a subject and they 
will be directly experiencing it. As Swinburne states, “It is something of 
which we are often aware without our knowledge of it depending on our 
knowledge of anything more ultimate.”140  
Notably, the type of self with which non-reductionists are concerned 
is indicated without its properties, strictly speaking. They make no reference 
to personal identity given biological and psychological considerations, as 
                                                        
137 Chisholm (1976) p. 50.  
138 Swinburne (1984) p. 47. 
139	Swinburne (2012) p. 105. 	
140 Swinburne (1984) p. 42.  
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these considerations are necessary and sufficient for the persistence 
conditions of identity. Considering Chisholm, Swinburne and Madell’s soul-
identity accounts of persistence, Lowe’s non-reductionist account represents 
a substantialist approach on the contrary what Chisholm, Madell and 
Swinburne defend. Lowe denies any necessary and sufficient conditions of 
personal identity over time without referring to any separately existing 
entities (transcendent entities, such as soul). That is being said, for Lowe, in 
our ontological scheme, personal identity should be something so basic 
(essentially a simple entity) that is primitive and nothing more informative 
can be said about.141 Persons are simple substances who are basic sort of 
subjects of experience.  
The terms Lowe uses here represent something substantial and being 
different expression of the same idea. However, adds Lowe, the self 
(person) is both the object and the subject of experience. So, it cannot be 
separated into parts. A simple substance that belongs to our phenomenal 
world with its bodily continuity, is also a psychological substance: “a person 
is a substantial individual belonging to a natural kind which is the subject of 
distinctive psychological laws, and governed by persistence conditions 
which are likewise distinctively psychological in character”142 The version 
of non-reductionism Lowe offers is distinctively not dualist and precisely 
not mystical approach. Nevertheless, his conclusions about the persistence 
are quite circular. When we talk about ordinary objects, Lowe says, the 
persistence of the entity consists in the persistence of its sufficient portion of 
its component parts. The persistence is a matter of the continuity of 
constituent parts. Yet, what amount of portion is sufficient for the 
persistence remains debatable.  
Personal identity, however, is subject to a different degree of 
consideration. In his reasoning, the conditions of a diachronic identity 
cannot be provided in personal identity over time. As simple ungrounded 
substances without proper parts (biological and psychological continuity), 
                                                        
141 Lowe (2012), p. 152.  
142 Lowe (1996), p. 32.  
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persons have a persistent identity due to having the identity itself.143 He 
concludes that “the identity consists in nothing but itself” by employing a 
further argument, where he claims that identity persists over time without 
being ungrounded.144 Undoubtedly, Lowe’s argumentation is a strict version 
of non-reductionism, where the absence of criteria for persistence is a 
consequence of self’s being unanalysable into its parts.145 The denial of any 
criterion as such is thought to be independently from any property of a 
person in question.  
Although denying the possibility of a reductionist approach seems to 
be affirming to influence the idea of essential properties of a person, which 
persist along with identity, the idea of essential properties is left aside 
without a proper examination (especially by Lowe). So, the shift of non-
reductionists’ attention from the notion of an anti-persistence condition 
approach to the possibility of essential properties makes their inquiry of 
personal identity over time quite problematic and hard to pursue. The reason 
is that by using the term “essential properties” in their premises without 
actually rationalising the term through what are these essential properties 
might be, they commit to characterising the persistence condition as 
something extremely puzzling.   
 
                                                        
143 Lowe (1996), p.43.		
144 “… it would clearly be futile to expect the concept of the self to reveal upon analysis an 
account of the self's identity over time which did not implicitly presume the very thing in 
question”. Lowe (1996), p.42. See also Lowe (2009), p. 140.  
145 The strict version of non-reductionism is also defended by Merricks: See Merricks 
(1998) and (1999). On the contrary what Lowe’s non-reductionism suggests, according to 
Merricks, it is the impossibility of any criteria providing analysis of identity through time 
for any entity (whether it is an object or persons) appears negatively, yet expresses the 
fundamental independence of persistence from any criteria. He explicitly rejects 
reductionism and the possibility of any criteria (and criteria analysis) of identity over time. 
Instead, he affirms that the persistence of a thing is independent from any criteria of 
persistence. In that sense, things (and persons) persist regardless of any criteria attributed to 
them. Since any criteria will represent an external factor, which could be either the 
psychological continuity or biological continuity.  
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1.5 Conclusion: How Do We Account for the Metaphysics of Personal 
Identity? 
The essential notion of the subject and the self certainly continues to exist 
and we are able to know its existence through our physical and 
psychological states. The transference between mental states does not 
necessarily entail the inevitable dependence on properties and conscious 
states. Nevertheless, there must be, at least, an empirical possibility of such 
a belief. What the defenders of the non-reductionist view attempts to show 
above is that after a critical examination, the idea of a subject seems to be 
preceding biological and psychological properties. Most non-reductionists, 
such as Swinburne, Chisholm, Lowe, and even Merrick, take persons as 
individual substances and individual beings, who are ontologically 
fundamental and persist in virtue of their essence (being a substance, self 
and person). Their existence depends on nothing but their endurance over 
time without referring to any necessary and sufficient condition. The 
motivation given by Swinburne, Chisholm and Lowe is clear, but I do not 
think that their accounts are convincing at this point. First of all, they claim 
that the substantialist notion of persistence conditions are consistent with 
our commonsense and everyday language. For them one should accept that 
in our everyday life we denote persistence to persons as enduring individual 
substances. What I suggest in the following chapters is that our 
commonsense, intuitive considerations and premises we use in our everyday 
language are not entirely credible grounds for a metaphysical inquiry. In 
fact, we do not know what sort of commonsense or intuition involves in the 
substantial approach of personal identity. Though, what we know is that the 
grounds suggested above will always remain unknown to us.  
The reason for that, at first glance it seems rather uncertain whether 
it is possible to know intuitively that there is something more fundamental – 
beyond the dependence of biological and psychological traits of a person – 
to identity than its properties. Categorically, terms such as “subject” and 
“self” should remain utterly fixed and unchanged, and thus essentially 
capable of surviving in their pure form. This notion requires a further 
distinction between having certain properties – as it has been discussed 
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above, in the Lockean terms these properties refer to consciousness and 
memory – and being these properties itself. One may argue that explaining 
identity as something understandable along with certain properties is a 
circular exercise that cannot propose an account of the practical aspects of 
personal identity, as the states of consciousness appear to us only through 
subjective experience. While what we are can be known directly through 
consciousness, however, it can be also true that we are aware of ourselves 
directly through conscious states. The subject can underlie these states, but 
even this feature can be attributed to identity, as its existence is necessary 
for the existence of certain psychological states.  
The careful analysis above may suggest that the notion of the subject 
can represent more than an abstract conception in order to generate identity, 
in which a person can exist in an actual sense. As mentioned earlier, 
describing identity without attributing its certain properties would be 
meaningless in practice. Nonetheless, if any property is required, then it can 
only be the subjectivity of a person that is the persistent unity of properties. 
Although the implications of non-reductionism successfully support the 
unified notion of a subject, which exists and persists without being reducible 
to its properties, it remains unclear what counts as the subjectivity of a 
person and how the idea of an underlying subject is separable from the 
states of consciousness or self-awareness. Furthermore, we should also be 
able to point out exactly why the idea of an underlying subject is not 
reducible to any property and is not analysable into further components. 
Apparently, this is the absence of an argument, from which the idea of an 
underlying subject emerges. Such a non-reductionist notion of identity is 
something not entirely dependent upon what reductionists are strictly 
insisting on. In other words, something that is not entirely dependent upon 
only the experience of conscious states and properties. In that sense, 
defenders of the non-reductionist approach clearly offer reasons why we 
should think that the subject may plausibly be distinct from its properties, 
but they also fail to show to what extent the persistence condition is actually 
separable from these essential properties.  
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So far, enough has been said about the general problem of personal 
identity within the historical and contemporary considerations. I would like 
to conclude this chapter with a briefly summary of the concerns and 
objections recited above from various opponents of the reductionist view. 
One may think of reducing identity to psychological or biological 
continuance, or both, as the continuation of a single unity. Initially, though, 
the kind of unity we are talking about here must be clarified. This 
interrogation should reflect upon what psychological and biological aspects 
we are to favor when we consider what kind of unity is relevant to our 
persistence conditions. Fundamental deliberation is required concerning 
what aspects are essential for the persistence conditions of identity. Such a 
reflection will include the psychological and biological aspects of a person 
that we regard as essential to the unity that we are. This reflection will 
initially concern whether we persist as the same beings through time. Being 
motivated by the above discussion, we can now reformulate the 
metaphysical question of personal identity in two ways. First of all, to what 
extent can a person be separated from its properties (such as conscious states 
and self-awareness)? Secondly, if such an approach can be successfully 
addressed, how can it be related to the continuant identity regardless of 
changes in that identity?  
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Chapter 2: Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics: Individuation, Identity of Substance, and Essence 
 
Formulating a notion of a person, including questions of what a person is 
and how a person persists throughout time and over change, is primarily a 
way of forming an account in which each person has been individuated via 
their particular properties.  The metaphysical question of personal identity is 
“what is x?” In a broad sense, this question takes the identity claim as a 
relation and name, both of which identify the individuality of a thing. An 
important and mostly overlooked consideration in personal identity 
literature, is to assess the persistence criterion. In this chapter, the problem 
of personal identity will be  scrutinized within the scope of Aristotle’s 
thoughts on ontological dependence, where there is a sense of order or an 
ontological hierarchy between what something is and how it persists over 
change. There is a possibility of interpretation that has received less 
attention since the Cartesian revolution of the mind–body distinction.  
Consistent with the Aristotelian thesis, in order to originate an 
account of the identity of an individual and its persistence conditions 
through time, there is a need of a plausible explanation of individuation, in 
which the conditions of continuity have been secured. The main criterion of 
identity over time and the question of the nature of persons are distinct in 
thought and should be accounted for separately, yet these two questions lead 
us to the same information. Aristotle’s philosophy offers a salutary 
explanation by which to understand the notion of an individual. 
Consideration of what a person is in particular terms and how that person 
exists over time requires the same perspective on these notions. Thus, it 
would be a mistake to conceive that a sharp distinction can be made 
between personal persistence conditions and individuation. Since, the 
description of the conditions for the continuant existence of a person as a 
member of species is also the consideration of conditions for being a person 
as a member of species. To a large extent, the reasoning above is what 
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differentiates one from others.146  
These are the criteria of identity, which also account for the principle 
of individuation. The principle of individuation determines the relation 
between persons. On the one hand, it articulates the individual essence of a 
person. For instance, if A and B are members of the same species, and if 
organism A is distinct from organism B, then A and B have either distinct 
matter or distinct form. It is a matter of how a member of a species is 
numerically distinct from another, but also how any members of the same 
species can be identified as a distinct particular.  On the other hand, the 
principle of individuation identifies objects through their properties. At one 
time and one place, an object possesses certain properties, whereas at a later 
time and another place it possesses different properties. 
 
2.1 Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Persons 
Aristotle’s view of the nature of individuals is undoubtedly a challenging 
one, especially his account of substance (ousia).147 Characterising the 
grounds for identity is not an easy task to take. Fortunately, Aristotle’s 
conceptual project of substance (ousia) and its persistence conditions were 
his distinctive way of solving some major problems of continuity over time.  
To broach the problem, it is important to begin with the concept of 
ousia, since this will take us directly to the concept of identity. I will 
examine the notion of ousia by focusing on the nature of an individual, 
which consists of a primary and unchanged underlying thing 
(hypokeimenon),148 a further fact.  This further fact determines an 
individual’s persistence conditions through time along with the persistence 
of material being. Aristotle formulates an extensive account of the term 
substance (ousia), which has the primary meaning “being”.  The term 
“being” is derived from the present participle of the word “to be” (einai). It 
means something “which is not predicated of any subject, but of which 
                                                        
146 Broady (1980) pp. 3–6 
147 Greek translations of the words are cited from Buchanan (1962). 
148 Hypokeimenon means subject, the underlying substratum of existence, it is undoubtedly 
the subject of change which remains one and the same through all changes and 
modifications. 	
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everything else is predicated.” Aristotle also characterises ousia as energeia, 
where he says, “Being is actuality”. Since “to be” is “to exist”, and “to ti en 
einai” means “what is it for each thing to exist, which is the first principle or 
“arche” of each thing.”149 In Metaphysics, Zeta, Aristotle articulates three 
possible definitions of ousia, which is preeminently something separable 
(thisness) and definite. Ousia is: (i) the composite of the form and the prime 
matter, (ii) to ti en einai (what was/is it to be) – the essence or formula, and 
(iii) energeia, which is the fundamental and comprehensive mode of activity 
of an individual. The key point to note here is that in its primary sense, 
substance (ousia) refers both to essence and the unity of form and matter.150  
There is a distinction between primary and secondary substances 
pointed out in Categories but abandoned in Metaphysics. The division is 
made in Categories:  
A substance—that which is called a substance (ousia) most 
strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither 
said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or 
the individual horse. The species in which the things 
primarily called substances (ousia), and the genera of these 
species are called secondary substances. For example, the 
individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a 
genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are 
called secondary substances.151  
 
Accordingly, secondary substances, such as shape (morphe), are not in the 
subject of which they are predicated. Differentiae are not present in the 
subject either: “And as for secondary substances, it is obvious at once that 
they are not in a subject. For man is said of the individual man as subject but 
is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. Similarly, animal also is 
said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not in the individual 
man.”152 Even though man is a two-footed animal, being a two-footed 
animal is a predicate of man, and this predicate is not something “in” the 
man. In that sense, differentiae imply what a thing is and how we can 
describe it.  
                                                        
149 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1050b2-3. 
150 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1037a29-30. 
151 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Categories, 2a13-18. 
152 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Categories, 3a 9-13. 
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In Metaphysics, the discussion of the notion of ousia is carried out 
around the distinction between universal predicates and things. According to 
Aristotle, “The essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of 
itself. For being you is not being musical; for you are not musical in virtue 
of yourself. What, then, you are in virtue of yourself is your essence.”153 He 
carries on to say “But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in 
the way in which the essence is so, can be present in this, e.g. animal can be 
present in man and horse.”154 Aristotle is quite determined here to validate 
his point, in which substance belongs to nothing but only to itself and to that 
which has it, of which it is again the substance itself. The question remains 
whether one’s underlying thing can be in many things at the same time. His 
answer is straightforward, he claimed that “no essence can be in many 
things at the same time but that which is common [a universal form, such as 
a human form] is present in many things at the same time.”155 What he is 
trying to communicate here is that no universal form can exist separately 
from the individuals. 
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that the essence of a thing 
cannot be its shape or form in something else. I want to suggest caution at 
this point for it is clear that what is true for the one is not necessarily true of 
the other. For instance, in the case of a bronze statue, the essence of a statue 
is not its being in a statue form, but its matter, which is a genuine subject. 
But this case does not apply to the definition of human beings:  
If in defining the essence of white one were to state the 
formula of white man; another because something else is 
added to it, white man is white indeed, but its essence is not 
to be white. For the essence is what something is; but when 
one thing is said of another, that is not what a ‘this’ is, e.g. 
white man is not what a ‘this’ is since being a ‘this’ belongs 
only to substances. Therefore, there is an essence only of 
those things whose formula is a definition.156 
  
Namely, Aristotle’s argument is that the essence of a person is what a 
                                                        
153 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1029b13-16.  
154 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1038b16-19. 
155 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1040b24-27. 
156 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1029b23-1030a7. 
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person is in virtue of herself (kath‘hauto).157  
Aristotle’s aporia in Categories and Metaphysics is set for 
substances (ousia). Substance is the only the subject of predicates. Further 
to that, substance is the ultimate subject of everything called substance 
(ousia) in a strict sense.158 Therefore, the principle of substance is thought to 
be primary and basic. Accordingly, things that are formed naturally can be 
qualified as primary substances (ousia): “While some things are not 
substances, as many as are formed naturally and by nature, their substance 
would seem to be this nature, which is not an element but a principle.”159 
The prime example of things that are formed by their nature is living things. 
Accordingly, “natural comings to be are the comings to be of those things 
which come to be by nature; and that out of which they come to be is 
something which exists naturally; and the something which they come to be 
is a man or a plant or one of the things of this kind, which we say to be 
substances if anything is.”160 Aristotle takes all living things as potential 
substances.161 Consequently, he seems to suggest that all living things have 
ontological status.  
Two key points of Aristotle’s idea of identity conditions can be 
mentioned here. In such a position Aristotle is compelled to the claims that 
“all living things are real substantial beings” and that “all living things are 
composites of matter and form”; “And when we have the whole such and 
such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and 
they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same 
in form; for their form is indivisible.”162 This passage is where Aristotle’s 
aporia is set for the notion of substance (ousia). Since, according to his 
classification of substance, the primary substance (ousia) is something that 
is basic, fundamental and does not have any parts. However, can we say that 
Aristotle seems to create a contradiction by generating the hylomorphic idea 
                                                        
157 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1029b13–16. 
158 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Categories, 2b35–3a1; 
Metaphysics, 1028b33–1029a1. 
159 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1041b28–30. 
160 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1032a15–20. 
161 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 104ob5–19. 
162 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1034a5–8. 
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of beings, namely claiming “all living things are composites of matter and 
form”? Living things represent a unity in their hylomorphic nature. This 
unity may call into question whether such a qualification creates a sense in 
which matter and form are distinct, as is the case after the Cartesian 
tradition. In Metaphysics book 8, Eta, section 6, Aristotle is concerned with 
the issue of composition in order to determine the nature of the composition 
of form and matter:  
To return to the difficulty which has been stated with respect 
to definitions and numbers, what is the cause of the unity of 
each of them? In the case of all things which have several 
parts and in which the whole is not, as it were, a mere heap, 
but the totality is something besides the parts, there is a cause 
of unity; for as regards material things contact is the cause in 
some cases, and in others viscidity or some other such 
quality. And a definition is a formula that is one not by being 
connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one 
object. —What then is it that makes man one; why is he one 
and not many, e.g. animal—biped, especially if there are, as 
some say, an ideal animal and an ideal biped?163 
 
The discussion of the essence of a living thing, whether it is only the form 
or the unity of form and matter, will be discussed in further details in the 
following chapter of this thesis.164 For now, the crucial question for now is 
this: Is it Socrates’ form that survives after certain changes occur, or is it the 
unity of Socrates’ form and matter? Which one qualifies the criterion of 
being an “underlying thing” in Socrates’ being to maintain the sameness of 
identity? In order to seek an appropriate explanation, we need to look at the 
notion of change in Aristotle’s metaphysics.  
 
2.1.1 Aristotle on Change and Persistence 
We can now raise a further question: How does the process of change cause 
the persisting entity to add or lose properties in physical aspects, while the 
identity of this entity remains numerically identical through time?   
                                                        
163 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1045a7–17. 
164 For the debate over the notion of substance see Ross (1949) and Burnyeat (1979) both 
claim that Aristotle’s focus is on a man as a composite. Whereas, Gill (1989); Halper 
(1989) and Lewis (1994) claim that the focus is on the unity of form. 
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Aristotle’s approach solves this problem165 in Physics book 4, 
section 11. He focuses mainly on the problems of change and persistence by 
claiming that a moving thing always has the same features. Although our 
main concern here is the persistence of substances, we can first analyse 
Aristotle’s example of the persistence of states of affairs:  
The ‘now’ in one sense is the same, in another it is not the 
same. In so far as it is in succession, it is different (which is 
just what its being now was supposed to mean), but its 
substratum is the same; for motion, as was said, goes with 
magnitude, and time, as we maintain, with motion. Similarly, 
then, there corresponds to the point the body which is carried 
along, and by which we are aware of the motion and of the 
before and after involved in it. This is an identical substratum 
(whether a point or a stone or something else of the kind), but 
it is different in definition—as the sophists assume that 
Coriscus’ being in the Lyceum is a different thing from 
Coriscus’ being in the market-place.166  
 
For Aristotle, substances and states of affairs persist in distinct ways 
through time. What Aristotle means here is that states of affairs do not affect 
Coriscus’ substratum. As a moving thing, Coriscus himself has the same 
substrate, but has different definitions at different times. It is only a matter 
of the plurality of accidental unities by which Coriscus has been accounted 
for.167  
In Metaphysics book 6, Aristotle examines the topic of becoming as 
a part of the discussion and asks whether “Coriscus in the market place” is 
the same person as “Coriscus in the Lyceum”.168 The sophists advocated 
that “Coriscus in the marketplace” becomes169 “Coriscus in the Lyceum”, 
                                                        
165 There is a similar puzzle called the Growing Argument, which poses a challenge to those 
who take material composition as a part of their account of persistence. Accordingly, the 
identity of an individual is nothing more than its material existence in a unity. Hence this 
material unity of a body is in a successive relation through time, and if this is the case, then 
the identity as a whole should be in a successive relation too. 
166 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 219b13–21. 
167 Elsewhere Aristotle raises a puzzle about Coriscus to the Sophists: “For the arguments 
of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether 
musical and lettered are different or the same” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by 
Barnes 1991, Metaphysics, 1026b15–18.)  
168 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1026b15–18.	
169 Here “becomes” as a verb is gignetai. There is a distinction between “the thing coming 
to be” is to gignomenon, which is “that which becomes”, and “what it becomes”, which is 
ho gignetai. In Physics to gignomenon can be used in different contexts, the initial object 
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which means “Coriscus in the market place” is being replaced by “Coriscus 
in the Lyceum”. Therefore, according to this logic, even a simple change in 
place should result in a new person. The reasoning behind this casual 
connection is the indiscernibility of identicals. Accordingly, if a person is 
identical to herself in different time and different places, then for every 
property she has at different times and places, she is identical to her future 
self iff she has the same property as she had before. In this case, Coriscus at 
time t1 has the property of being in the marketplace and Coriscus at time t2 
has the property of being in the Lyceum. Therefore, Coriscus at time t1 
cannot be identical to Coriscus at time t2, as Coriscus at time t1 has a 
property, which Coriscus at time t2 does not have.  
Aristotle’s solution to this puzzle holds on to the claim that the 
propositions “Coriscus in the market place” and “Coriscus in the Lyceum” 
are both true of Coriscus and that he is identical to himself in both places in 
terms of substrate but not in definition: “[Coriscus], with respect to [his] 
substrate, is the same, but in definition it is different.”170 The idea of being 
one in substance but differing in definition is Aristotle’s solution to the 
problems that entail a notion of unity and being the same individual in a 
variety of time and places. The same reasoning is applicable to the problems 
of change and persistence. In Generation and Corruption, book I, he writes: 
“Perhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in 
another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature 
may be is the same; but it’s being is not the same.”171 He also uses the same 
tool in De Anima, book 3, section 2, where he claims that the person who 
completes the action and the one who perceives it are unified on the one 
hand, but differ, on the other hand.  
By considering this relative notion in terms of the identity claim, 
Aristotle expands this idea of unity in Physics, book 3, section 3, where he 
gives a descriptive example of the road from Athens to Thebes. This is 
                                                                                                                                             
that undergoes the change, or resulting object from the change, or the underlying thing 
(hypokeimenon) persists through the change. 
170 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 219b13–21. 
171 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Generation and Corruption, 
319b3–7. 
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numerically the same as the road from Thebes to Athens, but the roads 
themselves are not the same in definition. Accordingly, “the road from 
Thebes to Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes are the same. For it is 
not things which are in any way the same that have all their attributes the 
same, but only those to be which is the same.”172 They are the roads defined 
by ones who are either in Athens or Thebes, thus, “any more than it follows 
from the fact that there is one distance between two things which are at a 
distance from each other, that being here at a distance from there and being 
there at a distance from here are one and the same.”173 We can employ the 
same reasoning to Coriscus’ example: “Coriscus in the market place” and 
“Coriscus in the Lyceum” are names for the same person but they identify 
the same person in different states of affairs. 
In Physics book I, sections 7 and 8, Aristotle regards another puzzle 
about change. In his treatment of the case, he implies the same sort of 
change in three different ways:  
We say that ‘one thing comes to be from another thing, and 
something from something different, in the case both of 
simple and of complex things. I mean the following. We can 
say the man becomes musical, or what is not-musical 
becomes musical, or the not-musical man becomes a musical 
man. Now what becomes in the first two cases—man and 
not-musical—I call simple, and what each becomes—
musical—simple also. But when we say the not-musical man 
becomes a musical man, both what becomes and what it 
becomes are complex.174  
 
Regarding the problem of continuant identity, what is important here is that 
in the second and third cases, there is a substitution of the thing, which is 
replaced by the thing it becomes: the not-musical man becomes a musical 
man. In the second case, the not-musical is substituted by the musical, and 
in the third case, the not-musical man is substituted by the musical man. In 
the same respect, the not-musical and musical man relation pair might seem 
analogous to the relation between “Coriscus in the market place” and 
“Coriscus in the Lyceum”. Since both are about state of affairs and 
                                                        
172 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 202b14–17. 
173 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 202b15–18. 
174 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics,189b34–190a4. 
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accidental unities. More importantly, in the first case, in which a man 
becomes musical, Aristotle explicitly suggests the idea of the unity of an 
underlying thing (hypokeimenon)175, which persists through change:  
One can gather from surveying the various cases of becoming 
in the way we are describing that there must always be an 
underlying something, namely that which becomes, and that 
this, though always one numerically, in form at least is not 
one. (By ‘in form’ I mean the same as ‘in account’.) For to be 
a man is not the same as to be unmusical. One part survives, 
the other does not: what is not an opposite survives (for the 
man survives), but not-musical or unmusical does not 
survive, nor does the compound of the two, namely the 
unmusical man.176  
 
Accidental properties, such as being-in-the-marketplace or being musical 
and not-musical are accidental unities, and they are formed with substances. 
They occur in different states of affairs or circumstances, in different places 
or times, but the man or Coriscus is the entity or substance (ousia), as one 
continuant being, which is regarded as identical through time in virtue of 
having an underlying element. 
The point of contention here is clearly holds the idea that 
persistence conditions of identity do not hold between accidental attributes, 
such as Coriscus’ being in the marketplace at one time and being in the 
Lyceum at another time. In the same vein, being not-musical at one time and 
being musical at another time indicates only the degree of knowing one’s 
accidental predicates. Instead, these conditions hold between instances of an 
underlying thing (hypokeimenon): for instance, Coriscus himself is a person 
in virtue of himself when he is stripped away from his accidental attributes. 
A state of affairs is meant to give a person something like the notion of what 
we can think of as contingent attributes. These accidental properties are not 
parts of substance (ousia), but they are only parts of a context, in which the 
potentiality of a substance emerges. In addition, these properties (such as a 
person being in one place at one time and being in another place at another 
time) do not conflict with each other, and there is no contradiction here in 
                                                        
175 Hypokeimenon is the subject that undergoes change and survives after the change 
occurs.  
176 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 190a14-22. 
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claiming that Coriscus in virtue of himself is identical over time.177 Since as 
in in the not-musical/musical example, one is acquired actually, the other is 
acquired potentially.  
However, Aristotle explicitly admits, “although this solution is 
adequate as a reply to the questioner, as an account of the fact and 
explanation of its true nature it is inadequate.”178 Aristotle’s confession here 
stresses the idea that even in being identical to himself, Coriscus may still 
be susceptible to further changes over time. Aristotle yet needs to give a 
credible account to explain the foundations or criteria that hold Coriscus’ 
identity in virtue of him as the same person over time, regardless of any 
possible change in his accidental properties. The question arises for 
Aristotle of the notion of the criteria that hold one’s identity in virtue of 
herself. In order to find out, in Generation and Corruption, book 1, at the 
end of section 5, he discusses the topic of growth. This is where Aristotle 
asserts that the form (morphe) of a living body persists through time during 
growth, just as the particular shape of a duct persists after being inflated:  
The form is a kind of power in matter—a duct, as it were. If, 
then, a matter accedes which is potentially a duct and also 
potentially possesses determinate quantity, then these ducts 
will become bigger. But if it is no longer able to act just as 
water, continually mixed in greater and greater quantity with 
wine, in the end makes the wine watery and converts it into 
water—then it will cause a diminution of the quantum; 
though still the form persists.179  
In contrast, in Physics, book I, sections 7 and 8, he seems to suggest that 
what persists through time is matter. Nevertheless, in Physics book I, 
section 7 it seems as if Aristotle is trying to establish the ultimate principle 
of identity, which indicates an underlying thing (hypokeimenon) as a being 
persisting through time regardless of any change. A man is the example of 
                                                        
177 “Plainly then, if there are causes and principles which constitute natural objects and 
from which they primarily are or have come to be—have come to be, I mean, what each is 
said to be in its substance, not what each is accidentally—plainly, I say, everything comes 
to be from both subject and form.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes 1991 
Physics, 190b17–20.) 
178 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 263a15–8. 
179 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Generation and Corruption, 
322a29–34.  
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this underlying thing (hypokeimenon), and it is substance (ousia) which can 
either be form or matter,180 or both, depending on the perspective we 
consider: namely, “we speak of ‘becoming that from this’ instead of ‘this 
becoming that’ more in the case of what does not survive the change.”181 As 
Aristotle says, “by that which is opposed, I mean the ignorant of music, by 
that which underlies, the man; and shapelessness, formlessness, disarray are 
opposed, the bronze, the stone, the gold underlie.”182 In the subsequent 
paragraph, he also posits, “the underlying thing, however, though one in 
number, is two in form. On the other hand there is the man, the gold, and in 
general the measurable matter; this is more of a this thing here, and it is not 
by virtue of concurrence that the thing which comes to be comes to be from 
this.”183 However, in Generation and Corruption, book 1, section 5 this 
“underlying something” (hypokeimenon) seems to be the form regarding the 
biological growth: “Those, then, who construct all things out of a single 
element, must maintain that coming-to-be and passing-away are 
alteration.”184 Here Aristotle still insists on assuming that unity over time 
requires continuity of form. The form survives from one moment to another 
in growth, as the process of growth happens gradually. Hence, the gradually 
changing matter constitutes a form from one moment to another without any 
gap. After all, it persists through substantial change.   
Therefore, one way interpreting Physics book I, section 7 and 
Generation and Corruption book 1, section 5, is that what Aristotle means 
by the word “substance” (ousia) could be the unity of form and matter, 
which persists through growth – matter persists through growth only by 
                                                        
180 There is a very crucial point in this particular paragraph I would like to mention it here 
again, where Aristotle claims that “one can gather from surveying the various cases of 
becoming in the way we are describing that there must always be an underlying something, 
namely that which becomes, and that this, though always one numerically, in form at least 
is not one.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by. Barnes (1991) Physics, 190a13–16.) 
He indicates the form as the same as in account. This point becomes very close, on my 
view, to revealing that Aristotle searches for the notion of an underlying thing, which is not 
openly spelled out as the matter or form alone. 
181 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes (1991) Physics,190a31. 
182 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes (1991) Physics,190b13–17. 
183 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes (1991) Physics,190b23–27. 
184 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes (1991) Generation and Corruption, 
314b1–2.  
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means of the relation of potentiality and actuality185 – and alteration. 
Another way of interpreting Aristotle’s account of identity in this particular 
discussion is that the individual unity of Coriscus’ form persists through 
change, and the criterion of persisting identity will be the underlying feature 
of Coriscus, yet what makes him in virtue of himself must be this underlying 
thing (hypokeimenon). Indeed, it might be argued that Coriscus’ identity, as 
a unity of his form and particular matter, persists over time iff 
(i) We take persistence comprise be overlapping chains. The 
underlying element (hypokeimenon) of his being continues to exist as 
overlapping chains without any gap; and  
(ii) Coriscus’ biological and psychological connectedness – the unity 
of his matter and form at different times – are linked by one uninterrupted 
history.  
Undoubtedly, for Aristotle, the continuity in spatial extension and 
temporal duration is the condition of diachronic identity. However, it is 
tempting to pose another set of questions. To what extent is Aristotle’s idea 
of connectedness relevant to the genesis of living organisms? What is it 
about the substance that remains numerically identical over change?  
 
2.1.2 The Direction of Change 
Aristotle’s discussions of how changes occur in substance (ousia) in order 
do not require any specific reference to time. His remarks regarding the 
growth of a boy into a man appear in Metaphysics, book 5, where he 
describes what it is to be prior when it comes to biological development. 
Accordingly, “other things are prior in change; for the things that are nearer 
the first mover are prior (e.g., the boy is prior to the man).”186 On the one 
hand, the term “prior” might be understood as indicative of prime mover, 
which is the prior and the final cause of all change. On the other hand, it is a 
fact that the boy is prior to the man.187 In Metaphysics, it is clear that this 
                                                        
185 “The same things can be spoken of in terms of potentiality and actuality.” (Complete 
Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes 1991 Physics, 191b29.) 
186 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1018b19–21. 
187 The same remark has been given in Generation of Animals regarding the boy is prior to 
the man through time: “Now we speak of one thing coming from another in many senses; it 
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order cannot be always taken as a temporal succession:  
For one thing comes from another in two ways; (a) as the 
man comes from the boy, by the boy’s changing, or (b) as air 
comes from water. By ‘as the man comes from the boy’ we 
mean ‘as that which has come to be from that which is 
coming to be, or as that which is finished from that which is 
being achieved’; on the other hand, coming from another 
thing as water comes from air implies the destruction of the 
other thing. This is why changes of the former kind are not 
reversible, —the boy does not come from the man (for what 
comes to be from the process of coming to be is not what is 
coming to be but what exists after the process of coming to 
be; for it is thus that the day comes from the morning—in the 
sense that it comes after the morning; and therefore the 
morning cannot come from the day); but changes of the other 
kind are reversible.188 
 
Aristotle draws our attention to a very crucial distinction that we will 
scrutinise extensively in the last chapter. For now, according to his 
categorisation we can imply two types of connectedness between entities. 
The first category represents temporal succession, which is irreversible in 
order and in this succession entities are connected in one single history, like 
the relation between boyhood and manhood. In the second category, entities 
are connected to one another in a reversible relation in theory. Hence, when 
one thing comes into existence, the other ceases to exist. Aristotle uses the 
water or air example to demonstrate this reversible relation. For example, air 
is produced from water if we start boiling it. Upon reaching 100°C in 
temperature, water ceases to exist and the air comes into existence, and vice 
versa, by through cooling and condensation.  
In the first category, even though the boy precedes the man in 
succession, Aristotle’s concern is rather teleological, regarding the 
relationship between boyhood and manhood. In other words, the 
connectedness of boyhood to manhood represents one single history of a 
person’s identity. Apparently, identifying the man as “that which has come 
to be” and “that which is finished” and the boy as “that which is coming to 
                                                                                                                                             
is one thing when we say that night comes from day or a man becomes man from a boy, 
meaning that the one succeeds the other; it is another if we say that a statue is made from 
bronze and a bed from wood.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, 
Generation of Animals, 724a22–3.) 
188 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 994a22–994b3. 
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be” and “that which is being attained” is to say that the man is something 
complete and the boy is something in progress and incomplete. Thus, 
manhood is the goal of the boy’s development. This, for Aristotle, means 
that there is a relation between these two stages, which takes this form: “the 
boy is potentially the man.”  
The basis for the order of change is represented by Aristotle’s 
concepts of nature and potentiality.189 In Physics, Aristotle states that having 
a nature means having the principle of a certain kind. Basically, it is the 
principle of things, in which they are things in virtue of themselves. He 
expresses the relation “in virtue of” clearly with the term “according to 
nature”, which is applied to all things and also to the attributes which belong 
to them in virtue of what they are: “for instance the property of fire to be 
carried upwards—which is not nature nor has a nature but is by nature or 
according to nature.”190 In Metaphysics, Aristotle argues that the nature of 
the form or essence, which is the primary principle undergoing change, is 
essential in natural substances. In De Anima, book 2, he classifies the form 
of person as soul, and asserts that soul is the efficient cause of one’s actions. 
Therefore, soul could be the boy’s nature; namely, it could also be his form 
or essence, but also it could be the innate impulse, which drives the 
biological development.191 Nevertheless, this notion of innate impulse is 
only partly relevant to the relationship between potentiality and actuality. 
Since, in such an interpretation the essence of a person is the form realised 
through the process of one’s development. The boy’s nature consists not 
                                                        
189 For more detailed discussions of nature Physics, II, 1 and Metaphysics book 5, section 4. 
190 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 192b35–193a2.	
191 Similarly, in De Anima III, 9, Aristotle raises similar points about the different faculties 
of the soul, such as the appetitive and the imaginative or the rational faculties. Each faculty 
is applicable to the notion of soul, yet these faculties are relative regarding the perspective 
we are taking into account. In De Anima, II, 1, Aristotle identifies soul as substance, and the 
definition of soul contains form and actuality. In the same chapter, he classifies the soul as 
it involves in first and second actualities. Accordingly, the first actuality is identified with 
the essence, which is its ability to do or actualize it. The second actuality is its actuality of 
doing it. For instance, in human beings the soul is first actuality, because it does not 
disappear in conscious or unconscious states. Aristotle also gives examples of an axe (if we 
think of an axe as a natural body) and eye, an axe’s essence would be it’s being an axe, and 
an eye’s essence is sight, respectively. In these examples, Aristotle acknowledges soul as 
the essence of a thing, yet from another corresponding degree the soul might be taken into 
account in terms of its hierarchical functions or activities, such as growth/nutrition, 
locomotion/perception, and intellect/thought. Nonetheless, the soul has a capacity to engage 
in all these activities as a unity.  
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only in his human form or soul, but also in his body is also the subject of 
growing into manhood. The notion of essence as the unity of form and body 
is obvious here. For instance, “Socrates as a boy” at t1 and “Socrates as a 
man” at t2 represents two phases that change through time, and they always 
stand within the normative order of biological development. When Socrates 
at t1 becomes Socrates at t2, the connectedness of his two phases is 
accountable only in virtue of his nature. Yet, there is no harm in considering 
this connectedness from the teleological perspective, as much as the relation 
between potentiality and actuality requires. 
 
2.1.3 Change as the Relation of “A Is Potentially B” 
The formal relation between these two states is the relation of “A is 
potentially B”, which is transitive, asymmetric, and connected.192 For 
Aristotle, in the statement “A is potentially B” are two stages of change; the 
latter is the stage of ousia in actuality, which is to say that A is incomplete 
compared to B. Here, A as an incomplete actuality has a telos to become B. 
Thus, within the teleological framework, the notion of becoming B is 
identified by the stage that leads B to a specific telos: “change is thought to 
be a sort of actuality, but incomplete, the reason for this view being that the 
potentiality whose actuality it is incomplete.”193 
Recalling his arguments on the notion of substantial nature, Aristotle 
takes substantial changes to be teleological in Physics book 2, section 1,194 
where he divides the category of substance into two. These are natural 
substances, such as animals, plants and the simple entities in nature, and 
artefacts. Natural substances possess an essence, which is also the 
actualising principle, whereas artefacts do not. Aristotle claims that actions 
                                                        
192 The relation is transitive: If A is potentially B, and B is potentially C, then A is 
potentially C. This transitive notion of the relation holds the identity persistent through 
time. The relation is asymmetric if A is potentially B, then B is not potentially A; is 
connected for every A and B, if A ≠ B, then either A is potentially B or B is potentially A. 
Regarding connectedness, the question arises whether or not B in “A is potentially B” is 
always the goal of the change process. In the example of Socrates’ process of becoming a 
man, “Socrates-as-a-man”, there is no stage left out. Aristotle says that there is an absolute 
necessity between two phases of Socrates’ being, which is incapable of being otherwise. 
(Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, Metaphysics, 1006b31–2.) 
193 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 201b31–33. 
194 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 192b9–23. 
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of natural substances are always goal oriented, and all substances essentially 
carry a particular sort of telos and characteristics of the kind of substance 
that it belongs to, such as the statement “man is biped animal”. Therefore, if 
something is a natural substance and subjected to a natural change, then it 
has certain specific goals. If A and B are the stages in the change or growth 
of a substance, then the direction of the relation between A and B is 
necessarily ordered by the relation “A is potentially B”. Hence, due to their 
connectedness, the relation “A is potentially B” holds these stages in 
relation. 
This line of the argument has been developed further in Physics 
book 3, section 1, where Aristotle gives the definition of change as the 
actuality of what exists potentially.195 This approach explicitly applies to 
natural substances, and it is also related to his point in Physics, where the 
claim “no process of change is infinite” has been established.196 This claim 
indicates that every change, regardless of contraries,197 is a change from 
something to something; namely, it is becoming the latter in the process of 
change.198  
 
2.2 Alteration vs. Genesis on Identity of Subject 
Judged by the criteria pointed out in the previous section, we can now 
conclude that the matter–form relation applies to sensible substances, and 
according to Aristotle, this relation can be explained through the elements of 
generation (becoming) and the generation of substance (ousia) after change. 
It has already been highlighted that in Physics book I, section 7, he indicates 
that to consider something as changing in terms of characteristics, attributes 
or elements is to take this thing as it “comes to be” one thing from 
something else. This process was exemplified above, where Aristotle uses 
the example of a man becoming musical, in a sense that a man “comes to 
                                                        
195 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 201a10–1. 
196 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 241a26–b12. 
197 “Increase and decrease; of what can come to be and pass away, coming to be and 
passing away; of what can be carried along, locomotion.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, 
trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 201a13–14.)  
198 Whereas, alteration is always dependent upon contraries. 
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be” musical from being non-musical. The same example can be considered 
again, and apparently, a man survives the change and remains the same man 
when he becomes musical after having been not-musical. In this case, one of 
the contraries does not survive the change.  
These contraries, says Aristotle, are accidental elements of the 
subject and come from the appropriate contrary.199 When one of the 
contraries replaces the other, what remains is what lies under 
(hypokeimenon) the accidental predicates, even though changes can occur in 
the body of a man. For instance, Socrates’ body can be subject to several 
changes from one state of affairs to another, the same substance (ousia) – 
the same subject – remains as the same composite200 of substance and a new 
accident. In that sense, gaining a new characteristic can be described as the 
genesis of substance, as happens also in the case of alteration. Accordingly,  
Things which come to be without qualification, come to be in 
different ways: by change of shape, as a statue; by addition, 
as things which grow; by taking away, as the Hermes from 
the stone; by putting together, as a house; by alteration, as 
things which turn in respect of their matter. It is plain that 
these are all cases of coming to be from some underlying 
thing.201  
 
Elsewhere, he characterises this notion of change as an extraordinary 
difficulty:  
In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no being 
without qualification; yet in another sense they come-to-be 
always out of what is. For there must pre-exist something, 
which potentially is, but actually is not, and this thing is 
spoken of both as being and as not-being. These distinctions 
may be taken as established; but even then it is 
extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be unqualified 
coming-to-be.202 
 
These are two passages, in which the notion of genesis and its distinction 
from alteration or modification are explored. This explanation makes 
Aristotle’s point clear, namely that alteration belongs only to things in 
                                                        
199 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 188b1–3. 
200 This does not rule out the fact that Socrates remains as the same person through changes 
over time.  
201 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 190b5–10. 
202 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) On Generation and Corruption, 
317b15-–9. 
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themselves (kath‘ hauto), in which change occurs only through perceptible 
objects. Aristotle announces his point that alteration cannot belong to form 
(eidos), as gaining or loosing shape and form is not subject to alteration. 
Here, the question arises as to whether the matter (material parts) or the 
substance (ousia) is being shaped or re-arranged. If the process of genesis is 
being distinguished from the process of alteration, the subject of change – a 
new substance or what is being made – could not be the matter until the 
process of genesis is completed. For one thing, it could be suggested that it 
is not a question of existence or non-existence coming into being; rather, the 
question concerns the type of subject we take into account. The progress of 
genesis is related to the relation between potentiality (dunamis) and 
actuality (energeia/entelecheia) in the sense that if we think about a bronze 
statue (a famous example of Aristotle) to which the sculptor, who gives the 
form of a statue to a piece of bronze, is related only to the properties of 
bronze, as he designs his unique piece of art. He is making a bronze statue, 
which is not an instance of bronze, but something that is being shaped and 
formed. Therefore, the processes of alteration and genesis are related to the 
relation of potentiality and actuality, which also indicates the relation of 
matter and form. Since the alteration of bronze is necessary in the process of 
making a statue, alteration is a potential genesis.  
According to Aristotle’s argument, the genesis of a bronze statue is 
not equivalent to a lump of bronze coming to have a shape in it. There is a 
distinction between the processes of genesis and those of alteration. Since 
statues receive predicates in a different mode than bronze composes receives 
predicates. If we apply this argument to all beings – living and non-living - 
then it is true that anything that comes-to-be has not been altered into being. 
Although in each thing, what comes-to-be is the matter that has been altered 
(or heated or cooled), anything that comes-to-be is not altered. Yet what is 
undergone in the process of genesis cannot be matter. There is no alteration 
with respect to shape or form. It is only the alteration of shape or form as the 
underlying thing (hypokeimenon) of new qualities. Whatever is said in 
accordance with shape or form is also a different sort of subject from matter, 
which comes to have shape or form in it. This distinction recalls Aristotle’s 
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crucial paragraph in Physics: “These distinctions drawn, one can gather 
from surveying the various cases of becoming in the way we are describing 
that there must always be an underlying something, namely that which 
becomes, and that this, though always one numerically, in form at least is 
not one. (By ‘in form’ I mean the same as ‘in account’.)” 203 
To speak of the underlying subject of a bronze statue seems quite 
peculiar. Thankfully, Aristotle is aware that the application of the progress 
of genesis and potentiality to non-living things like statue is quite obscure. 
In this respect, in non-living objects his argument concerning alteration 
applies to the properties or qualities of the object. By contrast, in living 
things – for our purpose, human beings – the potentiality–actuality relation 
applies to. The underlying thing (hypokeimenon) cannot be thought of as 
something that has been modified.  
What is remarkable here is the relation between alteration and 
genesis. When matter is being informed by alteration, it becomes intelligible 
through actuality. Nevertheless, in the case of genesis, matter is changed and 
altered into the genuine parts of substance (ousia). The actuality of matter is 
now in the form. Nevertheless, neither its material substratum nor its shape 
on its own can account for the idea of subject (hypokeimenon), as a genuine 
bearer and possessor of qualities.  
 
2.2.1 Identity as the Relation of “A Is Potentially B” 
Now let us return to consider whether the relationship between potentiality 
and actuality might apply to the unity of form and matter, and whether 
applying this notion allows us to talk of essence as the ultimate principle of 
identity. Aristotle uses the relationship between potentiality and actuality to 
demonstrate the unity of matter and form as a substantial unity. In 
Metaphysics, book 8, Eta, he uses the notion of potentiality and actuality in 
order to describe what makes man one:  
Why is he one and not many, e.g. animal—biped, especially 
if there are, as some say, an ideal animal and an ideal biped? 
Why are not those Ideas the ideal man, so that men would 
                                                        
203 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 190a13–16. 
	 87	
exist by participation not in man, nor in one Idea, but in two, 
animal and biped? And in general man would be not one but 
more than one thing, animal and biped. Clearly, then, if 
people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and 
speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty.204  
 
Yet, he suggests the difficulty dissolves “if, as we say, one element is matter 
and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, [then] the 
question will no longer be thought a difficulty.”205  
Although the unity of form and particular matter (Socrates’ body is a 
particular matter distinct from Callias’ body) may not seem to account for 
strict identity at first glance, Aristotle treats the potentiality–actuality 
relation as an adequate explanation of the composite: “What then is the 
cause of this—the reason why that which was potentially is actually, —what 
except, in the case of things which are generated, the agent? For there is no 
other reason why the potential sphere becomes actually a sphere, but this 
was the essence of either.”206 The cause of the difficulty appears especially 
in the substantial unity if one thinks that matter and form have distinct 
causes. Still, in Metaphysics Aristotle claims that for each individual the 
unity of matter and form can be explained through the notions of 
potentiality (matter) and actuality (form). Accordingly, “the proximate 
matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, the 
other actually. Therefore, to ask for the cause of their being one is like 
asking the cause of unity in general; for each thing is a unity, and the 
potential and the actual are somehow one.”207 A similar view is articulated 
in De Anima, where Aristotle says “Hence the soul must be a substance in 
the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But 
substance is actuality (entelecheia), and thus soul is the actuality of a 
body.”208 Along the same line, he claims “the soul is the first grade of 
actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.”209 At the same time, 
soul is the principle of body, and cannot exist without it. Soul (form) and 
                                                        
204 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1045a15–20. 
205 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1045a22–24. 
206 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1045a30–33. 
207 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1045b17–20. 
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209 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 412a 27.  
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body form a unity or composite in the same way that the composite of form 
and matter apply to a single unity of a being.210 “What is potentially” and 
“what is actually” are one, and they indicate a unifying mode of conception, 
rather than a mere synthesis of form and matter. For this reason, there is a 
substantial priority of actuality over potentiality.211 Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism explains how the persistent identity of an individual, which is 
not merely a continuity of form and matter individually, is explicable 
through the relation between actuality and potentiality. The following 
passage may be taken as a solution from Aristotle, which is offered in 
Metaphysics concerning the problem of how the idea of composition is 
possible:  
Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of 
definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the 
difficulty. But if, as we say, one element is matter and 
another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, 
the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. For this 
difficulty is the same as would arise if ‘round bronze’ were 
the definition of cloak; for this name would be a sign of the 
definitive formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of 
the unity of round and bronze? The difficulty disappears, 
because the one is matter, the other is form.212  
 
This is arguably the most crucial point of the discussion; that is, Aristotle’s 
solution is related to the distinctions of matter and form, and potentiality and 
actuality. There is only the relation between potentiality and actuality if each 
thing is taken as a unity of form and matter, then the potential and actual are 
somehow one.213 By following Aristotle’s relational explanation, we can 
now persuasively argue that we might think of the relation “A is potentially 
B” as it is applicable to the persistence condition of identity through time. If 
A and B are in different times and places, and if A is potentially B, then A is 
identical to B in substratum, because the relation connects the person to 
herself in different state of affairs. For instance, “Socrates as a boy” and 
“Socrates as a man” are identical in substance, which is teleological. 
“Socrates as a boy” is potentially “Socrates as a man”, where “is” might 
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212 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1045a21–31. 
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seem tenseless. Since it might be used to identify all the stages of change 
that Socrates has gone through. This “tenseless is” is key to the problem, as 
the question of “what/who is Socrates” implies something, which underlies 
his being and remains identical through time. This is Socrates, individual 
man and substance (ousia). Furthermore, there is a sense in which the 
essence of Socrates is a non-predicable subject of qualities. The essence of 
Socrates cannot be predicated universally and does not represent universal 
properties. In addition, a form as actuality implies that natural substances 
(such as human beings) are not a mere synthesis of matter and form, but 
basic and primary unities. This is where the foundations of Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism are based, which I take to indicate the notion of 
hylomorphism in its simple form. The implications of such considerations 
are pointed out in Physics, where he states: 
This then is one principle; one is the form or definition; then 
further there is its contrary, the privation. In what sense these 
are two, and in what sense more, has been stated above. The 
principles were three; our last statement has elucidated the 
difference between the contraries, the mutual relation of the 
principles, and the nature of what underlies. Whether the 
form or what underlies is the substance (ousia) is not yet 
clear. But that the principles are three, and in what sense, and 
the way in which each is a principle, is clear.214  
 
Despite this explicit acknowledgement of three principles, the obvious 
candidate for the principle of identity needs to be strong enough to entail the 
substantial theory of identity.  
 
2.3 Possibility of Particular Forms and Individuation 
Aristotle’s idea of form outlines the relation between “what it is to be you” 
(to soi einai) and “what it is to be Socrates”. There is a sense, in which 
Aristotle allows the idea of particular forms, which are not shared by the 
members or individuals of the same species.  At first glance, Aristotle might 
seem as if he is advocating the formal particularity of individual forms. In 
Metaphysics, book 7, Zeta, section 8 he explicitly claims that “when we 
have the whole such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is 
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Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is 
different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible.”215 Clearly, 
Socrates and Callias do not have individual forms, but they have similar 
forms. But why would we still think as if there is a scope for the ontology of 
particular forms in Aristotle’s view of substance (ousia)? Neither in 
Metaphysics, nor in other books has Aristotle satisfactorily answered this 
question. However, in Metaphysics his attention is fixed on the claim that no 
universal can be substance (ousia). We also know for certain that Aristotle 
takes form to be substance (ousia). He writes, “by form I mean the essence 
of each thing and its primary substance.”216 It is clear from these two claims 
that Aristotle is setting high standards for the idea of particular essences 
(forms), according to which forms or essences are not universals. On the 
one hand he treats essence as a particular thing; on the other hand, he claims 
that two individuals share the same form. It is fair to point out the 
distinction here that Aristotle gives quite unintentionally, which is that 
individuals have two sort of forms that one is a species form and a part of 
the unity. Although Aristotle does not spell out this distinction explicitly, 
what follows is that if forms or essences are not universals, then they should 
be particulars. Thus, forms are particular.  
The motivation behind the claim “no universal is substance” is quite 
clear if we also look at De Interpretatione, section 7, where Aristotle posits, 
“Now of actual things some are universal, others particular (I call universal 
that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and particular 
that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular). So it 
must be of a universal that one states that something holds or does not, 
sometimes of a particular.”217 
 
2.3.1 Individuation: Particular Substance as a Causal Relation 
The question that remains is, To what extent are Callias and Socrates’ 
essences distinct and particular? First of all, I would like to point out that for 
Socrates to have a direct awareness of himself and the idea of his persistent 
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identity, he has to have an individual concept of himself. Individuating a 
person requires a criterion that is true of that person as one and exclusively, 
but of no one else. We should be able to differentiate Socrates not only 
through his empirical features, but also through something more substantial 
that enables us to pick Socrates out among other individuals. The profound 
way to meet such an inquiry is to say that before individuating Socrates we 
should be able to locate him among certain species. We should differentiate 
the members of that class and specify the ways in which each person is 
related to other members in a unique way. To individuate Socrates is neither 
to relate nor to compare him to Callias, even though such a comparison 
might be the only way we can ever have. Undoubtedly, our concern here is 
to individuate Socrates in virtue of Socrates, thus, the identity of Socrates is 
determined only in virtue of Socrates.  
The relation of an individual as subject or substance (ousia) with its 
parts (his body and form, or more to our concern, his physical and 
psychological continuity) may be conceived as the unifying causal 
relationship. The logic of this explanation is to understand what kind of 
causal principle can explain the notion of an individual’s substantial being. 
In Metaphysics, book 7, Zeta, section 17, Aristotle makes a new start, where 
he examines the question of why substance (ousia) is a sort of cause and 
principle, which exist separately from perceptible substances.218 To seek a 
causal principle is to give an answer to such a question as “Why is Socrates 
Socrates?” or “On what account is Socrates Socrates?” For these questions 
to be intelligible, we can direct them in a form of “Why does one thing 
belong to something else?”219 In the explanation that something is the case – 
Socrates is Socrates – Aristotle claims, we already presuppose that 
something is the case; namely the answer has been decided. Since, he 
expands, “each thing is indivisible from itself that it is being one”.220 There 
is always a brief and common answer to a question like “Why is Socrates 
himself?” However, in order to avoid the regress, Aristotle argues that the 
question, “What is a man?” seeks the substance or the essence of something, 
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and the question seems to be asking why one thing belongs to another, such 
as Socrates’ identity (his essence, what it is to be Socrates) belongs to 
something (to his being the subject of predicates), which makes Socrates 
identical to himself through time. What has been sought in both questions, 
then, is the causal principle of his identity, which underlies his accidental 
predicates – such as, being white or musical, being-in-the-marketplace at t1 
and being-in-the-Lyceum at t2. The reason to seek an underlying thing 
(hypokeimenon) as a further element in his identity – even though one might 
presume the fact that “this is Socrates and something possesses his body” – 
is to look for something more substantial, which is the substance (ousia) or 
essence.  
However, one may be concerned about how the principle or causal 
relation between accidental qualities or properties and the unity of man – the 
composite of form and matter – can represent a substantial unity within the 
individual subject. In order to articulate an account of the subject’s 
“thisness”, Aristotle draws our attention to two types of causes. First is the 
final cause, which represents “for the sake of which”, and the second is the 
efficient cause, which indicates the first mover.221 Here, the relation 
between causes and the essence of a thing remains unclear. However, 
Aristotle identifies final and efficient causes with essences:  
This is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases 
is that for the sake of which, e.g. perhaps in the case of a 
house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for this 
also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the 
case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in 
the case of being also.222  
 
There is a sense in which the questions of what something is and what or 
who made this thing need to be distinguished. Nevertheless, Aristotle uses 
final and efficient causes in order to draw attention to form (eidos) and 
essence.  
In several passages of Metaphysics, Aristotle describes the relation 
between efficient cause and essence with an analogy, in which efficient 
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cause is the form of art and the essence is something rather than the artist. 
He says, “each thing is caused by itself” and “each thing is one and the same 
thing with its essence.” 223 If each thing is caused by itself, then these causes 
are the substance of each thing, namely, the principle of Socrates’ identity is 
indeed Socrates himself.224 Accordingly, “So that, just as in reasonings, the 
substance is the principle of all things. For reasonings proceed from the 
'what it is', and in these cases the geneses do as well.”225 If the substance 
(ousia) of a person is treated as a universal predicate (as a quality) in its 
application to its matter, then there will be a need for a separate unifying 
cause. For Aristotle, the substance (ousia) of Socrates determines his body, 
and his body is itself in actuality only if it is in his non-universal form, 
which is an individual essence.  
One way of articulating an account of the subject is described in 
Metaphysics concerning the type of substances (ousia) we are taking into 
account, either matter or body, or nature or form (eidos). Aristotle calls form 
a “this”.226 But how can the nature of form indicate the sort of a particular 
notion? The form is the principle in itself – “into which” or “towards which” 
- and also the principle of a particular individual, such as Socrates and 
Callias. Yet, Aristotle was aware of the fact that the form of the individual 
on its own cannot represent the principle of identity. In Metaphysics, book 
7, Zeta, section 11, Aristotle raises an issue regarding whether the particular 
individual is analysable as a universal mode of the unity of form and body. 
There is a good reason to think that Aristotle was seeking separable 
individual natural substances. If, Aristotle says, the essence of Socrates – 
what it is to be Socrates, what it means to be Socrates – is his psyche, which 
is the form of the living human being that captures both its biological and 
psychological nature, then apparently he was aware that psyche cannot 
                                                        
223 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1032b13; 
1034a24. 
224Aristotle seems to envisage a unity of final efficient and formal causes in order to explain 
substance: “But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, 
the final cause is sought in the case of being also” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by 
Barnes, J. 1991, Metaphysics, 1041a31-32.) “Since, then, substance is a principle and a 
cause” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes. J. 1991 Metaphysics,1041a8–9.) 
225 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1034a31–33. 
226 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1017b23–25. 
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apply in the sense of species form as a universal property that attaches to his 
body, but rather in the sense of being a separable form, which is the 
actuality of his body. Therefore, Socrates’ essence is the efficient, final, and 
formal cause at the same time, which is not a universal predicate, but “this” 
(tode ti), this particular body and particular form or essence. Some further 
distinctions may be made as to whether particular forms or the unity of form 
and body represents the idea of identity as one operating principle. I think 
taking Aristotle as being in favour of particular forms for the sake of 
announcing the notion of personal identity might be helpful here. Yet for the 
purpose of this thesis, we are mainly interested in the broader conception of 
the unity of form and matter.  
The picture I have been drawing in previous sections with broad 
strokes is based on the hylomorphic unity of form and matter, and the 
concept of unity that I have been trying to draw the reader towards regards 
where we think of the description of essence and form as roughly 
corresponding to the thisness of Socrates when it comes to personal identity 
and persistence conditions.  
 
2.3.2 Essence as the Subject of Predicates 
By and large, it seems hard to deny that the criterion that constitutes 
Socrates’ identity – and the persistence conditions of his identity – have 
now been answered. The unity of identity is Socrates’ essence (his thisness), 
namely “what was/is to be Socrates”. As noted earlier, Aristotle describes 
essence through the formula (to ti en einai – “what was/is it to be”, “what it 
means to be”), which is considered in virtue of being the ultimate subject of 
predicates. There are sections in Metaphysics, in which Aristotle clearly 
identifies the essence or form as the ultimate subject of predicates. Firstly, 
the claim appears in the following passage: “we must first determine the 
nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in 
the truest sense its substance (ousia). And in one sense matter is said to be 
of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third sense, the 
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compound of these.”227 Accordingly, the composite of form and matter as 
substance is the primary unity. Secondly, he adds “about the essence and 
about the substrate, of which we have said that it underlies in two senses, 
either being a ‘this’ – which is the way in which an animal underlies its 
attributes – or as the matter underlies the complete reality.”228 Namely, the 
essence of a person, what makes Socrates Socrates, is substratum, not just 
the material substratum, but unity, which is the subject. Moreover, in 
Metaphysics, book 8, Eta, he states that:  
The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the 
matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a ‘this’ 
actually, is potentially a ‘this’), and in another sense the 
formula or form (which being a ‘this’ can be separately 
formulated), and thirdly the complex of matter and form, 
which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without 
qualification, capable of separate existence.229  
 
In this sense, the essence is the primary substance230 and the substance 
(ousia) of each thing, not in the way that matter is the subject of predicates, 
but in the sense of a subject in its own right. Accordingly, “the essence of 
each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself. For being you is not 
being musical; for you are not musical in virtue of yourself. What, then, you 
are in virtue of yourself is your essence.”231 So the essence of a person is not 
what is said attributively232 or a shared attribute in common with other 
members of the same species.233  The essence formula (to ti en einai- what 
was/is it to be) is in a way seeks the fundamental (substantial) 
characteristics of the subject, such as when we ask, What characteristics 
does Socrates have in order to be Socrates? The being of Socrates is his 
                                                        
227 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1029a2. 
228 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1038b4–6. 
229 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1042a26–30. 
230 In Metaphysics the primary substance is described as “what is not spoken of as one thing 
being in another, that is, in a substratum as its matter” “By form I mean the essence of each 
thing and its primary substance” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, 
Metaphysics 1032b2–3.) 
231 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1029b13–16. 
232 “Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence – only species 
will have it, for in these the subject is not thought to participate in the attribute and to have 
it as an affection, nor to have it by accident” Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, 
J.1991 Metaphysics, 1030a13–14.) 
233 “It is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact 
that no common predicate indicates a ‘this’, but rather a ‘such’. (Complete Works of 
Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, Metaphysics 1038b34; 1039a1.) 
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being as the ultimate subject of his characteristics. Socrates’ primary 
substance, which is the composite of his form and body, expresses the 
actuality of his being as the subject. Therefore, Aristotle claims, Socrates’ 
being as the subject of predicates cannot be explained by universal or 
common predicates; rather, his essence is “this” (tode ti), which is an 
individual thing.234  
Still, it may remain unclear what Aristotle means in Metaphysics by 
claiming that “what it is to be” is per se or to be virtue of itself?235 
According to Aristotle, the essence of a thing is in virtue of itself and differs 
from “what it is” (ti esti) so long as it is excluded from the accidental 
predicates of a subject. Indeed, the formula of “what is it to be that thing”’ 
(or whatness) is elucidated by universal and common predicates. However, 
Aristotle gives more weight to the individual essence of a thing, as it has a 
specific individual and particular meaning. This individuality will also 
indicate Socrates’ individual properties, which are separate, continuant, and 
always present in him and in who he is. The crucial question may therefore 
regard to what extent does being in virtue of itself, per se (kath‘ hauto), 
applies to essences. Aristotle explicitly states that the essence of a thing 
belongs to the thing itself, which is not expressed according to participation, 
quality or attribute.236 In the following paragraphs of this particular section 
in Metaphysics, the conception of essence, namely the essence of persons, is 
evidently directed to the notion of individual form and matter, upon which 
the identity principle of an individual is precisely based. Therefore, Aristotle 
concludes, in virtue of itself must have several meanings: 
It applies to (1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in 
virtue of himself Callias and the essence of Callias; (2) 
whatever is present in the ‘what’, e.g. Callias is in virtue of 
himself an animal. For ‘animal’ is present in the formula that 
defines him; Callias is a particular animal.—(3) Whatever 
attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its 
parts, e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is 
alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life directly 
resides, is a part of the man.—(4) That which has no cause 
other than itself; man has more than one cause—animal, two-
                                                        
234 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1030a28–32. 
235“Each being is said to be by itself”. 
236 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1030a13. 
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footed—but man is man in virtue of himself.—(5) Whatever 
attributes belong to a thing alone and qua alone; hence also 
that which exists separately is ‘in virtue of itself’.237 
Apparently, the conception of particularity in form and matter adopted here 
is much more in line with what Aristotle had in mind. That is to say, there is 
nothing more substantial to a person’s being than her essence.238 It is quite 
clear for Aristotle that one cannot consider otherwise cannot be the case. 
Because the notion of essence is fundamental to any attribute. In this regard, 
the essence is the subject, which is definite and underlies accidental and 
essential predicates, in the way of being a causal principle of these 
predicates. As Aristotle puts in Metaphysics,239  
The essence and the individual thing are in some cases the 
same; i.e. in the case of primary substances, e.g. curvature 
and the essence of curvature, if this is primary. (By a primary 
substance I mean one, which does not imply the presence of 
something in something else, i.e. in a substrate, which acts as 
matter.) But things which are of the nature of matter or of 
wholes which include matter, are not the same as their 
essences, nor are accidental unities like that of Socrates and 
musical; for these are the same only by accident.240   
 
The role of essence is primary here. It neither belongs to universal 
predicates, nor species form (genus), but it is a primary substance as it 
underlies accidental and essential properties, not as a material substratum, 
but as something specifically “this”. To have a particular form denotes both 
necessary and sufficient conditions to the being in order to be an individual. 
It is also quite hard to see how an individual, such as Callias or Socrates, is 
identical with the particular form that indicates how the form of a man is 
identical with Callias or Socrates. In Metaphysics book 7 Zeta sections 6 
and 11, however, Aristotle claims that only those things, which are said in 
respect of themselves (kath ‘hauto) are identical with their essences, which 
are things that include individuals like Socrates. 
                                                        
237 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1022a25-36. 
238 “Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its 
essence.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, Metaphysics, 1032a4-5.) 
239 The same remark is stated in Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) 
Posterior Analytics 73b7 “what is not predicated of a subject as substance.” 
240 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1037b2-8. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the essence formula – what it is to be Socrates – invites the 
notion of universal predicates. Aristotle is quite straightforward and 
redirects our attention to understanding the essence of persons. Namely, it is 
the principle of one’s identity away from universality and towards 
something much more in touch with how we normally think of individuals. 
This line of interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of particular essence is due 
to the fact that the principle of Socrates’ identity is the actual primary “this” 
and another thing that exists potentially. The universal causes or forms do 
not exist. The individuality itself is the source of individuals.241 Still, the 
metaphysical question of “what we are” seeks clarification of attributes to 
the ultimate subject of predicates, which is, strictly speaking, non-universal 
and not common among the other members, and more importantly, it is 
continuous as one and unchanged unity through time. For instance, if we 
take the essence formula “what is it to be Socrates” as being wise, it might 
be, somehow, distinct to Socrates’ being and represent one of his essential 
qualities, and we tend to refer to all the characteristics of Socrates in the 
same vein. However, the essence is the subject as a principle, which 
determines the meaning of universal predicates.  
The essence of Socrates, then, is not a subject without attributes, but 
is the underlying principle and ultimate subject of these attributes. 
Therefore, the essence of Socrates cannot be conceived either as an 
independent or ideal entity of his form, or his body, but the actuality of his 
body. Thus, there is no reason to think that Socrates can be stripped away 
from his accidental properties, such as being musical, non-musical, a white 
man, biped animal, and so on. Form is a “this” (tode ti), not in itself, but 
rather by virtue of being consisted in a particular body.242 Here, Aristotle’s 
concern is not whether Socrates has these essential or accidental predicates; 
rather, it is how Socrates’ essence as a subject could have these predicates. 
Although Socrates’ wisdom, which is a fulfilment of his nature, might be a 
criterion of his identity, it does not answer the question of how wisdom 
                                                        
241 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1071a24-26.  
242 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 403b5-11. 
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belongs to Socrates. If what matters is how Socrates’ essence could have 
these predicates, it then becomes clear that (i) the substantial form (not a 
species form) of Socrates is particular, (ii) the essence of Socrates is his 
substantial form, and (iii) for the sake of continuity of identity through time 
substantial form is particular; therefore, (iv) individuals are particulars. 
This interpretation of Aristotle is not entirely new,243 where 
substantial forms are numerically different within the members of the same 
species, yet all members share a single definition. By contrast, the advocates 
of universal form have taken another approach, in which they are against the 
attribution of particular forms. They have indicated the substantial number 
of paragraphs in Metaphysics,244 where Aristotle reminds us that “the 
universal is thought to be in the fullest sense a cause, and a principle.” 
As the debate over the nature of form, and the role that is as a 
principle and a cause plays in fixing the context of one’s beliefs, is quite far-
reaching, it is no surprise that there are quite distinctive variations of 
interpretations on Aristotle’s formulation of the relation between form and 
body. My understanding of the relation centres on the possibility of 
particular forms in virtue of the dominant view in Metaphysics. My 
                                                        
243 For proponents of such view see, e.g., Frede, M. (1987); Frede, M. and Patzig, G. 
(1988); Witt, C. (1989). Whereas, Scaltsas, T. (1994) has a sort of content-based 
interpretation stays between the conflicts of two different refinements. Scaltsas’ middle 
way offers the concept of substantial forms to be particular in existence (actuality) and 
universal in thought (abstraction). It is more like the object of thought illustration, where 
we think of one determinate entity like human and but not various particular human beings. 
Socrates is a particular human being that ceases to exist while our thought of human beings 
and what constitutes human beings persist. What we are thinking in actuality has to be an 
abstraction and a separately existing paradigm. His twofold explanation of substantial 
forms is extensively differentiated from the hylomorphic notion of hybrid features of 
persons.  
244 There are passages in Metaphysics, however, which are thought to represent an opposite 
interpretation of particular substantial forms “Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself 
neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; 
nor yet negatively, for negations also will belong to it only by accident.” (Complete Works 
of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes J. 1991, Metaphysics 1029a24-26.) “As the substrate and the 
essence and the compound of these are called substance, so also is the universal. About two 
of these we have spoken; about the essence and about the substrate, of which we have said 
that it underlies in two senses, either being a ‘this’ – which is the way in which an animal 
underlies its attributes - or as the matter underlies the complete reality. The universal also is 
thought by some to be in the fullest sense a cause, and a principle” (Complete Works of 
Aristotle, trans. by Barnes J. 1991, Metaphysics 1038b1-7.) For advocates of universal 
forms see, e.g., Burnyeat (1979); Halper (1989); Lewis (1991); Loux (1991). 	
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adaptation of this reading is best understood by evaluating it within the 
unity of form and body as an underlying element (the principle, substance) 
of one’s identity. It is critical for the discussion carried out above that we 
should recognise, as Aristotle mostly has, that defenders of particular forms 
are, in a sense, also prone to accept that persons are best to be understood as 
a whole within the hylomorphic unity.  
I propose that the views argued in this and the subsequent chapters 
resolve rather serious problems with current formulations of the notion of an 
individual. Hence, the discussion in this chapter was really an attempt to 
adjudicate the benefits of the moderately hylomorphic view as formulated 
by Aristotle implicitly, if not explicitly. It will be argued in the next chapter 
that any reductionist approach, an approach that reduces the principle of 
identity to either form or matter, is better prepared to handle a rather serious 
problem, which contemporary commentators of personal identity face 
inevitably. Enough has been said about the possibility of particular forms; 
now, in order to stick to the original intention of this thesis I will try to focus 
my investigation exclusively on Aristotle’s hylomorphism and how I can 
develop a hybrid argument of identity by engaging Aristotle’s hylomorphic 
idea of substances presented in Physics and extensively advanced in 
Metaphysics. 
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Chapter 3: Maintaining the Hylomorphic Unity 
 
This chapter will demonstrate how Aristotle’s hylomorphism sheds light on 
the intuitive and theoretical character of personal identity and persistence 
conditions. The main issues with the problem of mind–body dualism have 
been persisted into the present since the early modern era, and carried out 
within the Lockean tradition as pointed out in the first chapter. In this 
chapter, I claim that taking Aristotelian hylomorphism into account not only 
provides an insight into understanding of the relation between mind and 
body, but also affords hybrid approach through which to comprehend the 
notion of a person as a unity and individual both in psychological and in 
biological terms. As Christopher Shields puts it bluntly, “[Aristotle’s] 
hylomorphism does provide a framework for thinking about soul–body 
relations which succeeds in acknowledging the full complement of 
phenomena we should wish to explain.”245  
Given that the main problem remains mysterious in considering the 
notion of an individual as a composite, it has become imperative to discuss 
several concerns. Firstly, do we actually understand what the essence and 
form of a person is? What consequences does hylomorphism offer for the 
unity of matter and form, and for the individual that these components 
compose? Aristotle’s metaphysics enables us to grasp their functions in his 
hylomorphic theory, yet a hylomorphic account remains questionable 
whether there is the possibility of reading some passages in Aristotle’s text 
according to which either form or matter can be acknowledged as the nature 
of individuality and identity. Moreover, since the relation between matter 
and form and the relevancy of this relation to the unity of a composite 
remains debatable, I attempt to determine why employing the Aristotelian 
model of hylomorphism is sufficient for understanding the persistence 
conditions of personal identity, considering a variety of both reductionist 
and non-reductionist approaches. The hybrid approach I propose will 
demonstrate the possibility of interpreting the notion of personal identity as 
a complete unity of psychological and biological traits by advancing the 
                                                        
245 Shields (2009) p. 307.  
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unity of form and matter.  
In the previous chapter, I presented a detailed outline of Aristotle’s 
characterisation of form (shape/morphe) and matter, which are the essential 
components of primary being. Here, I will attempt to demonstrate the main 
argument behind the relation between a hylomorphic compound and the 
persistence conditions of identity. Furthermore, I will assess which tools are 
needed to explain Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis within the contemporary 
discussion of the subject at hand. I claim that the principle of unity, in which 
something is composed of distinctive parts, defines an individual. I also 
claim that the principle of individuation, which makes an individual distinct 
from other members of the same species, is going to be the ultimate tool of 
this project. In order to explain the identity claim, I argue that both 
principles are necessary and sufficient to account for the notion of an 
underlying principle, which supports both diachronic and numerical 
perspectives of identity. Let us first look closely at Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism and highlight its roles in treating the problems of personal 
identity.  
 
3.1 The Aristotelian Hybrid View of Individuals  
Aristotle’s notion of hylomorphism marks a major shift from The 
Categories to Metaphysics in characterising the notion of a subject. In 
Metaphysics, he explains substance as a subject, where substance is that of 
which attributes are predicated. The shift pointed out in the subject becomes 
more apparent in determining the matter as substrata, which is primary and 
revealing the unchanging empirical structure of an individual. Substance 
emerges as a principle, cause, and definable thing.246 Nevertheless, in 
explaining the nature of substance he puts more weight on form when he 
describes the causal force of the soul in De Anima, where he states,  
What has been said in the case of parts must of course be 
understood as applying to the whole living body. For there is 
an analogy: as one part is to one part, so the whole perceptive 
faculty is to the whole of the body which is capable of 
                                                        
246 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Metaphysics Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 
1028a32;1031a1.  
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perception, insofar as it is capable of perception. The body 
which has lost its soul is not the one which is potentially 
alive; this is rather the one which has a soul.247  
His point comes very close to revealing an identity relation, as he claims, 
The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms  
'cause' and 'source' have many senses. But the soul is the 
cause of its body alike in all three senses, which we explicitly 
recognize.  It is the source of movement, it is the end, it is the 
essence of the whole living body. That it is the last is clear; 
for in everything the essence is identical with the cause of its 
being, and here, in the case of living things, their being is to 
live, and of their being and their living the soul in them is the 
cause or source.248  
 
This statement quite openly captures the weight of hylomorphism on living 
things, including persons. The figure of form as a cause and principle seems 
more adequate than its being a mere shape (morphe), as the relation is 
widely explored in the bronze statue example, where in order to achieve that 
task, Aristotle accounted artefacts in the same theoretical agenda, as they 
more appropriately apply to living things and to persons. The ontological 
role of form is more reflective, where the form is an actuality of body, and 
essentially, what is it to be for a body, as Aristotle argues in De Anima.249  
 However, within Aristotle’s metaphysics, a description is still required 
for identity and its ontological status as a unity without reducing it to 
components. It is then that we can describe the individual by emphasising 
either her material or formal nature. This consideration underlines the non-
identical aspect of matter and form as one of the strands of his 
hylomorphism. Matter and form are neither identical to each other, nor to 
the individual that they compose. Since, if we think that matter and form are 
identical to each other, and to the individual, then we are forced to accept 
that there is no principle of individuation – and persistence of identity – 
maintained either through material or formal aspects. This controversy leads 
us to a tautology, in which on the one hand either matter or form is the 
principle of individuation and the principle of one’s identity simpliciter, 
                                                        
247 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 412b20–27.  
248 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 415b9–13.  
249 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 412b4–12.  
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while on the other hand, neither matter nor form on their own can be the 
source of individuation and identity. If we maintain that either the form or 
the matter of an individual is identical to the individual, then the main 
argument of this chapter (and throughout the work) advocates the claim that 
both form and matter are non-identical (a) to each other and (b) to the 
individual. The possibility is worth pointing out that matter is non-identical 
neither to form nor to the individual, and also matter itself fails to be the 
individual, such that the matter of a human being, nonetheless, is 
indistinguishable among human beings, so it is only enough to count as a 
part of the unity.  
In Metaphysics, Aristotle describes “what is it to be Socrates” with 
essence, which is defined as a primary substance, what was/is to be the thing 
itself both in the present and the past. This captures the specific feature of 
persistence conditions of living things.250 The essence of Socrates reveals a 
connection between what or who Socrates is and how we can describe him. 
Claiming that the essence of Socrates and his characteristic attributes are not 
only accidently connected to him means these attributes require a unity and 
connection between his essence and the continuity of his identity through 
time, since determining the essence of Socrates allows Socrates to act 
according to his characteristic features. Aristotle’s way of structuring the 
composite unifies the meaning of substance and essence, which are 
interconnected in the composite itself. It is the unified account of the way in 
which Socrates comes to be, who he is, and how he manages to survive 
accidental changes. These accidental changes include changes in his 
physical and psychological traits throughout his lifetime.  
 
3.2 Ontological Dependence and the Critique of Reductionist 
Approaches  
One may still ask, whether form is the actuality and principle of body, then 
to what extent is form or matter prior to the composite? In other words, is 
there any part of the composite prior to any other component? Answering 
this question allows us to interpret how hylomorphism proposes a claim 
                                                        
250 For our purposes in this thesis, it is the persistence conditions of persons.  
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against reductionist accounts of identity (psychological and physical 
accounts in particular). In this section, I employ the hylomorphic unity in 
order to explain the persistence conditions, as they are nothing but the unity 
of psychological and physical attributes.  
We see in Metaphysics book 7, Zeta, that Aristotle uses the term 
“part” with several meanings, such as to measures another thing regarding 
its quantity, or in the sense that parts are the components of which substance 
consists.251 Form and matter are not intuitively parts of the individual, yet 
they are not mereological parts of the component. This is because in the 
ideal sense of hylomorphism, an individual could lose her arm, for instance, 
yet still persist through her loss. By contrast, she cannot persist after the loss 
of any primary component. We see a similar claim in De Anima that 
Aristotle posits, where he says,  
Suppose that the eye were an animal—sight would have been 
its soul, for sight is the substance of the eye which 
corresponds to the account, the eye being merely the matter 
of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an 
eye, except in name—no more than the eye of a statue or of a 
painted figure. We must now extend our consideration from 
the parts to the whole living body; for what the part is to the 
part, that the whole faculty of sense is to the whole sensitive 
body as such.252  
 
If, Aristotle states, one organ – although perhaps not a major life-depending 
organ such as the brain or cerebrum alone – is removed from the body, or 
when a human dies, the organ is no longer an organ except in name.253 
Organs are described according to their functions. If the organ is removed, 
the part of the body, which was the functioning organ before, ceases to be an 
organ, so it cannot function as that organ anymore. The organ must be in 
unity with the body, which is composed with the form. Regarding the form, 
the organ is subordinate in the account, so the form determines the function 
                                                        
251 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1034b34–36.  
252 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 412b18–24.  
253Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1035b24–25; De 
Anima, 412b20–22. Undoubtedly, identity is related to linguistic aspects, as we cannot 
identify entities without referring to their linguistic features. Such as, when we talk about 
identity and persistence conditions of an organ we refer to the organ as identical to itself, 
yet when it is removed and stopped functioning as the same organ as it was used to be, it 
cannot be identified as the same organ as it was attached to the body. 
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of this organ within the larger picture. For Aristotle, the whole lacks none of 
its parts, so it is complete,254 and remains as a unity even though it loses 
some parts after mutilation.255 This view leads us to another question: Do 
the identity and unity of composites accordingly depend upon their parts?256  
Several aspects of ontological dependence that are appropriate to 
consider here. To clarify the claim that “Socrates is ontologically dependent 
upon the unity of his form and body”, first we notice that if Socrates 
depends ontologically upon the composite, then his form and body represent 
the necessary condition for Socrates’ existence and his identity. If the 
composite exists, then Socrates also exists. It may be equally valid to argue 
that his form and body are the components of Socrates. Whenever Socrates 
exists then the composite exists. Nevertheless, the fact that his form and 
body once existed does not mean that they exist for the sake of Socrates to 
continue to exist. Consider a feature by which Socrates exists as Socrates in 
the way he is; Socrates is ontologically depending upon the unity of his 
form and body. Aristotle makes a similar claim: “For they [parts of a body] 
cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger in any state 
that is the finger of a living thing, but the dead finger is a finger only 
homonymously.”257 Yet, for Aristotle, the composite includes the parts of 
Socrates as long as he exists. Since his form and body are the components of 
Socrates, the ontological dependence upon his form and body must be 
mutual for Socrates to be unified. What constitutes Socrates’ identity and 
persistence conditions is his essence, namely the unity of form and matter.  
 In his discussion of the notion of substance Wiggins gives a similar 
understanding of the ontological dependence/independence. He notices that 
when it comes to dispositions of ontological dependence, the notion of 
                                                        
254 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1023b26–8. 
255 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1024a16.  
256 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1024a15: 
1024a22-25.  
257 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1035b23–28. The 
same remark is emphasized by Munzer, who pointed out “under [Aristotle’s] functional 
account, there seems to be an interval in which the transplanted part is not an organ, or is 
only homonymously an organ. A promising contemporary approach to this question makes 
identity of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) a necessary condition of the identity of natural 
organs over time.” Munzer (1993) p.110.  
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substance as a unity is prior to its parts, and this is what underlies the 
unchanging fact about our identity. Wiggins states that “Something that has 
this autonomy may be causally dependent on other things in the way in 
which the infant depends on the mother; but ontologically speaking, it is still 
independent”258, which in return offers a sort of hybrid unity. The reason 
Wiggins takes these parts and unity relation in favour of the independence 
of substantial unity is that, for him, we are both organisms and persons, as 
these two terms refer to the same entity. However, we use the term “person” 
only in order to refer to the organism in virtue of psychological properties, 
which are not essential to the organism. These psychological properties are 
not fully present when a human being born and they may cease to exist in 
later life. A person is not a distinct substance, but only a stage in a human’s 
life. So, personhood, adds Wiggins, is not a substance sortal but a phase 
sortal. 
If we employ the hylomorphic model I articulated above, it could be 
concluded that neither Socrates’ form (actualising principle/psychological 
traits), nor his matter (body/physical traits) is prior to Socrates himself as a 
unique individual. The composite of his substantial form and body denotes 
the same entity with himself, Socrates. If his form were prior to his body, 
then Aristotle’s argument, which he extensively articulated in Metaphysics 
book 7, Zeta – “form is not universal” – would be disregarded. Along the 
same lines, if his body were prior to his form, then again, Aristotle would 
not talk about form as the actualising principle of body, which makes the 
body a certain kind and what it is.    
Following the Aristotelian theory, in order to discern what the 
essence of an individual is, which determines what it is to be for a certain 
individual, we refer to components, matter and form. As Aristotle points out 
“therefore to bring all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the matter is 
useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular 
matter, or particular things in a particular state.”259 As pointed out earlier 
Aristotle argues that both form and matter determine the character and 
                                                        
258 Wiggins (2001) p.242. 
259 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1036b22–24. 
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identity of an individual.   
With the understanding of this type of ontological dependence in the 
background I suggest that in the unity of a person, neither part is initially 
prior to the other. Since, both matter and form are equally prior as a unity. 
In initialising this argument, I will try to clarify the ways in which we can 
understand the hylomorphic claim.260 Accordingly: 
              (i) the whole is made of elements,  
(ii) parts of the component are dependent upon the whole, yet  
(iii) there is a mutual dependence between the whole and its parts: 
“The elements in the formula which explains a thing are parts of 
the whole; this is why the genus is called a part of the species, 
though in another sense the species is part of the genus.”261 
Aristotle opens up the discussion by claiming “that which is true of a whole 
class and is said to hold good as a whole (which implies that it is a kind of 
whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it contains many things by being 
predicated of each, and that each and all of them, e.g. man, horse, dog, are 
one, because all are living things.”262 Hence, certain parts of substances are 
prior and some are posterior, yet some exist simultaneously with the 
composite. This, Aristotle suggests, leads us to conclude that “if then matter 
is one thing, form another, the compound of these a third, and both the 
matter and the form and the compound are substance, even the matter is in a 
sense called part of a thing, while in a sense it is not, but only the elements 
of which the formula of the form consists.”263 If the unity of an individual 
requires both of these elements simultaneously, then form or matter neither 
pre-exists, nor persists in the absence of the other. Considering this 
statement, we can suggest that form and matter are both contingent, yet 
necessary, as neither can exist in the absence of the other.  
In On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle explains how alteration 
                                                        
260 The notion of hybrid view in this thesis is now differentiated from Wiggins’, by pointing 
out that there is a mutual dependence between the whole and its parts. Whereas, in 
Wiggins’ reasoning there is only one type of dependence relation between the whole and its 
parts, which is the parts are ontologically dependent on the whole, strictly speaking.  
261 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1023b23–25.  
262 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1023b29–36.  
263 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1035b3.  
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in properties occurs while their form and matter remain: “For in that which 
underlies the change there is a factor corresponding to the definition and 
there is a material factor. When, then, the change is in these factors, there 
will be coming-to-be or passing-away; but when it is in the thing’s 
affections and accidental, there will be alteration.”264 The thing’s affections 
and accidental changes are determined by form’s predication of matter. 
These changes are essential to the composites but cannot be constituents of 
it.  
For all changes and alterations at hand, this notion of essentialism, in 
which matter and form composes individual essence, requires individuation 
and identity claims. The difference in their matter or form between Socrates 
and Callias is necessary and sufficient for the principle of individuation. 
That is to say, according to the principle of individuation, no two objects 
can have the same components in the same way. In Metaphysics, book 7, 
Zeta, section 8, Aristotle explicitly states that Socrates and Callias are 
different in virtue of their matter but the same in their from, as their form is 
indivisible.265 A mainstream interpretation of this particular passage, which 
is also adapted by the followers of reductionist and physicalist accounts of 
identity, indicates that two members of the same species share the same 
form (as species form is universal), and the only individuating principle is 
their matter. What defines one’s identity is merely their matter. However, in 
later passages Aristotle also claims that “the causes of different individuals 
are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from 
mine, while in their universal formula they are the same.”266 This passage is 
interpreted as underlining the priority of form that distinctiveness of matter 
is posterior regarding the unity and distinctiveness of form. The passage 
also shows why the identity claim in hylomorphism is more accountable 
than essentialism regarding the principle of individuation and 
                                                        
264 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) On Generation and Corruption, 
317a23–26. 
265 “And when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, 
this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is 
different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, 
trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1034a5–8.) 
266 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1071a27–29. 
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distinctiveness. Since, here, essentialism will not solve the puzzle, instead 
relying on the fact that form and matter are essentially composed within the 
unity of an individual. To clarify the notion of an underlying thing 
(hypokeimenon), we need to consider it within the distinctive nature of an 
individual as a unity and composite. There is a passage in Physics book I267 
references the identity claim that denotes the meaning of hypokeimenon as 
something persistent through coming-to-be: 
Now we distinguish matter and privation, and hold that one 
of these, namely the matter, accidentally is not, while the 
privation in its own nature is not; and that the matter is 
nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the privation in no 
sense is. For the one which persists is a joint cause, with the 
form, of what comes to be—a mother, as it were.268  
 
The hylomorphic unity is the principle of individuation and identity of an 
individual that is non-identical to either of parts of the component. If we 
suppose that the composite or the unity of form and matter itself are 
identical to the individual whose composite it is, then claiming that the 
composite itself is the principle of individuation and identity cannot suggest 
more than that the individual herself is the principle of individuation and 
identity. Therefore, by tautology, there will be no principle of individuation 
and identity at all.  
We are therefore motivated to search for the principle of 
individuation and identity in distinctive sources of hylomorphism, which 
can be done with less strain than is required of followers of the mainstream 
                                                        
267 In Physics I.8 (191a27–31), Aristotle sets out the aporia about things coming-to-be or 
ceasing to be. Aristotle describes the aporia that his predecessors attempted to clarify: “So 
they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, 
because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not both of which 
are impossible. For what cannot have come to be (because it is already), and from what is 
not nothing could have come to be (because something must be underlying).” The premises 
are carried out as follows: If coming to be is impossible, then; 
(i) Things must come from either what it is, or what is not,  
(ii)   Both possibilities are incorrect,  
(ii) If these are the only possibilities, then there is a contradiction that coming-to-be is  
impossible. 
The dilemma here is about how coming to be proceed from what is or what is not? Another 
ambiguity is also crucial here whether “what is” is being itself, or a being. Nevertheless, the 
main thing concerns us here is Aristotle's term of hypokeimenon, more specifically, an 
underlying thing as a subject that proves the operative notion of the identity claim in 
Aristotle’s metaphysics.  
268 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 192a4–14. 
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view.269 After adopting Aristotle’s account of ontological dependence, again 
we might ask our initial question concerning the principle of individuation 
and identity. This question will require a further investigation of whether the 
identity of an individual is reducible to its parts. 
 
3.2.1 Matter or Body as The Principle of Individuation and Identity 
In the previous section, I have pointed out that there is strong textual 
evidence in Aristotle’s works to explain how matter and form are not 
identical to each other or to the composite itself. A famous passage in De 
Anima refers to the soul (form)-body unity: “Hence too we should not ask 
whether the soul and body are one.”270 Here, he claims that the unity of form 
and matter emerges from the fact that the body of Socrates and Socrates 
himself are one, and we do not need an explanation for the unity of 
Socrates’ form and body.  
In Physics, matter is the primary substratum of each thing and it 
persists non-accidentally through change and generation.271 What’s more, 
for Aristotle matter is a significant individuating principle regarding 
numerical diversity among the members of the same species.272 One 
remarkable passage in Zeta explicitly classifies the principle of 
                                                        
269 Who claim that either form or matter is the principle of individuation and identity.  
270 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima 412b6–7. Aristotle 
indicates a great deal of hylomorphic unity of persons, a third thing (triton ti in Greek), the 
terms used in Plato’s Sophist, where he states being must therefore a third thing, apart from 
motion and rest, not the sum total of those two items either), where he says “sensible ousia 
is changeable, between contraries or their intermediates, but there must be some third thing 
(ti triton) underlying the contraries [or intermediates], something enduring.” (Complete 
Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, Metaphysics, 1069b3.) Aristotle offers 
appositive account on his analysis of soul and body, as the unity of those two is indeed ti 
triton in his hylomorphic middle way.  
271 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Physics, 192a31–33.  
272 “Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by 
analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose formula is one, in 
genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are 
related as a third thing is to a fourth.” (Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 
1991, Metaphysics, 1016b31–32.) “Some parts are neither prior nor posterior to the whole, 
i.e. those which are most important and in which the formula, i.e. the substance, is 
immediately present, e.g. perhaps the heart or the brain; for it does not matter which of the 
two has this quality. But man and horse and terms which are thus applied to individuals, but 
universally, are not substance but something composed of this particular formula and this 
particular matter treated as universal; but when we come to the individual, Socrates is 
composed of ultimate individual matter; and similarly in all other cases.” Complete Works 
of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. 1991, Metaphysics, 1035b24-31.) 
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individuation and identity as specified by matter: “And when we have the 
whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is Callias 
or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is 
different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible.”273 Some 
commentators have interpreted these passages as if Aristotle were holding 
the idea that the distinctiveness of two individuals is possible only through 
their distinct matter.274 These commentators can be categorised as the 
followers of the traditional view, in which matter is the principle of identity. 
How can they account for the possibility of such cases in which the 
individual’s identity, for instance, at t1 could consist of matter (in this case, 
it is a body in whole or in parts) different than the same individual at t2? I 
claim that they cannot explain how matter alone could be the principle. 
Accordingly, if advocates of the traditional view are correct, then Socrates’ 
identity is accountable by a distinct parcel of matter at t1 and t2. Thus, if 
Socrates and Callias’ identities are accounted for and individuated only by 
the distinct parcel of matter, then their matter stands as the principle of 
individuation and identity. Their substantial form is universal and 
supposedly it gives sufficient reason for us to believe that form is universal 
and common in all members. Nonetheless, supporters of this view should 
accept that neither Socrates nor Callias’ identity would be accountable to 
their matter, as it is subject to change through time.  
However, what Aristotle maintains in On Generation and 
Corruption is that individuals’ identities do not change even though matter 
changes, the identity of matter as a component is secured by the unity that it 
already has. If we take our initial claim “the identity of unity is not 
dependent on its components” into account, then the argument that “the 
identity of matter does not depend on the identity of an individual” is indeed 
comprehensible. However, it remains difficult to understand how the 
identity of matter is secured by something else apart from the individual 
through the process of change and growth. Although the principles of unity 
and individuation are closely related to the principle of identity, the 
                                                        
273 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1034a5-8. 
274 Halper (1989); Lewis (1992); Montgomery (2007); Wedin (1984).  
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defenders of the traditional view cannot clarify how matter, as an initial 
principle, can be the principle of identity through time.  
 
3.2.2 Form as the Principle of Individuation and Identity 
In the same vein, followers of the non-traditional view,275 who believed that 
the form is the principle of individuation and identity, adopt the idea that 
parts of the formula or definition are prior to the whole. The individuating 
principle is form, which is somehow particular. This particularity can be 
interpreted as the form of Socrates being non-identical with the form of 
Callias and form as a definitional part being prior to the composite.276 Other 
parts of the composite are posterior in the unity of the composite itself. In 
that sense, form (and so actuality) is prior to matter and that the unity of 
form explains the unity of the composite. Supporters of this view interpret 
what Aristotle says in Metaphysics book 8, Η, section 6, in the way that the 
unity of Socrates’ form and matter is explained in terms of the unity of the 
form. There is a fundamental attribute to the human form, such that the form 
is not a collection of dispositions of a body. Socrates’ being and his 
persistence conditions exist only in virtue of his form, and his being and 
unity of the body is derived from the form (and first actuality, which is the 
soul in De Anima).  
Forms are somehow diverse in all living things, including human 
beings. Therefore, supporters of this view suggest that we do not need any 
further individuating principle, as long as we accept the claim that forms of 
individuals are diverse. One might still ask to what extent form can be the 
only principle which holds diachronic and numerical strands of 
individuation and persistence. One plausible explanation can validate this 
approach only if species form can secure the persistence, and if the 
individuation of matter in different organisms persists through the lifetime 
of an individual.  
After all, these two views try to construct the individuating principle 
of identity in persons along with the hylomorphic theory. However, neither 
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the traditional nor the non-traditional views in their own right can clarify 
whether matter or form alone would be sufficient to explain persistence. In a 
way, it might be plausible to think that anything that is one and a continuous 
unity possesses one particular form and a distinct parcel of matter. 
Similarly, in Metaphysics Aristotle identifies the unity of a thing in four 
ways:  
Things that are one in number are one in species, while things 
that are one in species are not all one in number; but things 
that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that 
are so in genus are not all one in species but are all one by 
analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one 
in genus.277  
 
As we can clearly see in the passage above, if form and matter are said to 
constitute one individual, then the persistence of matter does not entail the 
persistence of form. It is explicitly pointed out in this passage that the unity 
in number cannot be explainable regarding the continuity of matter, since 
this unity entails oneness in form. It is obvious, then, that the advocates of 
form have not much difficulty in clarifying the explanatory and 
individuating power of form. This power has been described as a descriptive 
and causal factor. Aristotle gives a similar account in De Anima, where he 
claims,  
Now the soul is the cause and principle of the living body. 
Cause and principle are spoken of in many ways. The soul is 
a cause in three of the ways already distinguished. For the 
soul is a cause as the source of motion, and as that for the 
sake of which, and as the substance of ensouled bodies. That 
it is the cause as substance is clear; since for all things the 
cause of their being is substance, and the being for living 
things is their living, the cause and principle of which is 
soul.278 
 
However, I claim that Aristotle’s hylomorphism still appeals to the view 
that the unity of form (the soul in De Anima) and matter employs this power 
in order to compose the individual’s identity, which is the underlying 
subject (hypokeimenon). 
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3.2.3 Critique of Both Views: The Hybrid View as a Third Option 
In the passage in Metaphysics, book 7, Zeta, Aristotle says “And when we 
have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is 
Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is 
different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible”279. This 
statement strongly justifies the view that Aristotle is affirming the idea of a 
qualitative difference between Socrates and Callias as being only composed 
of a qualitatively different matter. The above reading might avoid any 
objections that have been raised by the supporters of the non-traditional 
View, but both the traditional and non-traditional views fail to explain 
whether matter is individuated by form or vice versa. The passage indicates 
that their bodies can describe the individuation of Socrates and Callias. One 
way or another, Socrates’ body is a proximate matter and formed by 
appealing the form, which denotes the notion of form as a unifying and 
individuating principle. In favour of the non-traditional view, Whiting 
echoes the same claim:  
Proximate matter (or the ensouled body) is individuated by 
form (or soul) and so survives only as long as it is informed 
(or ensouled). This is the body of which the soul is the form 
or the essence (DA 412bll, 415bll). The body as proximate 
matter is the same at t1 to t2 only insofar as it embodies the 
same form (or soul) continuously from t1 to t2”280, and adds 
“Socrates and Callias are distinct (at a time) because each of 
them has or embodies a numerically distinct individual form 
or soul.281  
 
Therefore, I claim that followers of the traditional view have a difficulty 
when they conclude immediately from the famous passage in Metaphysics 
book 7, Zeta, where Socrates and Callias are said to be distinct individuals, 
and yet the persistence conditions of their identities from t1 to t2 are 
supposedly guaranteed by their proximate matter. Their proximate matter 
will be the same in kind (flesh and bones), but still we have to appeal to 
their matter in order to learn about their individuality. This process will lead 
us to a regression that centres the discussion of whether or not their matter is 
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a prime matter, which is pure substratum without essence. Yet again, this 
interpretation would not take the discussion out of the regress, even though 
it easily implies that the individuation of Socrates and Callias depends on 
the spatio-temporal distinctiveness. If Socrates and Callias’ matters were 
prime matter, then their individuation and identity problem could not be 
solved and would be still unknown to us, as their prime matter would be 
pure potentiality, and matter without actualising principle is just mysterious 
and unknown. Furthermore, spatio-temporal distinctiveness is the accidental 
predicate of a being, as I pointed out earlier in a previous chapter.  
The non-traditional view would also face a fair amount of criticism 
through the omission of Aristotle’s point, where he says form is not “this” 
but “such”.282 Therefore, it is only the individual that can be “this”, in which 
the numerical unity is guaranteed. Although the form is the principle of this 
unity, it does not follow that the individuality of Socrates is determined by 
his form (regardless of whether we count it as a particular or species form), 
but only the unity of Socrates’ form and matter; namely, “Socrates as an 
individual”. Another set of criticisms is directed at the non-traditional view, 
as it holds on to the claim that the form of each individual is numerically 
distinct from that of other individuals, and it is the only way to account for 
the distinctiveness of individuals. The non-traditional view is not without 
criticisms of its own when we ask to what extent forms can be essences. As 
articulated in the previous chapter, members of the same species have the 
same definition that determines what the individual’s essence is. According 
to the non-traditional view, members of the same species have a form that 
gives individuals their essences, which is not distinctive and individual in 
the first place. If the form is an individuating principle, then quite 
expectedly supporters of the non-traditional view should be able to explain 
how distinct individual forms are related to individuals with the same 
essences. We know that having distinct forms does not necessarily entail 
that two members of the same species are different in kind and definition. 
However, the non-traditional view would still face questions in supposing it 
is the metaphysical question that is being raised, whether individuals can 
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have their own definitions, as Socrates and Callias fall under a single kind 
and share the same definition, but not otherwise. Therefore, if the definition 
of form differs in each individual, then the definition of the individual 
herself also differs, and Socrates and Callias cannot share the same 
definition. What Aristotle tells us explicitly is that the definition of Socrates 
and Callias are the same and that their forms are not different in kind: “Now 
we have stated that the question of definitions contains some difficulty, and 
why this is so. Therefore, to bring all things thus to Forms and to eliminate 
the matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a 
particular matter, or particular things in a particular state.”283 Yet, Aristotle 
adds,  
It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the 
body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both 
taken universally; and Socrates or Coriscus, if even the soul 
of Socrates is Socrates, is taken in two ways (for some mean 
by such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), 
but if he is simply this particular soul and this particular 
body, the individual is analogous to the universal.284  
 
In that sense, Socrates and Callias share the same definition, and if their 
form is interpreted as the principle of individuation, then Socrates and 
Callias’ forms are supposed to individuate them, and their forms are 
supposed to be the same in kind. If this was the case, just as the followers of 
the non-traditional view suggested, we would accept that Socrates’ identity 
is Socrates’ form exclusively, only because the form of an individual would 
be itself that the individual in particular. However, for Aristotle, regardless 
of whether Socrates and Callias possess the same or distinct form, the 
individual is a unity and hylomorphic compound, in which “the soul is 
primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the 
compound of both taken universally.”285 
In order to account for the universality of species form, proponents 
of the non-traditional view must appeal to form as the individuating 
principle, and the only way to do so is to apply the distinction between 
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284 Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) Metaphysics, 1037a5-1037a9. 
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higher and lower order forms. Higher order forms are those possessed by 
each individual, namely each individual form. Others are shared by every 
member, which is species form, such as the form of human being. Hence, 
individual forms include specific matter and it is sufficient for form to be 
the principle of individuation. However, the idea of a two-level-form seems 
quite problematic. Firstly, if the individual form of Socrates represents the 
name of the form, then the individual form itself would be part of Socrates’ 
form, which seems implausible because the idea of a two-level-form 
remains unclear why Socrates’ form should accommodate another level of 
form. Since, according to supporters of the non-traditional view the form of 
Socrates is identical to his individual form, and therefore both Socrates’ 
numerical distinctiveness and his diachronic identity are secured. Whiting, 
for instance, explains this individuation of the form by employing a casual 
connection:  
We might allow that the appeal to individual forms resembles 
(or even involves) a causal criterion in the following way: x 
at t1 and y at t2 are numerically the same if and only if they 
have (numerically) the same individual form and the 
individual form of y at t2 is numerically the same as that of x 
at t1 if and only if the individual form of x at t1 is causally 
responsible (in the appropriate ways) for the existence of the 
individual form of y at t2. These causal connections may of 
course be mediated by the matter which (as I argue 
elsewhere) belongs to these forms. The idea is roughly that if 
the form in this matter (i.e., this individual form) at t1 is 
causally responsible (in the appropriate ways) for the 
existence of the form in this matter (i.e. this individual form) 
at t2, then these forms existing at t1 and at t2 are numerically 
the same and they are what make the individuals to which 
they belong, numerically the same.286  
 
Here, Whiting emphasises how Aristotle concedes the existence of 
particular forms and how these forms show similarities in the same species: 
“For the individual is the source of the individuals. For while man is the 
cause of man universally, there is no universal man; but Peleus is the cause 
of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular b of this particular ba, 
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though b in general is the cause of ba taken without qualification.”287 Is 
there really a possibility of individual form in Aristotle’s metaphysics as the 
essence of Socrates indicates the numerical distinctiveness of him from 
Callias? Followers of the non-traditional view are missing a very crucial 
point here. If there was a causal connection between two levels of forms as 
Whiting claimed, then there would be a challenge for us to comprehend how 
different forms could be universal in terms of explaining an individual form 
when we read Aristotle, since he claims that Socrates and Callias are the 
same in species form but individuated by their individual forms.  
If we follow the non-traditional view, when we say that Socrates’ 
species form is a component of his unity, then we are inclined to accept that 
the form of Socrates has a form, which leads us to absurdity because of the 
fact that it is impossible to sustain the difference between these two aspects 
of forms. In addition, Socrates’ species form cannot be the essence of 
Socrates, as Aristotle insists that essences are not universal. However, if 
Socrates’ essence is his individuating form as the supporters of the non-
traditional view suppose, then Socrates and Callias do not share the same 
definition, and the fact that they fall under the same species form cannot be 
explained. If this is the case, then there is no means of accounting for 
Socrates and Callias’ individual forms, as they are of same in kind. This 
account obviously raises a contradiction for the supporters of the non-
traditional view, since Socrates’ form cannot be both his essence and the 
realisation of species form. Aristotle’s passage in Metaphysics, in which he 
points out “the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and 
form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal 
formula they are the same”,288 can be interpreted as asserting that Socrates 
and Callias have their individual form and individual matter along with their 
individual moving causes. In the same vein, this passage also reminds us of 
a similar claim Aristotle makes earlier in the same book, maintaining “when 
we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, 
this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of  their matter 
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(for that is different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible.”289  
Throughout section 8 in Zeta, Aristotle discusses the notion of form and the 
objects that are generated from form. However, at the end of the section he 
states the passage I quoted above about individuation that is considered 
within the notion of matter.  
It is clear from the latter passage that Socrates and Callias are 
distinct individuals in virtue of their matter without the need for any further 
explanation. Since the term “in virtue of” gives us causal evidence, which is 
not to be taken in a strong sense. Otherwise, matter would be the necessary 
and sufficient condition that individuates Socrates and Callias along with 
the persistence conditions of their identity. Socrates’ form is a “such” but 
not a “this”, yet it does not justify the claim of the traditional view that 
Socrates and Callias are individuated in virtue of their matter. In that sense, 
we should read the use of “in virtue of” as something does not add extra 
value on matter, something like an individuating principle. Yet, it is a 
necessary part of the explanation. Socrates and Callias are diverse 
individuals regarding the components of which they have been composed, 
and in the passage, Aristotle suggests that at face value matter is the 
individuating principle, but not form. Undoubtedly, Socrates and Callias are 
individuated in virtue of their matter, but the overall passage strongly 
suggests the unity of matter and form. By taking this detail into account, 
both supporters of the traditional and non-traditional views may consider 
that what individuates Socrates and what differentiates him from Callias are 
the same thing. It is, undoubtedly, the notion of composition. Aristotle 
explicitly states that matter is neither separable, nor a “this”, but only a 
potentiality, which is actualised by form, by which these two components 
initiate the functional unity of an individual body. Although matter is 
something in its own right, it cannot be differentiated until it is actualized by 
form. We can thus say that this actualisation is the only way in which unity 
becomes numerically distinct in each member of the same species, and again 
the unity becomes accountable for the persistence conditions of identity. In 
this sense, Socrates’ identity is necessary and sufficient to be numerically 
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distinct from Callias’ identity, in the way they are both formed by distinct 
unities. To avoid the strains both views face, I will defend the hybrid view, 
in which hylomorphism finds its non-reductionist interpretation of the 
principle of individuation and the persistence condition of identity.  
 
3.3 The Non-Reductionist Account of the Hybrid View 
The main purpose of this section is to claim that while both views engage in 
a reductionist way of explaining the principle of individuation and identity, 
instead of dealing with an individual as a composite at a time and its 
persistence and continuity conditions as a unity over time, the non-
reductionist approach will certainly satisfy not only one of these 
requirements – as supporters of traditional and non-traditional views argue 
either matter or form is the principle of individuation and identity – but also 
shows, in fact, that Aristotle himself does not wish to reduce the principle of 
identity to either of these components. Instead, Aristotle takes them as 
components of a particular individual, and these components are 
accountable only if they have been correctly considered as the matter and 
form of that particular composite. The identity and distinctiveness of matter 
and form themselves are in a way secured by the unity of that composite, 
but not the other way around. Considering that less attention has been 
devoted to the non-reductionist account, my aim in this section is to endorse 
the view that we have reasons to accept the reductionist approach of both 
views. I also aim to introduce the idea that there is a third hybrid way of 
maintaining the continuity and individuation principles of a person, in which 
I am concerned with the way that it leads us naturally to appreciate 
hylomorphism, as it still accommodates a non-reductionist solution to the 
modern problem of personal identity and continuity.  
I have claimed that the principle of persistence and continuity of an 
individual’s identity is strictly bound to the principle of individuation. This 
view is profoundly a non-reductionist interpretation of the Aristotelian 
expression of an individual as a unity, and referring to its kind. Whiting 
emphases the same point:  
Matter has to make up one thing before it can be the same 
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as (or different from) another individual at a time. It also 
has to make up one thing at each of t1 and t2 in order for it 
to be the same (or a different) thing at each of t1 and t2. In a 
way, this priority of unity should be obvious. For we are 
asking when one individual (i.e., a unity) is the same as or 
different from other individuals (i.e., other unities) both at 
and across times. There is thus a conceptual connection 
between unity and individuation.290  
 
What’s more, Aristotle explicitly states in Metaphysics, Zeta, section 13 that 
“if man and such things are substances none of the elements in their 
formulae is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the 
species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no animal exists apart 
from the particular animals.”291 In this passage, Aristotle clearly highlights 
that the way of being one and being a substance is to be a human being, and 
yet to be this particular human being is distinguished from being this 
particular dog or horse. The unity of Socrates’ being is associated with the 
category of being a human, as the term “being” on its own cannot be 
accountable as one and the same. Yet Socrates’ species form, or the 
category to which he belongs to, should not be different from Callias’ 
nature. Aristotle recognises this challenge by acknowledging the fact that 
Socrates and Callias differ “in virtue of their own nature”, or in other words, 
“in virtue of otherness of the genus”:  
For by genus I mean that one identical thing which is 
predicated of both and is differentiated in no merely 
accidental way, whether conceived as matter or otherwise. 
For not only must the common nature attach to the different 
things, e.g. not only must both be animals, but this very 
animal must also be different for each (e.g. in the one case 
horse, in the other man), and therefore this common nature 
is specifically different for the two things. One then will be 
in virtue of its own nature one sort of animal, and the other 
another, e.g. one a horse and the other a man. This 
difference then must be an otherness of the genus. For I give 
the name of ‘difference in the genus’ to an otherness which 
makes the genus itself other.292  
 
This otherness of an individual would be lacking a complete unity unless it 
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is accompanied by a genus or species, which is something universally 
shared by Socrates and Callias. What the non-reductionist approach 
promises here is that the level of explanation for unity and individuation 
cannot be less than the genus or species level. Otherwise to explain the 
individuation and identity of Socrates and Callias by referring to their matter 
and form, which belong to the specific level of genus or species, would be 
to determine their individuation under the substance kind to which they 
belong to. In this case, the reductionist approach of both the traditional and 
non-traditional views account for the individuating principle, which for both 
views is either matter or form which differentiate Socrates from Callias 
independently of Socrates’ unity. In the same vein, if the individuating 
principle is differentiated independently of Socrates’ unity, then it must be 
identified independently of Socrates.  
If we suppose that either matter or form has a unity independent of 
the kinds in species, then the statement contradicts Aristotle’s claim, which 
is that the identity of matter and form are secured by the identity of one 
unified substance, and this oneness is lacking the completeness without 
reference to universally established categories. On the contrary, we cannot 
also suppose that the individuating principle of Socrates’ unity has some 
kind of universal level entirely, such as referring to Socrates’ unity as 
something like the unity of animal. The fact that the unity of a composite 
taken universally contradicts Aristotle’s initial claim that Socrates’ unity at 
the universal level is secured at the level of being a member of a species. 
Again, if the individuating principle is unified independently of species, 
then it contradicts the parallel between individuation and unity, as well as 
Aristotle’s claim that “all things that differ, differ either in genus or in 
species.”293 
I now suggest that no further claim is required to explain that 
Aristotle’s explanation of Socrates’ identity and unity is fundamentally 
considered within Socrates’ being as a member of a species at a more 
generic level, rather than reducing his identity to either matter or form. If the 
hybrid view I suggest is understood within the framework of hylomorphic 
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interpretation, we can reach the non-reductionist explanation of personal 
identity. Similarly, reductionism can explain neither what differentiates 
Socrates from Callias nor how Socrates’ identity persists as Socrates himself 
through time. Their individuation is considered in virtue of them being 
diverse individuals or substances considering that for Aristotle all 
individuals are substances in their own right.294 If he were suggesting a 
reductionist account of individuation and identity, as the followers of both 
views insist, then the individuating principle of a person – supposedly either 
matter or form – would be prior to the unity of Socrates. However, as 
pointed out earlier, neither of the components can be prior to the unity itself. 
If so, could they be posterior? There is no textual evidence in Aristotle’s 
writings that supports the idea of a component being posterior. Namely, if 
matter or form were posterior to the individual and originated the 
individuating principle from it, then the individual cannot have its 
individuality as something equivalent to the unity of an individual. In other 
words, according to both views, either Socrates’ matter or form serves as an 
individuating principle prior to the individuality of Socrates.  
As I have claimed earlier, individuality and unity are bound. 
Socrates and Callias can only be different individuals if the persistence of 
their identity is tied up with the unity of matter and form. On this 
conception, if the individuality of matter or form is prior to the individuality 
of Socrates, then the unity of matter or form has to be prior to the unity of 
Socrates. The relevant structure of explanation of both views faces 
difficulties in accounting for whether the unity of Socrates’ matter or form 
is prior to the unity of Socrates. The unity of Socrates then faces an 
exegetical dilemma, as Aristotle strictly claims that no substance is 
composed of substances. Therefore, if both views are right and accountable 
for an identity claim, then a genuine difficulty rises concerning how 
Socrates’ unity can be a substance in its own right. From here, we need to 
treat the hybrid view from a strictly non-reductionist strand of 
hylomorphism, in which the irreducible unity of Socrates is something 
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inevitable for his persistent identity through time. Once this interpretation is 
correctly framed we can justify it through Aristotle’s hylomorphism, where 
the individuality of Socrates and Callias are primary. 
 
3.4 Personal Identity as a Hylomorphic Unity 
In the following sections, more details are offered for a better understanding 
of the hylomorphic model. In hylomorphism form and matter compose an 
individual without ruling out the explanatory picture of the unity of an 
individual. We need to make some progress in clarifying whether or not 
Socrates’ being is a particular composed substance – in other words, being a 
plurality of distinct substances – that somehow threatens the unity of 
Socrates. It is the argument295 I would like to investigate whether the 
individuality and unity of Socrates’ matter and form are prior to the 
individuality and the unity of Socrates as one complete substance. I will 
claim that the only way to get out of this circularity is to give credit to what 
Aristotle insists in the claim that “one” cannot be fully explained unless this 
explanation is specified by universal species form. He further explains 
Socrates’ unity with reference to his being, which is a composite of distinct 
components.  
What would be confusing here is if, instead of accounting for the 
components as a unity, we take the unity of Socrates’ matter and form as a 
plurality of prior unities, in which the components are also taken as one 
substance. The solution is to maintain the relationship between the unity of 
an individual and the unity of matter and form within the scope of the 
primary notion of Socrates’ unity, which is irreducible to any of its 
components. The main reason to hold onto such a claim is to adhere to what 
Aristotle explicitly identifies in Categories along with similar points he 
makes in Physics and Metaphysics. Accordingly, an individual man is a 
complete substance that neither is said of a subject nor in a subject, since he, 
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himself, comprises a complete substance.296 In this way, we can articulate a 
plausible account in which, on the one hand, the irreducible notion of 
identity is necessary and sufficient to explain the individual’s persistence 
conditions, and on the other hand, this way of treating the persistence 
problem is compatible with hylomorphism. According to the model I have 
been suggesting, hylomorphism will be able to support the non-reductionist 
unity of persons. The crucial claim of this view of persons rests in the 
articulation of a non-reductionist vision, where the unity of Socrates’ form 
and matter cannot be prior to his unity, but Socrates himself as a unity is 
prior to his components.  
To clarify my point, I will attempt to identify what Aristotle 
specifically claims about the numerical identity of the unity in Metaphysics. 
Accordingly, one type of unity is continuous by nature, prior to other types 
of unities (more specifically the unity of matter or the unity of form) and 
non-reducible. The other type of unity represents the whole individual, to 
whose matter is causally related to its form by nature and who has a 
continuous identity. These components are indivisible in space and time, 
which means Socrates at t1 in x place is numerically the same person as 
Socrates at t2 in y place.297 
In that sense, we can conclude with a fair amount of confidence 
that Socrates is numerically identical to himself through time and has a 
higher-order unity than does Socrates’ body (matter), in which Socrates’ 
identity persists through time only if his body is a continuous piece of 
matter. Nonetheless, Socrates’ body is not continuous by its own nature. 
Recalling the causal force of the form, Aristotle claims that Socrates’ form 
as a human being has a human form, that in itself is the internal principle 
and the cause of the continuity – yet not the only initial principle - of his 
identity. Hence, the unity of Socrates’ body298 itself does not have the 
continuity principle by itself without the unity of his form, as the telos of his 
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bodily parts is derived from the irreducible telos of his unity of individuality 
as a whole. The non-reductionist notion of the hybrid view is expressed by 
the non-derivative notion of the continuity of Socrates’ identity, in which 
the persistence conditions of his identity are neither derived from, nor 
reducible to the parts of his bodily components.299  
Thus far, I have pointed out that the hylomorphic unity of Socrates 
as an individual is the principle of his numerical identity and that this aspect 
uniquely diversifies him from other members of the same species. If 
Socrates’ bodily parts derive their unity from the unity of Socrates as an 
individual, then this derivation might make one wonder whether the unity of 
an individual is prior to the alteration of an individual’s body, in which we 
can say, either that the unity of Socrates’ body at t1 is prior to the body at t2, 
where his body does not exist as the same body at t1 – therefore, as not the 
same person anymore, which is contrary to what Aristotle would say about 
the persistence of matter after generation or alteration – or that his body at t1 
persists at t2, but cannot represent the same unity which it represented in the 
first place.  
Individuality does not follow these possibilities, where supposedly 
the unity of individuality holds the identity of Socrates’ body through time, 
and strictly speaking his body alone cannot hold the persistent conditions of 
his identity. This is because by the principle of individuality, in terms of 
Socrates’ body we can characterise the unity of his bodily parts, which can 
be distinct at times t1 and t2, yet still be continuant. Nevertheless, even the 
unity of his body alone cannot have or represent the persistence of his unity 
and identity by itself, because of the non-reductionist notion of unity. 
Although bodily parts compose his individuality, and although he is 
constituted by the unity of his bodily parts, the unity of these parts on its 
own cannot explain the persistence conditions of these parts, particularly if 
these parts have undergone some sort of change. It means that the unity of 
individuality as it is composed is the principle of identity and continuity, but 
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to resist the objections of contemporary competitors in the following sections, such as 
Animalism and the Constitution View, and more generally thought experiments about 
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not the persistence of his body (or bodily parts).  
In the previous chapter, I have already discussed how the bodily 
parts of each person can undergo certain changes during alteration without 
undermining its unity. Even if Socrates’ body defines the persistence of 
Socrates’ identity regardless of changes that his body undergoes, it is only 
because of the presupposition that Socrates at t1 becomes Socrates at t2. 
Therefore, any of his bodily parts gains its identity by having a functional 
role within Socrates’ unity, as all his bodily parts potentially constitutes his 
body as a whole. Between time slices t1 and t2, Socrates’ body is counted as 
numerically the same – just so, his identity – as before, regardless of the 
change or alteration (and even generation) it had undergone. Since the 
change or alteration occurs in accordance with his nature of being a human. 
Hence, it is evident that all these changes occur within the teleological life 
cycle of persons; thus, neither his body nor his identity ever loses its 
persistence and continuity. All sorts of interpretations of hylomorphism 
should consider the explanatory role of the persistence problem of identity 
in this regard. The idea that either Socrates’ body or his form300 is prior to 
the unity of Socrates is not compatible with this account of personal 
identity.  
 
3.5 Hylomorphism in Contemporary Debate   
Undoubtedly, hylomorphism contains some dualistic aspects by proposing 
that each individual has a form, which is classified as a thinking substance 
in dualism. Yet, Aristotle was aware that each individual is a living 
organism. For the purposes of this chapter I claim that hylomorphism 
explains why the identity of a person, and so the persistence conditions, 
cannot be reducible to either aspect exclusively, either to form, or to a living 
body. From the Aristotelian perspective we can acknowledge that the 
reductionist approach is not strong enough to hang on to any kind of 
substantial theory. Though, we might look at the ways in which two sides of 
the description come together and perform as one explanatory solution to 
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the problem of personal identity. Although there may be some further 
distinctions that can be made between reductionists, I think the hylomorphic 
model and the possibility of a hybrid approach can be very appropriate to 
explore here.  
The hylomorphic notion of identity has been represented by several 
hylomorphists in contemporary discussion. Before exploring where the 
original problem has its roots in the biological and psychological continuity 
views, I would like to give an overview on hylomorphic accounts, who 
combined the psychological view with one of the other two views. 
Accordingly, person A at t1 and person B at t2 are numerically the same 
person iff person B is either psychologically continuous with A, or B is 
composed of the same substance as A, which means B either has the same 
soul as A, or has bodily continuity with A. 
Hershenov takes hylomorphism within the Thomistic notion. He 
claims that the hylomorphic approach is appealing as it allows us to 
consider ourselves as animals while justifying our responses in the intuitive 
manner for thought experiments. When he explores the notion of the 
hylomorphic theory, he takes the Catholic philosophical tradition into 
account and argues that “the proper Catholic construal of our animal nature 
is that we are contingently animals, i.e., we are living creatures but can still 
exist without being alive.”301 This claim accommodates both bodily 
continuity and the persistence of eternal soul. A person’s identity is 
connected by the continuity of body when the person is alive. The claim 
goes beyond the connectivity of living organisms and after that, he states, 
the identity would still persist after death by the continuity of soul.   
Toner’s account offers a hylomorphic version of Animalism302. 
Accordingly, persons are individual substances with a rational nature, yet in 
the meantime Toner ascribes rationality to angels as well, by claiming that a 
rational nature is something that we share with angels. The only 
distinguishing feature between persons and angels is having a sensation. 
Namely, we are rational animals and angels are not animals, but they are 
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pure intellect. Also, he defenses the Thomistic approach for the idea of 
survival after death. He thinks that we are rational animals and we survive 
our death as disembodied beings. The soul itself is not identical with the 
animal, it constitutes or composes it.  
Hershenov and Toner share the same thesis of two continuity 
conditions that personal identity is related to: the embodied identity and 
disembodied identity. The weak point of both views is that in their 
hylomorphism both embodiment and disembodiment are only contingently 
true for the persistence conditions. That is to say the disembodied human 
animal could exist in an unnatural state as a separated soul regardless of the 
lack of sensation.  
As I noted earlier in previous chapters, the soul as a disembodied 
entity and resurrection are religious explanations which are out of interest in 
this paper. What is worth noting here is that trouble will arise for these 
hylomorphists not only when they commit such a claim that we have 
separate souls in our substance kind, but also this soul has a causal 
connection between the states of embodiment and disembodiment. As we 
can conclude from this brief but ample glance at different versions of 
hylomorphism, their approach requires reductionist soul-identity persistence 
involving processes. The common deadlock these accounts will face is that 
whether there is a bodily continuity present or not, both personal identity 
and the principle of continuity are established on the ground of an eternal 
soul. It is important to note, then, it is not just these hylomorphic accounts 
which are vulnerable to “the further fact” objection, but any account of 
personal identity involves in reducing the persistence conditions to 
indeterminate sources (the persistence of soul-identity or the criterion of 
identity that is based on common sense) will experience a severe criticism.  
 What hylomorphism teaches us instead, on the contrary of what 
Cartesian substance dualism (and the contemporary advocates of such a 
view, such as Swineburn, Chisholm and Lowe) takes persons as precisely 
mental-immaterial substances. In the hylomorphic approach I defend 
persons represent being “selves” in their own merits, which amounts to 
being a subject of experience and substrate of reality, rather than being 
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mysterious, immaterial, unknown beings. 
 There are two contemporary interpretations of persistence of identity 
advocated by animalism and the neo-Lockean constitution view,303 which 
can be related to the hybrid view that I have adopted from the hylomorphic 
model I laid out earlier. By doing this, I will have the opportunity to 
examine these contemporary approaches thoroughly by using the tools that I 
have been advancing in previous chapters. I choose these two approaches in 
particular because they are plausible in their own merits, and particularly 
because each view strongly represents different elements of the unity of a 
person. These views are concerned with the objections raised against both 
biological continuity and psychological continuity views, and, in return, 
they raise objections against the hybrid approach, given that it combines 
elements of each view.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
From here, through the proper consideration of what has been determined of 
the unity of identity, the other aspect of numerical identity through 
generation can also be re-established. According to Aristotle, the 
implications of different principles of an individual through a lifetime might 
shift from one to another, and what causes the continuity of numerical unity 
could require a repeated explanation.  
Let us say we are considering the numerical identity of an individual 
from the Aristotelian perspective. This process starts from the moment she 
is in her mother’s womb and continues towards her adult life. Prior to the 
process of generation of this individual, the principle of the unity of her 
continuity had a functional role before she was born. It is a fact that she will 
be the same person potentially as she grows right after birth. Although the 
unity of her identity was derived from her mother’s unity of individuality, 
she can exist after birth as potentially the same individual as she will be as 
an adult, unless she undergoes some changes contrary to her nature. The 
teleological argument here requires the fulfilment of an individual’s telos 
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and the persistence of an individual’s identity regardless of temporal shifts. 
These temporal shifts can be recognised as the actualisation of the 
individual’s form, which is potentially present in the embryo from the 
beginning. Yet, her body’s growth and development in later stages will 
identify her persisting unity and continuity. Her identity will remain 
persistent through time. From one perspective, one may object that 
Aristotelian idea of telos here represent a kind of unknown deterministic 
nature, which is causally directed to one certain unchangeable direction. 
However, the aim of bringing the potentiality–actuality relation into our 
consideration is to draw our attention to a bigger picture, where Aristotle is 
more tolerant about the notion of form and the unity of form and matter.  
In this sense we can argue with some confidence that a numerically 
identical body endures through change, which does not undermine the 
numerical identity. For Aristotle these types of changes demonstrate that 
predicates can also compose the unity of identity, as he argues that 
movement of matter is one and the same in time and place.304 This 
characterisation will be reflected in the next chapter, where I am considering 
several interpretations of the fetus problem. For now, we can conclude that 
the unifying principle of matter and form and the relationship between 
actuality and potentiality make the unifying principle plausible within 
hylomorphism. Therefore, the identity of an individual remains the same 
through time within the scope of the cause of unity in general.305 Namely, 
the individual becomes the cause of unity. On the contrary what some 
hylomorphists suggest, no other cause (something like the eternal soul) is 
needed to explain persistence conditions. The persistence condition is only 
applicable to material substance but nothing else. This reading of 
hylomorphism is persuasive for several reasons. In contrast to some 
hylomorphists just described, one possible reading of hylomorphism I have 
been pointed out is inspired by the nature of causal dependence between 
parts and the whole. The parts are dependent on the substance for their 
continued existence. Whereas in Hershenov and Toner’s reading of 
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hylomorphism, identity could still exist without embodiment. On the 
contrary what Hershenov and Toner describe persistence conditions to be, 
one notable feature of hylomorphism is that it does not dissolve the relation 
between the unity and its parts. Hence identity is unified not because it can 
persist without its parts, but because its parts cannot exist apart from it. This 
understanding will shed light on transplantation cases and other problematic 
cases of persistence, such as a vegetative state case and fetus problem, etc. 
The suggestion in the next chapter is that in accepting that in principle 
humans could undergo a sort of disassembly (as in transplantation cases), or 
loss in their psychological states (as in a vegetative state case), one should 
not necessarily commit to a view, in which the unity of identity is corrupted 
and the persistence condition is dependent upon being integrated into either 
biological continuity or psychological continuity.    
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Chapter 4: The Hybrid View in Contemporary Discussion 
This chapter divides into three sections. Firstly, I will introduce 
contemporary defenders of the hybrid view and indicate how their accounts 
motivates the hybrid approach to our persistence. Secondly, I will consider 
the persistence conditions falling under two headings as animalism and the 
constitution view (as a representation of neo-Lockeanism). The claim of the 
chapter will be that both these continuity conditions are relevant to our 
persistence. And finally, I will describe how to make the hybrid view fit 
with hypothetical transplantation and everyday cases regarding persistence. 
  Langford’s account shows resemblance to the hybrid view and he 
seems implicitly to offer two suggestions. Firstly, he defends the notion of a 
non-reductionist disjunctive approach for the persistence conditions.306 
Accordingly, the continuity of a certain kind is sufficient for our persistence 
in non-branching cases.307 In his critique Langford suggest that these 
continuity defenders only argue for the sufficiency, yet they do not claim in 
favour of the necessity:  
Agreeing that you were once a foetus implies biological 
continuity is enough for your persistence. It doesn’t imply 
that you couldn’t persist without biological continuity. 
That idea goes beyond the example. Likewise, agreeing 
that you could survive the inorganic-continuer example 
implies psychological continuity is enough for your 
persistence. It doesn’t imply that you couldn’t persist 
without a psychological continuer.308  
For him we are bio-psycho-continuers, which indicates that “being able to 
persist by having a biological (but non-psychological) continuer is 
consistent with being able to persist by having a psychological (but non-
biological) continuer.”309 The term “bio-psycho-continuers” gives room for 
the possibility of our being; (i) that is not able to have the continuity 
condition biological and psychological continuity defenders can obtain 
                                                        
306 Langford (2014). 
307The branching problem occurs when A’s cerebrum transferred into B’s body, leaving A’s 
original brainless body alive in a vegetative state, and if both continuity relations are 
sufficient for A’s persistence, then there will be two A’s in one place.	
308 Langford (2014) p. 357. 	
309	Langford (2014) p. 358.	
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independently, and (ii) that is able to persist through some means other than 
the biological or psychological continuity, such as A could become a wholly 
inorganic entity. Langford presents an ample example of the hybrid view. 
On the face of it, he takes the case of A was once a fetus, then A develops 
into a conscious adult, and finally A could survive as a cerebrum in a vat as 
one and the same entity. This might allow A to persist through some other 
kind of physical (maybe not as a whole body) or psychological entity. In 
that case, our biological and psychological continuity conditions exist only 
contingently. In that sense, our identities persist regardless of the degree of 
connectedness in any case, which remains as a highly theoretical point. I 
agree with him on the contingency of continuity conditions, yet due to a 
possible interruption between biological and psychological persistence one 
may not survive after disassembling certain parts of the body. In Langford’s 
approach we may not have to submit to either conditions exclusively, but his 
reasoning of the continuity conditions embraces any sort of case, including 
fission and fusion. I will examine their theoretical possibility in the 
following sections. 
As a defender of non-reductionism, Noonan310 offers a similar view 
to those who defended non-reductionism, the notion of unity and persistence 
over time. In his book Personal Identity, he explicitly sympathies the hybrid 
model of persistence conditions. His approach suggests that we are animals 
whom persistence conditions are partly biological and partly psychological:  
The Hybrid Approach is obligatory for anyone who 
believes that each of us ‘is’ an animal in the sense of being 
identical with one, but accepts the deliverance of the 
Transplant Intuition and also accepts (what seems 
undeniable on any view) that psychological continuity is 
not a necessary condition of identity for human beings. It 
is therefore the position the biological theorist must move 
to unless he can reject the Transplant Intuition.311 
For Noonan, non-reductionism entails that the persistence of personal 
identity consists only in identity itself. That means, x is whether identical to 
                                                        
310 See Noonan (2003).  
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y or not, there will be no other option to consider for persistence, as identity 
is determinate regardless of any indeterminate identity statements.312 Thus, 
we have either a persistence or non-persistence, simpliciter. The fallacy the 
reductionist view falls consistently is that whether persistence is determinate 
or not, the criterion of identity (either biological or psychological) may not 
be satisfied entirely in every situation.313 He also warns us to be cautious 
about how soul-identity defenders (Swineburne, Chisholm and Lowe) 
consider non-reductionism. According to them, identity goes where the soul 
goes and this position applies to non-trivial and non-redundant constraints 
on personhood. Noonan’s critique is persuasive. Soul-identity defenders trap 
themselves into an ambiguity, where we do not know whether we can have 
the same soul over time or not. No informative sufficient condition can be 
given to confirm the idea of a persistent soul. In that sense, his critique can 
be directed to both ends. His critique applies also to those who defines 
themselves as reductionists. Noonan’s account is a sort of intermediate 
between non-reductionist and strong reductionist accounts (such as Olson, 
Baker and Shoemaker represent). What is more controversial but seems 
almost equally certain, is that for Noonan, there is no so-called guaranteed 
condition of a person who is existing at one time is identical with the one 
existing at another time. This, as Noonan calls, is the unoccupied position, 
which is a non-reductionist complex view: “there are informatively 
specifiable necessary conditions of personal identity over time, but no 
informatively specifiable sufficient conditions.”314  
 What Noonan tries to establish here indicates very similar attributes 
to those what Aristotle would have in his mind regarding the specifiable 
sufficient conditions. When he talks about change in Physics, Aristotle 
points out explicitly that contrary properties being instanced at different 
                                                        
312 According to the determinacy thesis, “if it is true (a) that there is just one person in place 
p at time t and true (b) that there is just one person in place p' at time t′ then either it will be 
definitely true that the person in p at t is identical with the person in p′ at t′ or this will be 
definitely false.” Noonan (2003) p.104.   
313 Noonan (2003) Chapter 6.  
314 Noonan (2003) p. 97.  
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times is not sufficient for change. We still need a substance to persists 
through time regardless of change in properties. Noonan does not talk about 
substantial change, or the difference between substances and their accidental 
predicates, yet in the same vein with Aristotle, he suggests that any changes 
occur in psychological and biological continuities does not affect the 
persistency in personal identity. What persists through change is neither 
soul-oriented identity, nor the criteria-based variables just like reductionists 
claim. It is rather the identity itself, which is depended upon the condition 
where x is either continuous with y, or not. Ultimately, Noonan’s aim is to 
establish an account which complements the logical gap between denying 
what Swineburne and Chisholm supported, and committing a form of 
reductionism.315  
Exploring the non-reductionist hybrid view further, we can mention 
McDowell’s account as well, who also suggests that a person has to be 
conceived as an embodied entity within the realm of reason. His hybrid idea 
of the self recognises the inseparability of one’s consciousness from the 
body. He constructs an idea of one’s personhood that cannot be isolated 
from one’s body and one’s psychological (also intellectual) stages. 
Reasoning, for him, may not require identity.316 Since, the self is 
represented through formal states. If the persistence is something similar to 
substantial persistence (persistence of immaterial substance), then we would 
commit to a self that is similar to a Cartesian Ego. For McDowell this could 
be an extreme end for a substantial explanation. His thinking of the identity 
of a substance is similar to Wiggins’, where Wiggins claims that personal 
identity does not consist of either mind or body exclusively, but the subject 
represents essence, which is not reduced to mind or body, but both (and this 
condition would not be reductionist). Wiggins insists that the idea of 
personhood is required in persistence. It is true that we are animals when we 
born, and then become persons by attaining conceptual capacities and moral 
sensibilities. McDowell explicitly asserts in his book Mind, Value, and 
                                                        
315 Noonan (2019) p. 21.  
316 McDowell (1994) pp.99–100. 
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Reality that in order to avoid circularity, we could accept a characterisation 
for the persistence condition(s), where the continuity is considered “in terms 
of spatio-temporal continuity under a substance concept”.317 Hence, within 
its spatio-temporal process persons are the natural maturations of human 
beings (and the artefact of culture)318.  
In his critique McDowell treats reductionism (reducing identity to a 
continuous consciousness) as it is much less fundamental than the idea of a 
continuous immaterial substance (the Cartesian substance). What is more, 
he also believes that the self-contained notion of consciousness, as appears 
in neo-Lockeanism, is definitely Cartesian. As a subject of experience, a 
person experiences her life through her continuous consciousness (a first-
person perspective in neo-Lockeans terms), which is “suppose to be what 
Locke really intended to remind of us, something tailor-made to seem 
entertainable, like the Cartesian cogito, without objective propositions.”319 
This is a notion of consciousness that has its contents independently of any 
objective context.320 Whereas, the supporters of non-reductionism, who 
favour the idea of identity as a further fact, have a plausible reason to think 
that the question whether a person exists and whether a certain life is still in 
progress have more determinateness than any construction out of 
psychological and bodily continuity could give on their own.   
McDowell is quite straightforward when he is presenting his hybrid 
view. Accordingly, we are neither separately existing entities, nor our 
identity is reducible to a further fact. Rather, he asserts, “Not that a person 
should be identified with his brain and (the rest of) his body, any more than 
a house should be identified with the bricks, and so forth, of which it is 
composed; but there is no commitment to some peculiar extra ingredient, 
which would ensure determinateness of identity.”321 Persons are equipped 
                                                        317	McDowell (1998) p.360. 	
318 McDowell (1998) p.360.	
319 McDowell (1998) p.364.	
320 McDowell (1998) p.366.	
321 McDowell (1998) p.378. 
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with a notion of rationality, as what he calls it as a second nature.322 Our 
interpretation of the unity of psychological and bodily continuity is the 
reflection of our understanding psychological continuity in its essential 
relation to the continuity of an embodied being323: “the idea of a 
subjectively continuous series of mental states is just the idea of a singled 
out tract of a life.”324 This interpretation explicitly indicates the notion of a 
hybrid identity that is continuant as one and only individual through time. 
I have mentioned Wiggins in section 3.2 already, yet it seems also 
appropriate to point out Wiggins’ metaphysics here. His perspective 
illustrates a connection between our animal and rational sides that are 
essential to the being that we are. Personhood, he suggests, is an 
enhancement of the mode of activity325 of a human being, which means, an 
infant is potentially entitled to be a person and has the potential for 
developing reason. Our interpretation of identity and its persistence 
conditions, Wiggins adds, should reflect on the reciprocity between our 
animal nature and reason. This foundation of unity is entitled under the 
intimate connection between our personhood and our animal nature.326 This 
intimate connection will escalate our perspective to a wider picture, where 
the nature of our bodily presence in the characteristic activity of a particular 
human form is vital to our identity.327 The “human being principle” that he 
has developed in his works (particularly in Sameness and Substance and 
Sameness and Substance Renewed) manifests his divergent from other non-
reductionists.  
Wiggins’s position is hybrid, since he explicitly defends the claim that 
we are fundamentally both persons and human beings.  Although he is 
aware of the requirements of the term “person” and “human being” 
                                                        
322 McDowell (1994) p.103. 
323 Bakhurst (2005) p.468.	
324 McDowell (1994) p.103. 
325 For Wiggins mode of activity (or mode of being) is something that substance attains as a 
sortal kind. It is universal for members of that particular kind, and from which persistence 
conditions of a person may be derived. 
326 Bakhurst (2005) p.467.  
327 Wiggins (2001) pp. 208-9.  
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provokes different explanation for their persistence conditions, devoting a 
unity to the conditions of individual in that sense is a sort of relativity of 
identity. Our understanding of personhood and what we acknowledge when 
we are considering the persistence conditions of human being are somehow 
intertwined. As he explicitly suggests in Sameness and Substance Renewed, 
“the concepts person and human being assign the same underlying principle 
of individuation to A and B and that that principle, the human being 
principle, is the one that we have to consult in order to move towards the 
determination of the truth or falsehood of the judgement that A is B.”328 By 
taking the term “person” and “human being” within the conceptual 
agreement, Wiggins’ human being principle represents a hybrid notion, and 
accommodates insights of both animalistic and neo-Lockean idea of 
personal identity. Although by taking Sameness and Substance into 
consideration Olson thinks that Wiggins is a neo-Lockean, as he defends 
that there is no circularity or absurdity in Locke’s criterion of 
consciousness329, Wiggins has affirmed that memory alone cannot provide a 
basis for identity criterion330, and in Sameness and Substance Renewed 
(after Olson published Human Animals) he distanced himself from his 
former position, which has been interpreted as he is sympathetic to the 
Lockean notion of identity exclusively.  
For Wiggins, neo-Lockeans devote an exclusive emphasis on 
psychological continuity, yet they should not omit the importance of 
biological persistence conditions, and we should still defend the biological 
aspects of our nature, not against neo-Lockeanism, but along with neo-
Lockeanism. Wiggins’ concern has always been to endorse a positive thesis 
of our spatio-temporal continuity that is understood only through accepting 
                                                        
328 Wiggins (2001) p. 194. 	
329“Whereas my view is that psychological continuity is completely irrelevant, except 
derivatively, to our persistence, Wiggins insists that certain broadly mental capacities – 
sentience, desire, belief, motion, memory and others – are part of what it takes for a person 
to remain alive, and so to continue existing.” (Olson, 1997, p. 20.) "Wiggins argues that 
memory is ‘crucially relevant to our choice of continuity principle for determining the 
biographies of persons’... Although there is much in Wiggins’s work that I do not 
understand, his view seems to me to be a sophisticated version of the Psychological 
Approach.” ((Olson, 1997, p. 20.) 
330 See Wiggins (1976).  
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the fundamental notion of being a human animal.  Yet, he also pulls himself 
away from the scrutiny of any possible interpretation in which he has been 
referred as an animalist. Wiggins sympathises animalism due to our human 
nature, but he criticises the animalist denial of the neo-Lockean idea that we 
are essentially persons. Therefore, we can conclude from above discussion 
that Wiggins’ treatment of personal identity and persistence conditions 
presents a significant resemblance to the hybrid theory implicitly, if not 
explicitly. This is simply because Wiggins’ human being principle approves 
both animalism and neo-Lockeanism.331  
The hybrid view’s exposition of personal identity is insightful. Reading 
personal identity and persistence conditions within the hybrid notion 
presents a series of convincing arguments that reveal an inseparable relation 
between the term “person” and “human being”.  
4.1 Objections to Animalism and the Constitution View  
This emerging thought of the hybrid view on what a person is and how a 
person’s identity persists manages to accommodate constructive features 
form both neo-Lockeanism and animalism. This union draws our attention 
to two mainstream views from each side. The first objection addresses how 
Olson’s animalism primarily focuses on the definition of human animals. 
The next objection deals with issues inherited from psychological continuity 
views, in particular Baker’s constitution view. Specifically, the questions 
that psychological continuity defenders direct whether physical continuity is 
required for our continuity. I give a brief outline how these approaches are 
evaluated, and then I claim that these views within their own perspective are 
                                                        
331“A person is, par excellence (and as a presupposition of all the traditional questions in 
the philosophy of mind), the bearer of both M-predicates and P-predicates, where M-
predicates are predicates that we could also ascribe to material objects and P-predicates are 
predicates that we could not possibly ascribe to material objects and comprise such things 
as actions, intentions, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories, and sensations: and that ‘a 
person’ is a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and 
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to an individual of that 
single type.” (Wiggins, 2016, p.76.) 	
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reliable and each affirm their favoured continuity relation. Yet, their 
resistance to accept to go beyond what their favoured continuity relation has 
got to offer and not being in a position to see why a middle path way may be 
tempting, are the challenges they have to face. Having said that, the 
contribution of the hybrid view is quite clear. Plainly, it adopts these two 
contemporary accounts by combining them, and it supports a third way, 
which supposedly avoids the objections that these two accounts of identity 
have to face. In the final section, I consider the broader question of whether 
the hybrid view promises the best fit for everyday cases (the fetus problem 
and permanent vegetative state) and thought experiments. After giving this 
brief outline, now let us first look at the initial aspects of Olson’s animalism 
as a criticism to the hybrid view.   
4.1.1 Olson’s Animalism: A Biological Approach  
According to the animalist approach, all persons are identified with animals. 
In our animal nature, there is nothing beyond the biological interest of 
science. Therefore, there is nothing further that we can associate with a 
persons’ identity and persistence conditions through time. What matters in 
identity is precisely a work of biology. Eric Olson, who has developed a 
remarkable account of animalism, brought a breakthrough change in 
drawing a line between the aspects of a person and contemporary biology.  
There are certain positive implications of the biological approach, of 
which Olson takes advantage of while contrasting his account with other 
reductionist accounts of the bodily criterion. According to Olson, the bodily 
criterion supposes that we are identical to our bodies, which means that the 
main principle of identity is the continuity of the physical parts of a body. 
So, “If x is the person at time t and y exists at t*, x = y if and only if the 
thing that is x's body at t is y's body at t*.”332 The bodily criterion identifies 
persons with their physical bodies by claiming that although a person has 
gone through remarkable physical changes in her lifetime (especially 
considering the fact that the human body regenerates most of its cells 
approximately every seven to fifteen years), she will be identical to herself 
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only if her past and future selves hold the same body, the same organism. 
This approach seems to define what a human body is, yet, Olson suggests, it 
is commonly agreed that a body is difficult to define as the same entity 
through time. Olson is right in that sense, since human beings undergo 
innumerable physical changes through their lifetimes. Yet taking the bodily 
criterion’s initial argument into account and defining a person as the same 
one who was in the past seems very challenging, unless, claims Olson, our 
initial concern is the function of body parts. This is apparently a problem for 
the bodily criterion, since this approach seems only concerned with the 
physical parts of a body.  
In his critique of the psychological continuity view, Olson claims 
that the biological approach to personal identity is advanced enough to 
explain what makes a person persist through time within biological terms. 
Claiming that we are human animals, Olson argues, does not mean that the 
human body itself is an animal, or that a human animal constitutes our 
identity. Our self is numerically identical with an animal. Since, Olson adds, 
being essentially a person matches our criterion for being an individual 
among other members of the same species, yet what defines our substance 
concept and what we are essentially are only explainable through accepting 
that we are nothing more than human animals:  
We are essentially or most fundamentally animals. We are 
essentially animals if we couldn’t possibly exist without 
being animals. It is less clear what it is for us to be most 
fundamentally animals, but this is usually taken to imply at 
least that our identity conditions derive from our being 
animals, rather than from our being, say, people or 
philosophers or material objects – even though we are people 
and philosophers and material objects.333  
 
Being a human animal theoretically encompasses all means of living and 
functioning as a human person through time:  
When you look in a mirror you see an animal. It is easy to 
believe that you and that animal are one and the same, and 
that is indeed the way it appears. That is because you are 
connected with that animal in a particularly intimate way: 
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you and the animal are made of the very same atoms and 
occupy exactly the same region of space.334  
 
This is a well-defined critique of dualism in the sense of characterising the 
“thinking being” as a human animal. Yet, for Olson, being numerically 
identical with a human animal does not entail that non-human animals can 
be persons. In his discussion, Olson claims that being a person requires 
certain psychological capacities, and non-human animals lack these rational 
capacities, such as self-consciousness and intelligence.335 This is a vital 
divergence between human animals and persons, for Olson, that it is the first 
and foremost difference between human animals and non-human animals. It 
is likewise for the persistence conditions of a person. These conditions are 
certainly differentiated in non-human animals, which are able to hold their 
identities without having these mental capacities. According to the 
psychological approach336, a human being who does not have these 
capacities, such as fetuses, would not be accounted as persons. Olson’s 
counter argument sounds more plausible, where he claims that these 
organisms are indeed human animals.337  
 As a functioning animal, human animals survive as numerically the 
same from the cases where rational capacities are not appropriately 
developed, removed or mutilated, or may be completely destroyed.338 Then 
one may ask, to what extent does a human animal remain as a person after 
mutilation? Olson’s initial response will be that unless a human animal stops 
functioning as a living organism, we can still account the remaining entity 
as a human animal. Human animals still need to have these certain 
capacities in order to function as persons.339 These considerations might 
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337 Olson (1997a) pp.110–111. (1997b) pp. 95–97.  
338 Here Olson uses the example of the vegetable case, in which a human animal ceases to 
exist in the case when its psychological capacities are destroyed and replaced by a 
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339 This is a quite controversial interpretation of Olson’s account when we consider David 
Degrazia’s argument in “Are We Essentially Persons? Olson, Baker and a Reply”, (2002), 
where he rightly claims that regarding the persistence conditions, Olson sets the 
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make one wonder whether we are human animals or persons regardless of a 
materialist or immaterialist point of view. For Olson, we are living human 
animals, which are identical to human persons, and strictly speaking, a 
thinking animal and a thinking person are numerically identical. The notion 
of numerical identity has similar implications for the conditions of 
persistence. Although the continuity of animals depends strictly upon their 
bodily continuity, for animalism what matters in survival is the continuity of 
the brain’s life-maintaining functions, the continuity of the brainstem in 
particular. The brain, in this sense, has a priority over other life-maintaining 
parts of the body. 
Olson and Aristotle’s accounts of “becoming” are quite similar in the 
sense that an individual remains as the same through both her biological 
growth and her accidental changes. Socrates, from his childhood at t1 
becomes an adult at t2, and at t2 Socrates ceases to be a child, as he aged, yet 
he cannot be separated from the child at t1. Socrates is identical to himself in 
two different times t1 and t2. For a moment, if we put the substantial 
continuity aside, we can still claim that although Socrates’ accidental 
properties cease to exist (including his psychological properties) his 
essential properties – for Olson especially Socrates’ physical properties – 
survive from t1 to t2.  
For animalism these conditions are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for Socrates’ identity to persist through time. Since for Olson, 
Socrates is an animal before any other attribute is attached to his being, 
including being a person and persisting through time as being the same 
person. What matters for Olson is whether the same animal persists through 
time. Snowdon directs a relational question very openly, which is 
appropriate to mention here. He asks, What is the relation between an 
animal and its body?340  
For an animalist like Snowdon, an animal is identical with its body, 
as bodily continuity is sufficient for an animal’s persistence. It is the same 
relation for an individual to persist through time; no further causal relation 
                                                                                                                                             
psychological continuity conditions aside entirely so that our essential features are nothing 
to do with psychology.  
340 Snowdon (1990) p.71. 
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is needed. There are two main types of cases that represent the possibility of 
being identical to the animal. One is an animal-without-person case, in 
which we are inclined to think that the animal still exists regardless of any 
psychological changes. As a result, one might say that the person no longer 
exists. For instance, when a person loses her mental capacities and goes into 
a vegetative state, the animal remains alive, breathing, and not dead. 
However, certain personal traits would no longer exist. Can one say that this 
human being is not the same being who existed before? The being in a 
vegetative state was the being who had interacted with the world in her own 
unique way, and she was holding her characteristic traits along with her 
essential properties, such as memory, the perception of self and the 
perception of others, and so on. If we consider the possibility of this theory 
and claim that the being in a vegetative state is no longer the person who 
used to be, then from the ethical perspective the result may create a conflict 
between the family of a patient and professionals regarding the treatment 
decisions (according to one qualitative case study of the professional 
perspective in  moral case deliberations, conflicts occur between families 
and physicians concerning several themes, such as organisitional aspects, 
communication, feelings and attitude, impact on relationships, and family’s 
wishes for treatment, and so on).341 Nevertheless, we are inclined to 
recognise the person and recognise that the person is still the same human 
being.  
Unlike Olson’s rigid animalist explanation of the relation between 
the terms “human animal” and “person”, for Snowdon, it should be a 
practically undisputed point that there is no such a thing as a human animal 
without a person. The same reasoning is present in Toner’s animalist 
hylomorphic account, where he claims that being in a vegetative state and 
undergoing a cerebrum transplant operation, or remaining as a cerebrum-
less animal body, does not affect a human being’s persistence condition in 
substance terms. Namely, there will not be any change in the original 
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substance as long as there is no interruption in a human’s life. Accordingly, 
“This is very strong evidence for the human being’s survival. But if it has 
survived – if it has not undergone a substantial change – then it must still be 
the same kind of thing it was prior to the surgery/accident. It also means, of 
course, that it is still rational, in sense one.”342 
The second stage is to investigate whether there is a possibility of a 
person without an animal. This option could be scrutinised under the 
possibility of a brain transplant. The brain is removed from the original 
body but can continue to function as it was used to. The assumption here is 
that the personal traits and mental characteristics of a person after the 
operation would be located within the brain. The most common inclination 
would say that the identity is constituted by the brain, and what is left 
without brain is nothing but a body. Yet, there is a possibility that the 
animal left behind could be kept alive, if a certain amount of brain remains, 
or if the animal body is connected to an artificial life support machine. If we 
take the animalist perspective into account, the brain-transplant operation 
would not be much different than a heart-transplant case. Although the heart 
is a vital organ, we do not think that the identity of animal moves with the 
heart after the operation takes place. Similarly, for animalism it is not the 
case that the brain takes the whole animal with it. Rather, the animal left 
behind is the same animal without the crucial organ. The animalist argues 
that if identity goes with the brain, then not only do we reject the identity 
relation between person and animal, but also, we give credit to the 
psychological continuity view, which no animalist would wish to be the 
case.  
How can animalism make sense of such a case without something 
radical, like a brain transplant, taking place? If the person and animal can 
come apart, then the animal and the person are not the same thing. What 
psychological properties does the animal itself have? An animalist needs to 
ascribe more mental properties to human animals than we do normally for 
other animals, such as mammals. Human animals think and they are 
psychologically equipped as persons. If, animalism claims, one still thinks 
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that we are not animals, we should accept that there is one highly 
psychologically advanced animal, and there is the person as well. An 
animalist will argue that the claim that persons are distinct from animals is 
highly paradoxical. In this argument, however, what specific type of 
physical continuity we have to regard as the principle of identity, remains 
unclear, as biological continuity is essential for the persistence of the same 
human animal through time. 
According to Olson, strictly speaking, not our mental properties, but 
only our bodies (and functions of our brains) separate us from other animals 
as Homo sapiens. There could be persons who had no bodies or who had 
non-organic bodies. From the hybrid perspective, such an explanation 
remains limited and cannot explain what we are. Although certain potential 
similarities can be detected between bodies and non-organic bodies in terms 
of mental properties, individuals are separated due to their organic bodies. 
Olson’s argument is quite straightforward here. For him, “regardless [of] the 
possibility [that] someone could have a partly or wholly non-organic body –
one even might have a complete robotic body – no animal body [and so 
human body] could be entirely non-organic.”343 Olson goes on to argue;  
It may be possible to replace all of your parts, including your 
brain, gradually and piece by piece, with inorganic prostheses 
in such a way that your mental capacities were preserved 
throughout. The result would be a wholly non-biological – 
person with rationality, consciousness, free will, the works – 
who was both psychologically and physically continuous 
with you. Nevertheless, according to the biological approach 
that being would not be you, for you are a biological 
organism, and no organism could come to be a non-
organism.344 
According to Olson, even though the whole body of an organism is replaced 
with non-organic parts (including the brain) piece by piece, as long as the 
brain carries out the same functions after the replacement takes place, the 
animal would be the same animal. For Olson, whether organic or non-
organic, as long as the brain functions properly as it used to, its persistence 
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is guaranteed. On the other hand, the biological approach emphasises that 
the human body is itself the principle of identity. On this approach, one’s 
identity is reduced to their biological organism only (but in particular 
reduced to the continuity of brainstem), so the persistence formulation posits 
that the person at t1 is the same person at t2 if and only if she is the same 
biological organism (and has the same brainstem) at t1 and t2. Namely, what 
persists through time is a certain sort of biological entity. Our persistence 
conditions determine what type of changes happen to our bodies, yet we will 
still have the same bodies and remain as the same persons. These biological 
changes can be major ones, including being pregnant, giving birth, growing, 
and certain kinds of organ transplantation. However, the crucial condition of 
persistence, being the same person through time, requires more than a 
particular type of organism as an explanation. For Olson, in its basic form, 
the person at t1 is identical to the person at t2 iff that person has the same 
brainstem at both times, regardless of other changes to the body or 
psychological states:  
But even here, for that thousandth of a second during which 
you have no brainstem, there is nothing to direct your life-
sustaining functions. Even if those life-sustaining functions – 
heartbeat, respiration, digestion, and so forth – continue in 
the interval, your capacity to direct them is destroyed. So for 
a thousandth of a second there is no self- directing event that 
coordinates the activities of your parts in the unique way that 
biological lives do there is no living organism there, but only 
a corpse so fresh that its heart is still beating.345 
Although Olson follows the biological approach, in his many writings he 
eventually excludes most of the body in support of isolating the functioning 
brainstem as the main principle of identity, since the brainstem is the source 
of all our fundamental functions. It keeps the body operating in a way that it 
is alive. Hence, his approach is ultimately reductionist in the same way as 
the proponents of the biological view. Yet, Olson claims that there is a good 
reason for reducing the principle of identity to the persistence of the 
brainstem, which I will evaluate in due course.  
                                                        
345 Olson (1997a) p. 141.  
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 On the face of it, Olson seems to make the principle of identity 
strictly dependent on biological and material considerations, rather than 
something further, such as mind or self.346 These physical and material 
considerations define essentially what we are. In the light of this definition, 
the most natural interpretation indicates that Olson would not take any 
hybrid explanation of identity into account. His claim seems extremely 
straightforward: Only the biological features are essential to our persistence 
conditions, rather than the psychological parts and their continuity 
conditions. He writes “The Biological Approach is intended to be 
compatible with a ‘dual-aspect’ or ‘property-dualist’ theory of mind, 
according to which psychological properties are in some sense non-physical 
properties.”347 which means that he does not believe that biological 
organisms are merely biological.348 He further posits that if anyone claims 
that two individuals are not only differentiated by their organisms but also 
by properties that can be non-biological properties, such as being famous or 
wise, then their view is compatible with his account of animalism, unless if 
they mean that two individuals have parts that are not parts of any living 
organism. In that case, Olson claims, it is puzzling how the supporters of 
such a view could still claim to favour the biological approach.  
However, Olson’s argument here is not quite satisfactory. To a 
certain extent, it is not hard to see that human animals are essentially 
physical beings. It is almost needless to say that as rational beings we must 
have further aspects to our animal nature that differentiate us from other 
animals. While Olson’s approach may not require a hybrid view of identity, 
such a view might improve his argument for persistence conditions, at least 
in not taking psychological continuity as a mere “property”, which is almost 
equal to seeing it as an accidental property.349 The biological approach 
                                                        
346 It is very apparent that in most of his works he avoids using the term “self”.  
347 Olson (1997a) p.126. 
348 Here in the following line Olson also rejects the idea that biological organisms are 
“purely physical” regarding the things that do not have certain properties, such as linguistic 
competence. At any rate, Olson seems to commit a falsifiable claim here, which does not 
compatible with the notion that he has been defending in the first place.  
349 There are, of course, some parts of psychological continuity that can be treated as an 
accidental property, which is temporary and not directly accountable to memory traits. 
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supports the idea that the persistence of a particular organism is ultimately 
dependent upon biological traits, which may not necessarily maintain the 
same psychology.350 This idea explains what makes us human animals and 
how individuals persist. At first glance, there may not appear to be any 
problems. What seems to be a problem for the biological approach is the 
issue of the connection between the parts.351 If the individual as a unity 
depends upon its parts, then how can these parts work together as one? How 
is the causal connection between these parts facilitated? The biological 
approach, on its own, does not have a plausible avenue to follow without 
questions, as it itself already requires a broader ontology to explain the 
problem of personal identity and persistence conditions. 
Another sort of objection we can explore here, within the scope of 
the present discussion is raised against the conditions under which the 
principle of identity is considered within Olson’s claim. It is called the “too 
many thinkers” or “too many minds problem”.352 It is agreed that brains 
think and are parts of bodies. This is where the objection arises wherein the 
thinking body appears to exist simultaneously with a thinking mind. The 
problem here is a dilemma or more like a mereological fallacy, which 
involves in ascribing attributes to parts rather than the whole itself (as the 
whole is the composite of those parts). Either the body cannot think, which 
means thinking does not belong to the body, or the brain does not think, or 
psychology is not necessary. Here is how Olson understands the dilemma:  
Consider what it would mean if you were something other 
than the animal. The animal thinks. And you think. So there 
would be two beings thinking your thoughts: the thinking 
animal, and you, a thinking non-animal. More generally, 
every human person would share her thoughts with an animal 
numerically different from her. Every thought would have 
two thinkers.353 
                                                                                                                                             
Nevertheless, the whole picture of the hybrid view accounts for psychological continuity of 
an individual as a necessary part of the explanation.  
350 What I mean by these traits is that our essential psychological features, such as the unity 
of consciousness, a first-person perspective, the connectedness of memory to a certain 
degree, etc.  
351 Here, by parts I mean the compounds of the unity. For personal identity, parts represent 
the compounds of the unity of personal identity, psychological and physical continuity.  
352 Shoemaker (1997) p. 499; (1999) p. 79. 
353 Olson (2007a) p.45. 
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There is a joint view that is expected to give an appropriate response, yet 
cannot answer the question of what we are. For instance, as a proponent of 
the psychological continuity view, Shoemaker attempts to avoid this 
dilemma with an applicable methodology, in which he claims that animals 
do not think, since animals do not have minds in the same way that human 
beings do. Persons are not identical to animals. Instead, persons are 
constituted by animals. As such, there is no duplication of the thought 
problem here. 
In contrast, the way in which Olson tries to avoid the dilemma is 
credible only to a certain degree, since he sets several premises for his 
argument for animalism and establishes a plausible defence. Accordingly, if 
we assume that there is a human animal sitting in your chair, we can 
immediately say that the human animal in your chair is thinking in order to 
be you, and the unavoidable conclusion that follows from this premise is 
that “you are the thinking being sitting in your chair, which means the only 
thinking being sitting in your chair is you, a thinking human animal”.354 
Therefore, Olson concludes, we are essentially human animals, because we 
are human animals simpliciter.355 After accepting that we are material 
beings of some sort, for him it seems quite obvious that we are mere living 
animals. For a human animal to persist, it needs life-sustaining functions, 
which provide biological life.356 To be a living organism is to have the 
capacity to direct these life-sustaining functions that keep the body 
biologically alive.
 
Olson explains:  
By “life-sustaining” functions I mean those that sustain life in 
the biological sense: they are those functions that keep an 
organism alive in the sense in which not only human beings, 
                                                        
354 Olson’s approach is very similar to the one Aristotle explicitly manifests in De Anima: 
“to say that the soul is angry is as if one were to say that the soul weaves or builds. For it is 
surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns or thinks, but that a man does these with 
his soul.” Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. by Barnes, J. (1991) De Anima, 408b12-15. It 
is a mistake to ascribe attributes to the mind that are ascribable to the person as a whole.  
355 Elsewhere Olson gives an explicit example for how to avoid the Too Many Thinkers 
problem - sometimes called the Over Population problem. (Olson; 2001b). Accordingly, in 
our identity we carry some properties in a derivative sense. For instance, “We are tattooed 
in so far as our skin is tattooed.” (Olson; 2001a) p.76. In that sense, Olson’s conclusion 
would be that I am not something further than a human animal, which thinks. There is 
nothing beyond that animal being which/who does the thinking for me. Two entities are not 
existing as a thinking animal on the one hand and thinking mind on the other.  
356 Olson (1997a) p. 112.  
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but also cockroaches and cabbages, are alive. There are 
certain features that distinguish biological organisms from 
non-living things.357  
Thus, what matters to a human animal’s identity is life-sustaining functions 
and nothing further. Accordingly, in the metabolic process, these functions 
occur organically in their different forms. They proceed to what makes the 
body persist through time, and this persistence is what determines the 
identity of a body. Olson claims that these functions are necessary and 
sufficient to characterise the identity and persistence conditions of persons. 
The brainstem has a vital role here, as it controls all these functions. If it is 
removed from the body or stops functioning, then the animal would cease to 
persist regardless of whether other organs function perfectly. As Olson 
reasons, “As soon as your brainstem is destroyed, you lose the capacity to 
direct your vital functions. You cannot survive brainstem replacement for 
the same reason you cannot survive annihilation and replacement by a 
perfect duplicate.”358
 
A new human animal comes into existence, but 
definitely it will not be the same human animal as the one before.  
For Olson, biological life is the only important unity for identity to 
persist through time, because we are human animals. Science defines what 
constitutes animal life, which is a particular group of functions that all living 
bodies accomplish, such as digestion, healing, and adjusting body 
temperature. Whereas, in human animals, the brainstem controls and 
monitors life-sustaining functions. When the brainstem of a human animal is 
destroyed – for Olson that could also be a gradual process – a brainstem’s 
ability to coordinate its life-sustaining functions is also destroyed.
 
Hence, 
the brainstem, which is the vital aspect of a body, is the main principle of 
identity and its persistence conditions. 
As a result, similar to the Aristotelian claim, in his biological 
approach Olson allows natural processes to occur, such as the regeneration 
and replacement of dead cells. Apparently, Olson’s approach allows bodies 
to change and perform bodily functions through time; in contrast, the bodily 
criterion has the difficulty of explaining generation and change because of 
                                                        
357 Olson (1997a) p. 112. 
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its exclusive focus on the physical traits of bodies. The main difficulty for 
the bodily criterion derives from characterising the identity strictly within 
the scope of pure physical matter of bodies without describing how bodies 
and their identities persist through change. Compared to the biological 
criterion’s lack of responsiveness, Olson’s approach seems more plausible, 
as it underlines the persistence conditions of a body while the processes of 
regeneration and replacement take place. According to the biological 
criterion, it is not the psychological continuity, but rather it is our bodies 
alone that are essential to our identity and persistence conditions. If it is the 
case, Olson argues, the biological criterion entails that “I am a material 
object of some sort (something called "my body"), and that what it takes for 
me to survive is what it takes for that object to survive.”359 In its simplistic 
form, the biological criterion denotes human animals as having more or less 
the same persistence conditions as artefacts. The biological approach Olson 
defends is in favour of animalism, by which Olson claims that physical 
bodies are essential to our identity and persistence conditions as long as we 
have animal bodies that function by brainstem. Assuming that we know 
what it takes for a person and a human animal to survive, Olson is not very 
clear in his approach concerning how exactly we can define persons, as they 
are essentially human animals. As he admits bluntly,  
Is there any way to find out whether some animal’s life is your 
life without first knowing whether that animal is you? If not, the 
current proposal would be no better than this one: a person x 
picked out at one time and something y picked out at another 
time are identical just in case x and y are legally entitled to bear 
the same passport. While this may be true, it doesn’t tell us 
anything about how to individuate people, because any evidence 
for the claim that x and y are entitled to carry the same passport 
would have to involve the claim that x is y.360 
 
Yet still, Olson thinks, his biological approach is superior when we think 
about the compatibility of the psychological approach with the neo-Lockean 
view of persons. Recalling the context from Chapter 1, the Lockean view of 
persons is basically a collection of complex psychological states, and 
                                                        
359 Olson (1997a) p. 143. 
360 Olson (1997a) p. 139. 
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therefore differences in psychological properties are the only distinguishing 
feature between human and non-human animals. Again, however, Olson 
does not use these differentiating features in his approach. He claims only 
that the principle of identity and individuation does not depend on 
psychological continuity or other psychological states, since psychological 
continuity alone is not essential to the persistence conditions of identity. It 
matters to us only in social and pragmatic contexts.  
If, Olson asserts, we accept the Lockean view of persons, then 
regardless of their modal or dispositional properties, a person cannot fail to 
be a person in the first place. That means, persons are always necessarily 
persons, and there will be no condition in which persons fail to be persons. 
In such a case, the Psychological Approach would fail to account for the 
identity conditions of persons who might have gaps between their 
psychological states, or between mental contents, such as memories, beliefs, 
and desires. Namely, there could be a lack of continuity that is necessary 
and sufficient for being the same person through time, according to the 
psychological approach. The Lockean account also fails because the being 
in question cannot be a person that conflicts with the premises of the 
Lockean view. According to Olson, Locke claims that “any rational, self-
conscious moral agent is a person; in this sense nothing could fail to be a 
person merely because of its historical or modal properties.”361 Olson 
claims, strictly speaking, that 
The Conjunction of the Psychological Approach and the 
Lockean Account, then, entails that every rational, self-
conscious being must persist through time by virtue of 
psychological continuity. No such being could survive as a 
vegetable, or fail to go along with its cerebrum when that 
organ is transplanted.362  
 
In order to avoid confusion here, Olson secures his account of the 
persistence of identity by claiming that the cerebrum alone is the central and 
exclusive feature that controls one’s thoughts, memories and consciousness. 
Olson’s biological approach neglects the remaining parts of the body in 
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362 Olson (1997a) p. 105.  
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order to isolate the functioning brainstem as the main principle of personal 
identity. Since as I highlighted already, for him, the brainstem is the cause 
of all vital functions and keeps the body alive through time.  
There are two implications of Olson’s reductionist approach. Firstly, 
from the hybrid point of view, animalism fails to capture the notion of the 
persistence conditions of our identity in some respects. For instance, an 
animalist believes that in some cases a person does survive, where the 
notion of our persistence cannot survive after change or alteration. In the 
same vein, there are cases where a person does not survive, where the notion 
of our persistence can survive after change and alteration. Let us say 
Socrates’ cerebrum363 is removed and transplanted into Callias’ body, where 
it is properly connected without losing any of its proper function, and the 
remainder of Socrates’ body (that also includes the remaining parts of his 
brain) are destroyed. Based on the basic interpretation of transplant cases, 
one could claim that Socrates partly survives. Since certain parts of his 
identity –such as initiating voluntary movements, reasoning and intelligence 
– is continuous with Callias’ identity, where Socrates’ cerebrum was 
transplanted. Yet, Socrates’ identity will be constituted by Callias’ identity. 
According to animalism, regardless whether Socrates’ cerebrum is 
functional and intact in another body, he died when his brainstem ceased to 
existed.364
  
A second conflict regarding the persistence conditions of identity 
occurs where the cerebrum is still functioning and healthy, while the 
brainstem is replaced with another brainstem or ceases to exist. According 
to animalism in those cases the individual dies.  
Nevertheless, our reasoning in this thesis is based on the hybrid view 
of identity, in which we assume that an individual’s identity remains 
continuous with individual through time. This is because, if the cerebrum is 
the obvious candidate for interpretation, initiating voluntary movements, 
reasoning, intelligence and so on (which could continue to occur in cases 
such as the replacement of the brainstem), one’s conscious states would be 
effected along with one’s basic bodily functions (breathing, heart rate, etc.). 
                                                        
363 It even may be the whole brain is transplanted.  
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As a result, one may have gaps in some of one’s mental states. What I want 
to point out here is that Olson’s animalist concern is rather biological, and 
there is a strong emphasis on the notion of basic bodily functions compared 
to states of consciousness. If animalism’s concern is purely about the brain’s 
function in identity claims, in the latter example, the healthy cerebrum 
continues to execute its functions as before. The results I drawn from these 
cases are not philosophically controversial, and are in some ways coincide 
with our reasoning.  
Animalism claims that in some transplant cases, an individual’s 
identity persists, even though the hybrid intuition considers the individual to 
cease to exist. For example, if Socrates’ brainstem was removed from his 
head, and the rest of his body and brain were destroyed, then quite naturally, 
we would tend to think that he would not survive, which indeed is the case 
according to the hybrid view. Given the fact that his brainstem is 
undamaged, on the animalist view, we do not need any further evidence to 
prove that his identity still persists.365 This being said, certain parts of a 
body are crucial for the survival of that a body in the same way that a 
brainstem is. The same reasoning applies to the transplantation of other 
organs as well. For instance, if x’s kidney is transplanted into y’s body after 
x’s death, this transplantation would be evidence of x’s kidneys continued 
existence, and thus of x’s identity. In this regard, it is fair to say that the 
brainstem does have the sort of significance that other organs have for the 
body. It is simply a part of the composite that is separable from the body, 
and if it is transplanted into another body, it may operate it did in the 
original body. From the hybrid point of view, after the transplantation takes 
                                                        
365 The brainstem discussion is something that I think Olson struggles to explain in the first 
place. In his paper “The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity” (Olson; 2016) he tries 
to clarify the misunderstanding over his claims about the role of the brainstem. Olson 
explicitly states two major statements about the role of the brainstem in defining persistence 
conditions: (i) There cannot be a human life unless there is a functioning organ of 
maintenance caught up in that life. (ii) The organ of maintenance in human beings is the 
brainstem. (p. 293) In his respond to Tzinman’s criticism, after highlighting that we are the 
same animals as long as we have the same brainstem, he immediately suggests in brackets 
“Let’s not worry about whether this would require a criterion of identity for brainstems.” 
(p. 293) This line of argument is extremely confusing. On the one hand, Olson offers 
reducing persistence condition to the continuity of the brainstem. On the other hand, he 
suggests that our concern should be the brainstem itself in the context, not the continuity of 
it.  
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place it does not guaranteed that the individual’s identity persists. Whereas 
Animalism claims the exact opposite: If one’s brainstem is still operating, it 
continues to bear one’s personal identity.  
As is already clear, the hybrid view hinges on the fact that animalism 
and other kinds of biological approach are quite narrow in marshalling 
support due to eliminating the role of psychological traits all together. In his 
recent paper, Olson admits the defect observed in his treatment of transplant 
cases:  
I said other things about animal identity that may support the 
brainstem condition. But never mind: it appears that I was 
wrong to connect the brainstem with the continuation of a 
human life in the first place. The neurologist Alan Shewmon 
argues against [the statement “There cannot be a human life 
unless there is a functioning organ of maintenance caught up 
in that life”, and “The organ of maintenance in human beings 
is the brainstem”]. First, he says, the brainstem is not the 
organ of maintenance in human beings – or not the only one. 
It does direct basic life-sustaining functions, but other organs 
do too. The brainstem is just one of several organs of 
maintenance.366   
 
Olson eventually admitted that we must include life-depending organs into 
our ontology not as particulars, but in a more holistic manner. However, this 
concession was mainly the result of his larger biological approach, which is 
subject to alteration as long as the mysteries of the brain are fully resolved.  
There is a crucial distinction here, which animalism seems to avoid 
accepting due to it’s a broad reasoning. An individual’s identity still 
continues to persist in such cases where the individual’s brainstem is 
removed and placed into another body and the rest of her body is destroyed. 
It is true that a human animal can remain alive, yet the identity of the 
individual cannot persist. I will discuss the notion of transplant cases in the 
following sections more extensively. However, introducing this short 
critique of animalism seems informative here. The short critique can act as a 
guideline for later critiques, and I shall now denote the reasoning behind 
Olson’s discussion of human animals, persons, and the continuity of 
identity, by which he presents a valuable interpretation of the relationship 
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between a person’s identity and biological nature. His biological 
considerations serve as the guarantor of physical continuity. There are some 
major differences we can detect between Olson’s animalist approach and the 
hylomorphic notion of the hybrid view I have been suggesting. Firstly, 
nowhere does Olson allow the idea of an internal cause that governs an 
organism’s function, something that gives necessary and sufficient reasons 
to control the human animals’ biological processes.367  
What seems to emerge here, quite frankly, is that for Olson, 
organisms respond to their environment in a mechanistic manner, which 
leaves us with the claim that just like any other living organism, human 
animals are regulated by a governing mechanism. His reductionist 
physicalist approach is the subject of considerable dispute concerning 
whether human activities are governed by the complex mechanistic nature 
of the human organism or rather there is something more substantive that is 
explainable along with the biological phenomenon. Secondly, and most 
importantly, Olson leaves open the possibility of situations in which a 
person does not always persist as a person. Each person starts existing as an 
unthinking embryo and could be in a vegetative state later in life, and he 
adds, we do not count them as persons at those times.368 An unthinking 
embryo could be a person potentially in the future, but apparently not a 
person in its fetus stage, or a human being in vegetative state could be a 
person in her early life, up until her required brain functions stopped 
processing. By contrast, from the hylomorphic point of view, fetuses are 
potentially persons, and we can apply the same relation in a chronologically 
reversed version369 to someone in a vegetative state. Accordingly, persons 
could be in a vegetative state at later stages of their lives, yet this state 
would not mean that a person ceases to exist when she is in a vegetative 
state. Olson does not directly claim that persons cease to exist in a 
                                                        
367In the Aristotelian terms the actuality of form governs primary matter as a cause and 
principle.  
368 Olson (1997b); (2012). 
369A quick reminder is needed here. The relation between potentiality and actuality is 
irreversible in nature. What I meant by “the same relation in reversed version” is that any 
person can be in a vegetative state in their later life. This is definitely out of her teleological 
context.  
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vegetative state, but he sees the continuity relation in a vegetative state as 
less persistent as in the transplant cases.370 A substantial amount of work has 
been dedicated to responding to Olson’s challenge to the sychological 
approach371, and Lynne Rudder Baker offers a significant argument that has 
offered a methodological contribution to the neo-Lockean approach while 
accommodating our animal nature.  
 
4.1.2 Baker on the Constitution View of Human Persons: First-Person 
Perspective 
In her defence of the psychological approach, Baker addresses the 
difficulties in Olson’s method of explaining persons as numerically identical 
to human animals.372 For her, persons are definable only through certain 
psychological capacities, and these capacities are necessary and sufficient to 
explain the persistence conditions of persons. The relationship between 
person and body is not contingent, as in Cartesian dualism, nor necessary 
and sufficient as in Olson’s animalism, but only constitutional. In other 
words, the identity of a human being is more complex and substantial than 
can be represented by reducing the persistence conditions to mere biological 
continuity conditions. Rather than referring to persons as human animals in 
biological terms, she states that all persons are human beings, and it is 
likewise from the biological perspective that all human beings are persons. 
Therefore, human bodies constitute – but are not identical with – persons, 
without being numerically identical to them:373 “We are constituted by 
human animals, and when we say truly that we are human animals, we are 
using ‘is’ in the sense of constitution.”374 Baker gives an example elsewhere 
                                                        
370 Olson (1997b), p. 109. 
371 Parfit (2012); Shoemaker (2008).  
372	For Baker’s response to Olson see Baker (2001).	
373 Baker (1999) p.154; (2000) p. 7; (2007) p.67.  
374 Baker (1999), p. 57. Here, Baker clearly implies that we are animals. Therefore, quite 
naturally, we can conclude that having the same body through time is not a necessary 
condition. However, her constitution view underlines the idea that if persons are constituted 
by human animals, then persons can be regarded as human animals. It seems like Baker is 
suggesting a difference between a person’s persistence conditions and those of human 
animals’. In other words, it is plausible to imagine a case where, if my first-person 
perspective is transferred to a sort of non-human organism, so to speak, a robot, then I 
would still exist regardless of not being constituted by a body or a human animal.  
	 161	
to make her assumption as clear as possible:  
A river at any moment is constituted by an aggregate of water 
molecules. But the river is not identical to the aggregate of 
water molecules that constitutes it at that moment. Since one 
and the same river—call it “R”—is constituted by different 
aggregates of molecules at different times, the river is not 
identical to any of the aggregates of water molecules that 
make it up. So, constitution is not identity. Another way to 
see that constitution is not identity is to notice that even if an 
aggregate of molecules, A1, actually constitutes R at t1, R 
might have been constituted by a different aggregate of 
molecules, A2, at t1. So, constitution is a relation that is in 
some ways similar to identity, but is not actually identity. If 
the relation between a person and her body is constitution, 
then a person is not identical to her body.375  
 
This is what she calls “the constitution view”. It is reduced to a “first-person 
perspective”, which is, Baker insists, not a version of the psychological 
approach.376 Accordingly, the formulation of continuity is “ x at t1 is the 
same person with y at t2 iff x and y share the same first-person 
perspective”.377 Baker’s version of the neo-Lockean answer to the question 
“What are the persistence conditions of person?” is straightforward: Having 
a first-person perspective, namely, self-consciousness. That means the 
principle of continuity is a first-person perspective. Here is how Baker states 
what she thinks the notion of first-person perspective is:  
A human person comes into existence when a human 
organism develops to the point that its brain can support a 
first-person perspective. To have a first-person perspective is 
not a matter of having a brain in a certain state. To have a 
first-person perspective is to have a conceptual ability; to 
exercise a first-person perspective is to exercise a conceptual 
ability.  This conceptual ability is the ability to think of 
(conceive of) oneself as oneself. And it is an ability had by a 
person, not by a brain. A sufficiently developed brain is a 
materially necessary condition for having this ability.378 
 
This is something that all human beings have in common, yet each human 
being has their perspective for themselves, such as I have the perspective of 
myself in a unique way and others have the perspective of themselves in the 
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376 Baker, (2000), p. 59; (1999), p. 154.  
377 Baker (2000), p. 132.  
378 Baker (2001) p.1. 
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same respect. In this way, persons are identified only with a particular 
perspective.379 As she puts it elsewhere, “A person is a being with a first-
person perspective essentially, who persists as long as her first-person 
perspective is exemplified.”380  
How do we know whether the first-person perspective is persistent 
or not, however? Baker claims that the essentiality of first-person 
perspective enables us to be aware of our existence. If we are having an 
experience, then there is no doubt that first-person perspective is involved in 
the process. It is impossible to think of any experience (both self-perception 
and outer experience) without the underlying feature of a first-person 
perspective, which is a transcendental apperception. In that sense, Baker 
would insist that the persistence of our first-person perspective is 
unquestionable, because having any sort of experience requires existence, 
and if I exist, adds Baker – like Descartes famously expresses “cogito ergo 
sum” – I have a first-person perspective that is unique to my being.  
Even though a person is constituted by a human animal, as a subject 
of her thoughts, she can still think of herself as a human animal from a first-
person perspective; yet, Baker suggests, there is no ontologically 
differentiated notion of a subject – something like a further fact or separate 
entity – underneath her first-person perspective. Her “self” is her body. 
Thus, “the relation between a person and her body is an instance of a very 
general relation”,381 which is simply a constitution. The human body 
                                                        
379 The ontological nature of the explanation here can be derived from the distinction 
between a first-person perspective and a third-person perspective. I can describe myself by 
using identity terms about my race, age, physical features, which all explicitly distinguish 
me from other persons. I can also describe myself by only using the term “I”, which 
indicates my first-person perspective. Apparently, other persons cannot use the term “I” to 
describe me. For instance, if I express, “I am feeling very well today”, I have the authority 
to use the way describing myself, and there is no physical explanation that could be used. 
This authority of a first-person case is built into persons. It is not hard to see that this is also 
applicable to other type of human relations. Once we understand this notion, the relation 
between the self and the other escalates the explanation out of the biological realm. Baker 
gives a confirmatory example: “What one thinks from a first-person perspective cannot be 
adequately translated into third-person terms. To wonder how I will die is not the same as 
wondering how Lynne Baker will die, even though I am Lynne Baker. This is so, because I 
could wonder how I will die even if I had amnesia and didn’t know who I was.” Baker 
(2007), p. 69. 
380 Baker (2013) p. 149.  
381 Baker, (2000) p. 27. 
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constitutes the human person, Baker argues, “If x constitutes y at any time, 
then [strictly speaking] x is not identical to y.”382 As is perhaps already 
clear, this notion clearly reduces the constitution view to a sort of 
materialism, even though Baker claims that our brains are not sufficient for 
identifying the persistence conditions of personal identity.  
The constitution view can agree with substance dualism up to a 
certain degree without suggesting the idea of immaterial souls.383 The 
constitution view and substance dualism agree on the questions of whether a 
person is identical to her body and whether person can survive after a drastic 
change in her body. However, the explanation of the non-identity of person 
and body, and the way one interprets the possibility of swapping bodies or 
brain transplants in thought experiments diverge. I still argue that 
constitutionalism can be seen as a form of materialism. As Baker 
acknowledges, for those who are skeptical about the argument in favour of 
the view that persons are not identical to their bodies, we can claim that 
“although it may be empirically impossible for me to have a complete 
change of body, the constitution view raises no theoretical barrier to a 
human person’s having a complete change of body.”384 We can only assure 
that unlike Olson, Baker is more accurate in elucidating the relation between 
complex psychological capacities and the human body. Baker claims that 
we have an immediate relation to our body. There is no temporal gap 
between physical occurrences of any pain or pleasure in our thoughts and 
our first-person perspective of these emotions and thoughts. We are, of 
course, the subjects of our thoughts, emotions, and the reflection of 
intentional states, yet Baker argues, only in the sense that we have the first-
person perspective of our body. The relation between persons and their 
bodies is not contingent. Persons are enduring entities regardless of changes 
in their bodies – as long as the change is not drastic, such as loss of 
imperative bodily parts. However, it is also conceivable, Baker adds, that as 
long as a person has a continuous first-person perspective of herself and is 
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embodied in an organism, in cases like body-switching or teleportation – 
such as in Locke’s thought experiment of the prince and the cobbler – are 
convincingly intelligible.385   
The constitution view uses more modernised version of Locke’s 
thought experiment. In Locke’s example, the soul (in contemporary terms, 
the consciousness) of the prince enters the body of the cobbler. Now, if we 
suppose that not only does consciousness move between bodies, but that 
they swap their brains too, the brain of the prince is in the body of the 
cobbler, and vice versa. In such a case, the person in the prince’s body holds 
all conscious states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, and memories) of the cobbler, 
and vice versa. It is commonly held that the prince and the cobbler have 
swapped bodies. If we take this position into account, Baker claims, both the 
identity of the prince and the cobbler have continued through the process, 
even though there was no bodily continuity for either the prince or the 
cobbler in their original bodies. It is true that they both still have bodies, but 
they are distinct from their original bodies. The term “continuance” here 
indicates some sort of continuing life. In this case, the continuance of the 
prince’s body is the continuing life of two persons. So, we can also conclude 
that before the brain swap, the prince’s life was only unique to him, but after 
the brain swap occurs, it is now the life of the cobbler. The same applies to 
the cobbler’s body. In that sense, the following reasoning seems plausible 
for Baker: (i) If it is possible for the prince and the cobbler to persist in 
different bodies separated from their original ones, then there is clearly no 
continuance between bodies after the swap has occurred, (ii) Bodily 
continuance is not necessary for the persistence of personhood. (iii) 
Therefore, the identity conditions for persons are different when we take 
only those bodies alone into account, and it is possible for a person to exist 
in different bodies at different times.  
       I have already pointed out in Chapter 1 what kinds of difficulties appear 
in reducing the continuity of persons to psychological continuity conditions. 
In Baker’s case the psychological continuity condition is the continuity of a 
first-person perspective. If we have a direct relationship to our body, as 
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Baker suggests, the extent to which the particularity of one’s body – 
“thisness”– is a necessary and sufficient condition for the persistence of 
one’s identity remains ambiguous.  
Baker seems as if she does not credit to any means of biological 
continuity, but what matters in her approach is embodiment. As long as our 
first-person perspective is embodied in a living organism, our identity 
remains determinable. Yet this account does not rule out the fact that 
persons are ontologically prior to the material world.  By being material 
entities, persons are part of the natural world, but on the ontological level 
persons are of course different from animals. Hence, suggests Baker, 
personal identity cannot be reduced to the continuity of human animals.  
Baker’s reductionist approach leaves us with a mystery concerning 
how on the one hand persistence conditions are not reducible to physical 
conditions of body or brain. On the other hand, we have a direct relation to 
our bodies, in which, Baker claims, our first-person perspective has been 
developed and shaped. Nevertheless, my first-person perspective inevitably 
depends on my brain to function properly. So in that sense, her account 
struggles to show that a first-person perspective is more than a higher-order 
property of the brain. This is a constitutive relationship between brain and 
personal identity that inevitably bears some similarities with the biological 
continuity view of identity. 
 
4.2 Was I Ever a Fetus?  
Baker explicitly claims that there is no so-called “further fact” underlying 
our first-person perspective. What’s more, in Baker’s psychological 
approach, having a self-awareness is not a necessary condition for a human 
to be a person in its early stages of existence. Hence, our perspective about 
ourselves gradually comes into place. Undoubtedly, having a first-person 
perspective must be accompanied by more complex psychological states to 
merit the status of personhood386 and this criterion even applies to newborn 
babies unavoidably. Specifically, Baker confronts this criterion and adds 
that newborns do not have a first-person perspective. They cannot grasp 
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their selves and the complexity of their psychological status, but they are 
potentially persons and remain in the process of developing a first-person 
perspective.387 If this is the case, then, A at t1 was an embryo and now A at 
t2 is an adult human being, and A at t1 is constituted by A at t2. Although 
Baker admits newborns are potentially persons, she still insists that we 
cannot employ the same potentiality principle to fetuses, as they lack 
psychological properties entirely. According to her, “we do, in the ordinary 
course of life, regard fetuses and adolescents as different kinds of things. 
From the point of view of common sense, there is a deep logical difference 
between being a fetus and being an adolescent.”388 She adds elsewhere that 
“A human person is wholly constituted by a human organism, without being 
identical to the constituting organism.”389 
It is tempting to question Baker’s argument here: What is the 
relationship between the person as an early form of fetus and the same being 
as a newborn, and eventually an adult in their later life? Baker could employ 
the same potentiality principle for fetuses as she does for newborns. Since 
after all, all fetuses (more accurately in their later stages) are potentially 
newborns, so far as all newborns are potentially persons. In her definition of 
the constitution view, Baker defends her account against Olson’s claim, in 
which Olson shows that some philosophical problems occur with the theory 
by which a person is not numerically identical to herself when she was ever 
a fetus in its early term. The constitution view affirms that an early-term 
fetus continues to develop until it constitutes a person, so basically nothing 
happens to the organism that was ever a fetus. The fetus does not cease to 
exist, but that there is no evidence (or any philosophical strength) in 
embryology that shows an embryo and adult person are numerically 
identical. Since, there is no causal relationship (a causal relationship 
between psychological states) between a fetus and a first-person perspective 
that this fetus will potentially develop in its adolescent life. 
The advantage of the hybrid view I defend for the fetus problem – 
and for the vegetative state case – is that by defending either sides of the 
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explanation exclusively, both animalists and neo-Lockeans commit to the 
claim that neither was I once a fetus, nor before that was I an embryo – and 
if someone is in a vegetative state now she is not the same person as she was 
once. By adopting the hybrid unity and bringing the process of becoming 
actuality into the debate, we will be able to avoid the complications that the 
contemporary debate has created over the issue of persistence.  
For the sake of maintaining a plausible principle, let’s suppose that I 
was once a fetus, and all this development happens from being an embryo 
into being a fetus, then after birth into being an infant, then into a toddler, 
and so on. The principle out of this supposition follows that if an organism 
was once existed, it has never ceased to exist, so the organism still exists. 
Someone who supposes that a human being can exist once and not exist at a 
later time, without having ceased to exist in between, is beyond the reach of 
argument. The crucial question we should ask now is: Have I as an embryo 
ever died? This is a question to which the biologists can tell us the answer. 
My cells have divided, differentiated, and developed further. Nowhere in the 
continuous history have we seen anything we could identify as death or non-
existence. In fact, the whole process is the very opposite of the process of 
death, but a process of growth. That embryo that was conceived nine 
months before my birth never died. It is true that it ceased to be an embryo, 
and at the end of the nine months (more or less) it ceased to be a fetus. This 
process is nothing like a death, but rather passing from one phase sortal to 
another, something like what Wiggins explains when he suggests the unity 
of an individual within the causal relationship between phase sortal and 
substance sortal. Passing from childhood to adolescence, or from 
adolescence to adulthood, by realising the same principle of activity, 
Wiggins assures, the fetus is identical to the adult it will later become. 
According to Wiggins, the principle of activity becomes realised at the 
moment of a human being is exist. It is when the zygote splits or settles 
down to develop as a unity.390 
From the hybrid view’s perspective, it also does not seem credible to 
say “fetus me and the adult me are not numerically identical”. Since we can 
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easily establish the following line of reasoning by recalling the notion of 
becoming: 
(i) I was fetus F at t1, 
(ii) F successfully became an adult-me A at t2, 
(iii) F became A, only if there was no significant interruption 
through my lifetime between t1 and t2. 
(iv) F became A in virtue of F being potentially A.  
(v) Thus, there is no good reason to reject the idea that F at t1 is 
numerically identical with A at t2, even though there is no causal 
relationship between F and the first-person perspective of A.  
Hence, the main feature of identity is nothing more than the relationship 
between being a fetus once and an adult later in life. Here, I would like to 
borrow the reasoning of becoming. If we say that adult-me391 comes from 
the fetus that I was once, then adult-me is something “which has come to be 
from that which is coming to be”. This is the basic form of becoming. Fetus-
me becomes an adult-me, and in the same vein, fetus-me is potentially the 
adult me, in which the persistence condition is preserved through time. It is 
certainly true that adult-me has the psychological continuity conditions, in 
which the unity of the first-person perspective is perfectly attainable. 
Nevertheless, fetus-me cannot be me entirely and does not have the 
biological development that human beings accomplish. Yet, these inabilities 
do not make fetus-me F less me than adult-me A, even though I have no 
psychological connectedness to my being as a fetus F. The potentiality 
relation is applicable to all stages without exception. Presumably, A at t2 
differs from F at t1 not only in terms of psychological features, but in 
countless other qualities, such as physical features and the capacity to 
reason. In the light of these differences, one may question, How can 
enduring person A gain properties both in psychological and biological 
terms? There are many ways and causes persons gain and loose properties. 
For now, we can see clearly from the above example that there is no good 
reason for us to accept that F is not numerically identical to A, as F and A 
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can be diachronically identical. We can suppose that there are necessary and 
sufficient reasons to believe that fetus-me F has become adult-me A. There 
is no evidence to support the claim that fetus-me has become adult person B 
or adult person C. And again, there is no reason against to believe that fetus-
me F has become adult-me A, but not otherwise. This feature does not rule 
out the possibility that F and A are numerically identical.  
Now, if we take the view that identity consists only in having a first-
person perspective at different times, then the result is noticeably circular, 
since the persistence condition of a person is defined neither by the 
biological view nor by psychological connectedness. Baker’s suggestion 
that “to have a persistent identity is just to have a first-person perspective” 
seems fairly reasonable, but why is a first-person perspective the only 
persistence condition to consider is not completely clear. I believe she was 
also aware that what is needed here is a proper criterion for diachronic and 
numerical identity, one that appears to justify the identity relation of F at t1 
and A at t2. I think both Olson and Baker’s accounts on their own fail to 
bounce back from criticism. Fortunately, the notion of personal identity can 
be approached through the middle way. 
It has already been pointed out in the previous chapter that the 
hybrid view is capable of reducing the identity relation into the formulation 
of “x is potentially y”, which provides a criterion for diachronic and 
numerical identity. This basic formulation causally relates the single entity F 
at t1 to A at t2 without any condition. The identity criterion I offer here is 
based on an account that takes the identity relation as non-circular, definite, 
informative and fixed with no further requirements. I now identify the 
modes of non-reductionism and how other non-reductionist accounts treat 
problems of personal identity, along with the benefits of the hybrid view I 
have defended in comparison to other approaches to non-reductionist 
accounts.  
 
4.3 Modes of Non-Reductionism and How Non-Reductionist Accounts 
Treat Persistence 
By characterising the identity conditions within the scope of animalism and 
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the constitution view, we have come to the conclusion that the hybrid view 
offers a plausible third way to address a theory that embraces the idea that 
we are persons embodied in particular bodies with first-person perspectives. 
It is an adequate way of comprising the aspects of Animalism and the 
constitution view. Hylomorphism demonstrates a model, which harmonises 
these two approaches and gives room to both the physical and psychological 
states of persons, and initiates the hybrid way of understanding human 
nature.  Accordingly, a person is not only a composite of two substances – 
as claimed in substance dualism – or a mere animal. Hylomorphism 
understands the term “human being” as one-individuated substance. From 
the non-reductionist perspective and based on the hylomorphic account of a 
person, the hybrid view has the unity of a first-person perspective and a 
living animal body, yet the identity conditions cannot be reducible to any of 
these notions alone. Regardless of whether we are human animals, human 
beings, or human persons, only one condition applies to the persistence 
condition: Essentially, persons cannot be reducible to their accidental 
properties, or their psychological states, but persons are identical to each of 
these features in a simple hybrid way, and identity itself is non-reducible. 
Now, I would like to consider different modes of non-reductionism, which 
afford a conclusion concerning the plausibility of the hybrid view of 
identity, which in return justifies the hypothesis of this project.  
The first mode of non-reductionist accounts I would like to examine 
adopts the idea of being entities, in which the identity conditions can exist 
separate from bodies, brains and psychological continuance. The most well-
known example of this non-reductionist account of identity, which was 
already discussed in Chapter 1, was Cartesian dualism. I take the Cartesian 
dualism here to be non-reductionist, only because Descartes did not reduce 
the identity conditions of a person to a material entity, nor he did not reduce 
the identity conditions to the psychological continuity, as Locke does. 
Cartesian dualism considers persons as mental and separate entities. The 
continued identity of a person either exists or not. Persons’ continuity 
conditions through time are not determined by physical or psychological 
continuity. This is to say, the persistence condition of our identity is 
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accountable only if these conditions are non-reducible. Other possibilities 
have already faced the difficulties set by non-reductionist approaches, 
providing that non-reductionism is more acceptable.392  
Now let’s suppose that we are persons but some sort of separate 
entities from our bodies and brains, something like a Cartesian ego. Hence, 
persons are distinct from their brains or bodies, and particularly from their 
psychological states, and the persistence conditions of their identities are not 
ruled out by any of these strands. Accordingly, the identity formulation of 
the separate entity view is “x is at t1 is continuous with y at t2 iff they have 
the same Ego through time.” With this definition in the background, we can 
assume that physical continuity and psychological continuity are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a person’s persistence. Just like any other non-
reductionist view, the advantage of this view is significant if we take split-
brain or brain transplant cases into account. Because when we split A’s 
brain and put one half into B’s body and the other half stays in A’s body, we 
suppose that each half can perfectly contain A’s original mental properties, 
such as thoughts, beliefs, memory, and so on, both bodies claim to be A by 
having A’s psychological continuity. In such a case, not only will both A 
and B be psychologically continuous with A’s pre-operation self, but also A 
and B will be materially continuous with A, as they both have half of A’s 
brain.  
This scenario, in which A has become A and B after the operation, is 
problematic for any reductionist account, as well as animalism and the 
constitution view. Since two hemispheres cannot be identical, A-before-the-
operation cannot be identical with A and B-after-the operation. The non-
reductionist notion of the Cartesian ego has a definite attitude for thought 
experiments, does not allow personal identity to split between the two at the 
same time and does not allow both resulting people to possess the mental 
qualities of the original person has before the split operation. Wherever the 
Ego goes, so too does the identity of the person. The Ego can only move 
from one body to another, but not split into two. The case is the same for 
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idea that persons are sort of non-material entity, something more like a soul or spirit.
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transplant cases. The Ego is the bearer of the identity, which means if the 
Ego ceases to exist, then the personal identity ceases to exist as well, and 
therefore cannot be split into two.  
By and large, these remarks about the Cartesian ego conclude that it 
accommodates our own continuity through time. Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence to show that personal identity behaves in the way Cartesians 
suggest. Not only do we have no reason to believe that persons have the 
same Ego throughout their lifetimes, but also we are left without a 
justification for the transplant cases in which an identity switches bodies. 
What happens in transplant cases and how personal identity shifts between 
bodies cannot be explained, and it prompts a circular reasoning. The 
question of how this separate entity responds to different problems of 
personal identity remains unanswered. One has to face this remarkable 
weakness if she favours the non-reductionist separate entity view of identity.  
Another possibility for the non-reductionist claim I would like to 
examine is the further fact view. I earlier mentioned the possibility of a 
further fact, and in order to offer a subtler explanation, I left the examination 
of such a possibility to following chapters. What I meant in the first chapter 
by stating that personal identity can be explained by a further fact was that 
the persistence condition of identity needs a further fact, which is, strictly 
speaking, not reducible to any of the identity claims, such as the biological 
view or the psychological view.  
One can still claim that the persistence conditions of identity consist 
in a further fact. As Parfit states, according to this view, we are not 
“separately existing” entities, but personal identity is a further fact, which 
consists not only in physical or psychological continuity.393 The view is 
followed by some non-reductionists and denied by the reductionist view. 
Personal identity is not consisting in the holding of any other more 
particular facts which can be described impersonally, but personal identity is 
simply a further fact. This notion of identity does not require our identity to 
be distinct from our bodies. On the contrary, our identity conditions are 
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always determinable and compatible with persistence conditions.394 If this is 
possible, it is hard to see any reason why we could not consider the 
possibility of a further fact that underlies our identity conditions. However, 
difficult to conceive how one might be suspicious of the fact that there is a 
lack of evidence to support the further fact view that non-reductionism 
offers. Undoubtedly, the further fact intuition is required to provide 
appealing reasoning in order to tackle hypothetical cases of personal identity 
without committing circularity. The further fact intuition is also 
unsatisfactory. I think the sophisticated puzzle in question is raises an issue 
for the further fact view, similar to the issue I have examined in the separate 
entity view.  
4.4 Defending the Hybrid View as It Addresses Cases of Personal 
Identity 
4.4.1 Everyday Cases of Persistence 
Endless examples can be constructed for this section, as these types of cases 
are related to everyday experience. I consider two main examples here, 
though: dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, and the fetus problem the latter 
of which has been considered already in section 4.1.3. When we look at the 
fetus puzzle again, it should be a practically undisputed point that there is no 
simple solution to the fetus puzzle at hand for neither reductionist nor non-
reductionist accounts can provide. What I suggest in this project is the 
simplest way to get a plausible result for this puzzle, which is first to be 
more flexible when it comes to the indiscernibility of identicals.395  
Accordingly, if fetus-me F once was me, and is numerically identical to 
adult-me A, then for every property P, fetus-me F has the property P iff 
adult-me A has the same property. This property, or the unity of properties, 
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395 This is one of the fundamental principles of personal identity that has been pointed out 
by Leibniz. Accordingly, two distinct objects cannot have the same properties. In that 
sense, these two objects must hold at least one differentiating feature between them. 
However, if there is a case where these objects cannot be differentiated in any way, then 
they must be identical.  For the purpose of the subject we are dealing about the fetus puzzle 
here, counting fetus-me F and adult-me A as two distinct beings hardly does us any good if 
we have any interest in figuring out the principle of persistence.  	
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persists through time, even from the very early stages of my existence to 
later periods of my being. In this particular example, however, there are 
neither physical nor psychological properties, or the unity of these 
properties, would persist from t1 to t2. Nevertheless, the hybrid formulation I 
propose here shows that F is potentially A through its life time without a 
gap, and this reasoning fits well with hylomorphism. The solution I offer for 
this puzzle is a neither reductionist nor “narrow” or “weak” form of non-
reductionism, rather it is a form of hylomorphism. The lay out of the hybrid 
view’s proposal for this particular example goes as follows: 
First, we take our initial Aristotelian premise, 
(i) Fetus-me F is potentially adult-me A without a gap through my 
lifetime, 
and apply the formulation “A is potentially B” to each predicate: 
(ii) F is potentially psychologically continuous with A, even though 
there is no direct causal relation between F and A’s 
psychological stages, 
(iii) F is potentially biologically continuous with A, and 
(iv) F’s potential psychological continuity with A is in virtue of   F’s 
potential biological continuity with A.  
The reasoning I propose above is the foundation of the hybrid view and this 
view requires predicates (ii), (iii), and (iv) all together without any 
exception. The hybrid view’s reasoning focuses on the problem generated 
by both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of identity. The hybrid 
view is not only non-reductionist, but also claims that psychological 
continuity of identity is only accountable in virtue of biological 
continuity.396  The hybrid notion of identity and persistence is perhaps most 
helpfully clarified in defending the idea that psychological continuity is in 
unity with physical parts. Namely, psychological connectedness is grounded 
in physical connectedness. In this regard, Olson was right to cite the 
cerebrum (or whatever part of the brain is responsible for the life-
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physical continuity, as it is the mere principle of identity, but just as a necessary part of 
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	 175	
maintaining functions) at the centre of psychology, which is the case 
regardless of whether changes occur in other body parts. As long as there is 
no damage in the cerebrum, the unity of identity and persistence is secured.  
Now, I will claim that the same adaptableness eliminates difficulties 
resulting from both the psychological and biological views of reductionist 
persistence conditions. I have already mentioned in previous chapters that 
the psychological continuity view requires transitivity in psychological 
connectedness, which is only ideal in theory, yet it is hard to see how it can 
be applicable to our practical life. When we talk about psychological 
connectedness, it is either strong, short-term connectedness, or long-term 
connectedness, such as happens over many years or even a lifetime. We 
know that our psychological states cannot be connected to each other 
strongly through our lifetime, which means even overlapping continuity 
would be sufficient for the person at t1 to be psychologically continuous as 
the same person at t2. Hence, there will be no strong connectedness between 
psychological states of a person through distinct periods of life.  
The same understanding applies to the notion of the strong physical 
connectedness of a person, which consists of having approximately the same 
matter with a strong physical connectedness. Unless there is an interruptive 
disturbance occurring within a short period of time, we are physically 
continuous beings. For instance, I have a strong physical connectedness 
between my yesterday-body – or even two days ago – and my now-body. 
That means, I will have a strong physical connectedness to myself at 
different times within a short period of time. However, just as in the fetus-
adult example, even if adult-me shares some physical features with fetus-
me, such as having exactly the same DNA structure, the same blood type, 
and so on, it is also unquestionable that fetus-me F does not stand in a 
strong physical connectedness with adult-me A. Physical connectedness 
here, in terms of a body, is extremely low, yet the entity of which I 
consisted of when I was a fetus was potentially adult-me, and that 
connection reveals a great deal to justify the physical continuity between my 
being at vastly different periods of time.  
Note that in this specific example, how much physical connectedness 
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and continuity are required for identity to persist through time is variable, 
and can present tight or loose connections. Admittedly, where personal 
identity begins in human life is not always clear, and there is this 
controversy regarding where precisely to draw the line. We often – in no 
philosophically complex way – recognise that our lives have a progressive 
feature. What I argue here is that regardless of the degree of physical 
connectedness through time, psychological continuity for identity has been 
secured, since the persistence conditions of a person are not limited to 
physical connectedness alone. This flexibility is the distinctive advantage of 
the hybrid view, in which both necessary biological and psychological 
conditions are united in the same person through time. The person A is the 
same being at t1 and t2, and A’s identity persists through time as the same 
person iff A at t1 is psychologically continuous with A at t2 in virtue of 
being physically continuous with A at t2. This formulation in the 
background, the hybrid view fits well with our everyday-life ordinary cases.    
Another obvious example of an everyday case is related to suffering 
degenerative brain disorders, such as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. In 
these examples, the disease progresses by developing from short-term 
memory impairment to further memory loss. At first glance, there will be no 
difference in a patient’s biological continuity. In further stages of the 
disease, psychological connectedness can no longer be fully accountable. 
May one claim that “personhood” ceases to exist, she is no longer 
accountable397 as the same person, since she lacks the psychological 
connectedness (which represents a lack of connectedness in memory traits 
or a complete memory loss in cases of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease) 
that the hybrid unity of identity requires?   
Undoubtedly, memory is a fundamental component of one’s identity 
traits and we should have a clear understanding of the notion of memory we 
are taking into account while we are considering the cases, such as dementia 
and Alzheimer’s disease.398 A neuroscientist Squire399 has divided memory 
                                                        
397 Accountability in identity is a forensic concept within the grounds of moral agency, and 
more substantial research should be dedicated to this single subject alone.  
398 Jungert (2017) p. 8–9. 
399 Squire (2004), pp. 171–177. 
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into two classes as declarative memory and non-declarative memory, and 
declarative memory has been divided into two categories as semantic 
memory and episodic memory. Squire identifies declarative memory as a 
capacity of which we consciously re-call about facts and events. Whereas, 
non-declarative memory represents traits that are categorised through 
performance, such as skills and habits.400 The subdivision of declarative 
memory as semantic and episodic memory is within the concern of this 
paper. Semantic memory stands as a conceptual knowledge in which 
personality traits may or may not be represented, such as knowing capital 
cities, different types of food, function of tools, and so on. Whereas, 
episodic memory is event-based and is derived from lived experience and 
manifests itself as autobiographical memory with emotional attributes, 
which, in total, characterises the narrative of identity within a first-person 
perspective (a sense of subjective continuity of the self).  
For a neuroscientist Davis401, in the case of an amnestic disorder 
patients lose their sense of self, and this idea of loss could cause a 
disintegration. On the contrary, there are case studies402 prove that even in 
the most severe cases of episodic memory loss, patients who are at the mild 
to moderate stage of dementia could still retain a sense of self-continuity 
through preserved knowledge about their personal traits and preferences.403 
Regardless of the common assumption – without memory there can be no 
self – 404 some neuroscientists suggest that to a certain degree, aspects of a 
persistent identity remain present even in the face of severe episodic 
memory impairment.405  
Moving forward from the above discussion, we can conclude that a 
person with dementia or Alzheimer’s disease will be only qualitatively 
different, but numerically the same person, in theory. Numerical identity is a 
worthy concern here, because it is the main requirement of the continuity of 
personal identity. We cannot regard psychological continuity as a qualitative 
                                                        
400 Squire (2004), pp. 173. 
401 Davis (2004).  
402 Brown, C. H., Grillid, M. D., Hannad, J. A., Irisha, M. (2019), p. 4. 
403 Brown, C. H., Grillid, M. D., Hannad, J. A., Irisha, M. (2019), p. 4. 
404 See Downs (1997); Davis (2004); Fontana and Smith (1989).  
405 Brown, C. H., Grillid, M. D., Hannad, J. A., Irisha, M. (2019	
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feature. Since, not only both psychological and biological traits are the 
essence of an individual, but also these traits are necessary and sufficient 
components of an individual’s unity. The person before dementia is 
continuous with the person after dementia in virtue of having the same 
biological traits.   
Another aspect of a persistent identity in cases of dementia or 
Alzheimer’s diseases stems from our everyday experience. We regard the 
person as the same being as before so long as she is alive, which I think, 
accords well with the conclusion of the hybrid view. Although her 
psychological traits are gone for good, she is still the daughter of her 
parents, or the sister of her siblings. Family relations are not based only on 
personal traits, but are also dependent upon biological attributes, may even 
be based on being a human animal in the Olsonian idea.  
It would also be misleading holding onto the belief that the way 
hybrid view highlights the notion of persistence is nothing but a wishful 
thinking, a sort of validation that focuses on the intuitive reasoning. My first 
answer to this criticism amounts to not relying on the notion of intuition in 
any case, as our common beliefs and practices can be ambiguous, decisive, 
and sometimes scientifically falsified. My second answer is given that a 
person can become a human vegetable one day, and we are perfectly aware, 
I think, of the fact that a human being in a vegetative state is still a person. 
There will be a lack of psychological connectedness, yet she still holds her 
rationality, even though she cannot think or act upon it ever again.  
 Can anyone cease to be a person? There are no plausible grounds on 
which to believe that if the essential psychological qualities (consciousness 
and memory) that make the person who she is, are no longer exist, then we 
should accept that the unity of her continuity and her personhood have been 
interrupted. When attempting to accurately describe the condition of a 
human vegetable (the same rule applies to human embryos and human 
fetuses too), the hybrid view proposes a plausible position in this particular 
case. Accordingly, even though the personhood of a human who is in a 
vegetative state seems as if it was a phase sortal in her life and is now no 
longer available to her, we cannot deny who she is as long as her body 
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accomplishing the initial requirements for the legal protection of the right to 
live.406 This is not an obscure notion altogether. One may claim that there 
may be sufficient reasons to believe that this person exists in a new form 
when she is in a vegetative state. This state is almost like a new person with 
a new self, in which the psychological connectedness of her previous self is 
no longer available, her thoughts, beliefs, memories, and so on are no longer 
connected. I do not think that there will be a new person in this particular 
example just because her psychological continuity ceases to exist after a 
non-reversible severe disease has occurred. Her psychological traits may no 
longer exist, but physical continuity does still exist.407 We regard her as the 
same person before as long as she is alive, even in a vegetative state. I 
follow the Olsonian line of the argument in this particular case. A person’s 
hybrid unity has been ruined, yet labelling her as a new person brings no 
plausible validation for the issue either.  
These examples represent quite common everyday cases and make 
the point fairly clear all by themselves. We can gain more insight into the 
benefits of the hybrid view by looking at the ways in which the hybrid view 
I have favoured treats thought experiments. 
                                                        406	Medical law may reveal controversial conclusions in different cases of vegetative state 
patients, where the law adopts brainstem death as the point at which life ends. Nevertheless, 
this debate within medical law should not affect the way we see a person in a vegetative 
state, who is still regarded as a person, even though she may not hold the psychological 
connectedness between the time when she was holding self-awareness and the time when 
she is in a vegetative state. Whether we say someone was once an embryo and potentially a 
person, or someone who is in a vegetative state, she is granted with moral values and legal 
status. Therefore, I suggest, it follows that on the contrary what scientists and neo-Humean 
philosophers would claim, we must have a plausible reason for why the explanation for the 
persistence of identity requires a unity. 
407 Regardless of the loss of some organs’ functions.  
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4.4.2 Thought Experiments: Split-Brain and Transplant Cases 
In the previous chapter, we saw that philosophers of personal identity deal 
with thought experiments, such as the very well-known case of the prince 
and the cobbler408 and split-brain cases, and they try to internalise the 
outcomes. In this section I offer a more detailed investigation of thought 
experiments and how the hybrid view I have been defending responds to 
some crucial questions and puzzle cases. I claim that the hybrid view 
provides distinctively satisfying answers to these problematic cases.  
The problematic notion of split-brain cases was introduced409 in the 
1960s, when there was no treatment for those who were diagnosed with 
epilepsy, apart from cutting off the corpus callosum between two 
hemispheres of the brain. In those patients, excessive signalling between the 
two hemispheres, caused by epilepsy, was prevented from spreading to the 
other half when the corpus callosum was separated. This procedure enabled 
patients to live a normal life after the operation, and the operations did not 
cause any noticeable change in personality and behavioural traits. Each half 
of the brain could still able to accomplish certain requirements after the 
operation, but one half did not have the information about what the other 
half had experienced or learned, and each half had their own memory. 
Causal investigations, severing procedures, and experiments on such cases 
carried out after this trial all had a great impact in the philosophical 
literature. Regardless of whether these procedures in specific cases are 
effective as a cure, the possibility of imaginary cases in philosophy, such as 
fission and fusion, remain debatable and open to scrutiny.   
My aim is to motivate an inquiry in which the hybrid view I defend 
                                                        
408 A similar example is illustrated by Sydney Shoemaker in Self- Knowledge and Self-
Identity, which is known as a body-swap argument.
 
Accordingly, the brain of Brown is 
somehow accidentally placed in Robinson’s body. After the brain-transplant operation takes 
place there will be the composite of Brown’s brain and Robinson’s body. Shoemaker 
suggests that the new functioning combination of the two is now Brownson.
 
If we suppose 
that the transplant operation is successful, after the surgery Brownson claims he is Brown in 
Robinson’s body, as Brown’s identity has continued after the operation without his body. 
Because all his psychological states persist in Robinson’s body. This is a prime example of 
psychological continuity supporters. Then again, it is not hard to see the argument here that 
the bodily continuity cannot be the only criterion for persistence. 
409 Sperry, R. (1975) pp. 30‒33. 
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provides plausible grounds on which to investigate these cases. The idea 
that if during any period the brain is damaged or split into two hemispheres, 
and one hemisphere or both hemispheres are not intact in the original body, 
then the persistence of identity could be ruined. The same rule applies to 
cases in biological continuity as well. If any life-dependent part of the body 
is removed from the original body, the recognition of the original body is 
endangered. The hybrid view reflects psychological continuity in virtue of 
physical continuity. In that sense, if these continuity requirements are 
broken at any time, then the unity of persistence conditions is lost. Since, 
persons are genuine unities, owing to the causal power they have over their 
physical and psychological status. The persistence conditions in terms of 
priority require a condition in which organisms are real unities and parts of 
unities are ontologically dependent upon them. 
There are imaginary cases in which these requirements cannot 
match. I will attempt now to identify imaginary cases in which personal 
identity either survives or faces non-survival according to the hybrid view.  
 
4.4.2.1 The Problematic Possibility of Fission and Fusion  
For any standard split-brain case, there are two versions of fission. The first 
version is a single transplant case in which we suppose that A’s brain is split 
into two hemispheres and that each part maintains the complete content of 
A’s mind. Furthermore, one hemisphere of A’s brain is placed into a 
brainless body B, and the other hemisphere is destroyed. It can be said as a 
result there would be psychological continuity between A and the resulting 
person B. It is worth drawing attention to the question of whether the 
resulting person is continuous with A, or instead A and B are two different 
persons. If we agree that B maintains the complete content of A’s mind, 
then we also have to accept that B is A. The second version is a dual-
transplant case: the other hemisphere of A’s brain is not destroyed, but 
placed into another brainless body C, at the same time the first half is placed 
in B.410 As a result, there will be two persons B and C, and each would have 
                                                        
410 Parfit describes a fission case in Reasons and Persons (1984), pp. 254-55, in which his 
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A’s psychological content. Therefore, there would be continuity between the 
psychological content of B, C, and A. 
Several questions are outstanding in fission cases. Does A survive 
after fission? If A does not survive, then to what extent is it a matter of 
concern that A is not identical with the post-fissioned person(s)? If A does 
survive, then which of the resulting person(s), if either, is A?411 The 
condition has already been pointed out that there is no loss in A’s mental 
content in either hemispheres of A’s brain, and both hemispheres contain 
enough of A’s brain content to represent qualitatively identical minds. The 
minds of B and C are also qualitatively identical to A’s mind. The 
psychological continuity defenders conclude that as a result, both B and C 
are A; that is, B and C are numerically identical with A. This intuition 
seems logically impossible. Two distinct persons cannot be numerically 
identical with one person, for then they would be identical to each other. If 
this is the case, then is one of them A, but not the other? If so, which one is 
A and which one is not? Or why one as opposed to the other one? Is there 
any relevant reason to pick B over C, for instance? Or are neither of them 
A? If this is the case, therefore, we have right to assume that A ceases to 
exist and fission has killed A.412  
It is not difficult to accept that at least in one way we would typically 
recognise a qualitative identity between distinct persons B and C. If the 
brain is split into two hemispheres and each is put into B and C, the result is 
two numerically distinct persons, but they are qualitatively identical with 
                                                                                                                                             
body has been fatally injured, while the brains of his two brothers are fatally injured. In the 
case of fission, Parfit’s brain is divided into two hemispheres, and one hemisphere is 
transplanted into the body of each brother, and his functioning brain appropriately attached 
to his brothers’ body, so Parfit’s brain can function. 
411 There is a problem involved in drawing a bigger picture of the relationship between 
continuity and survival. The persistence of identity is secured, and any discussion of 
personal identity will have to include aspects that the kind of reasoning we are searching 
for, which is dependent on the predicate that personal continuity is possible. Throughout 
this project I have ignored the idea of survival without identity. As I have initiated in the 
first chapter, the persistence of identity is crucial and there is an underlying element of 
identity, in which the continuity is secured through time. Strictly speaking, if there is 
survival without identity, then there is no continuant identity. Thus, simply there is no 
means of survival without a continuant identity.  
412 Similar case is discussed by Parfit (1984) pp. 254–256; Parfit (2008) pp. 200–201; Perry 
(2008) 329–330; Shoemaker (1984) pp. 85 and 119–120; Williams (1957) pp. 238–239. 
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each other as much as they are qualitatively identical with A. We know that 
neither B nor C is numerically identical with A. We typically assume that 
one entity cannot be numerically identical with two distinct entities. Thus, 
strictly speaking, A cannot be numerically identical with both B and C. 
Does the failure of the second version of fission make the first version true? 
For the sake of fission cases, we are asked to suppose that the resulting 
persons are numerically distinct and qualitatively identical with each other, 
as well as that they are identical with A. Of course, this supposition would 
not make the first version more acceptable than the second version. Both 
versions seem problematic regarding persistence.  
In fission cases, firstly, we should aim to find out which part of the 
brain is needed to meet the requirements of continuity if we insist on 
recognising fission cases as convincing. In single and dual versions of 
fission, we are asked to suppose that half of the brain – or can it be even less 
than half or a small portion – contains all the content of the original person’s 
mind and consciousness. In this regard, one may still assume that removing 
parts of the brain may not violate its content, and the necessary and 
sufficient reasons remain consistent with the original self. There is only one 
way to examine whether the fission case fails the hybrid test. Accordingly, 
B and C are continuous with A if and only if:  
(i) B and C are psychologically continuous with A, 
(ii) B and C are physically continuous with A, or 
(iii) B and C are psychologically continuous with A in virtue of B 
and C’s physical continuity with A.  
For any thought experiment and split-brain case, I will apply the same test 
to different variations, since the transitivity of identity in most transplant 
cases is not a plausible option for the hybrid view. One point that seems to 
be widely accepted is that it is not hard to realise how both single and dual 
transplant versions of fission fail the hybrid test, since they cannot meet the 
physical continuity requirements. If (i) is true, then for the sake of identity 
to persist, (ii) and (iii) must be true. Even though (i) can be a necessary 
requirement of continuance, (i) is not sufficient without (ii) and (iii) being 
fulfilled. It seems clear that neither B nor C would be continuous with A. 
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Hence, if they were continuous, each would be qualitatively identical with A 
and with each other, but they are distinct. Furthermore, B and C themselves 
do not stand in a relationship with one another either. Since, B and C are not 
physically continuous within themselves, and so they cannot stand in a 
continuous relationship with A according to the hybrid view. Thus, fission 
fails again. 
However, there are imaginary cases in which fission perfectly 
matches with the hybrid model. Suppose we switch the possibility in favour 
of fission. Let’s imagine a case in which B and C’s bodies are made of some 
sort of exact duplicate of A’s original body, and the two hemispheres of A’s 
brain are split and placed in A’s exact duplicate bodies B and C. From the 
hybrid point of view, it should be possible even for a split second (at least in 
theory) for the two hemispheres of A’s brain to function perfectly in exact 
duplicate bodies B and C, and in theory we should allow psychological 
continuity in virtue of physical continuity. Therefore, this is a crucial 
criterion that must be met for fission to be acceptable for the hybrid view. 
What I mean by “acceptance” here is that regarding the criterion of 
persistence both psychological and biological continuities are sufficient for 
A’s identity to persist in B and C’s bodies. There can be a case in which it is 
possible to survive and have a persistent continuity with only half of a brain, 
only if B and C are psychologically continuous with A in virtue of B and 
C’s physical continuity with A. Yet, there remains one condition that cannot 
be matched in any split-brain case: that is, even though B and C’s 
psychologies could be exactly similar by means of A’s qualitatively 
identical brain division into two hemispheres, B and C will begin to separate 
according to their experience right after this fission occurs. Subsequently, B 
and C will start to have different experiences and different psychological 
states as individual entities in virtue of having bodies separated from one 
another. In this case, regardless of whether B and C’s identities are 
continuous with that of A, their identities are not continuous with one 
another. This is a branching problem that challenges the possibility of 
persistent identity altogether, as the identity relation between A, B and C is 
not transitive. Accordingly, 
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(i) B is both psychologically and physically continuous with A 
in virtue of being physically continuous with A,  
(ii) C is both psychologically and physically continuous with A 
in virtue of being physically continuous with A, yet 
(iii) B is not psychologically and physically continuous with C in 
virtue of being physically continuous with C.  
No matter how much B and C are physically continuous with A and one 
another, as long as they become separate entities after fission takes place, 
their connectedness is interrupted. In the hybrid view, there must be a 
numerical identity between the entities we are investigating, and only then 
can the two beings be identical and their identity is persistent with one 
another. Apparently, the persistent identity of distinct individuals seems 
impossible for both cases of fission. The logic of identity limits the 
possibilities I have investigated. The hybrid view, in that sense, requires 
numerical identity, by which a person is identical to herself but to nothing 
else. If a person is identical to two other persons, these “two” must be 
identical to one another, which is again against the logic of numerical 
identity I have proposed above. If they are exactly similar, which means if 
they are both psychologically and biologically continuous with one another 
to a sufficient degree, it becomes impossible to discern one from the other. 
So, neither B nor C is A. Both are exactly similar to A, but identity is to be 
distinguished from the exact similarity. Therefore, fission fails again.  
I now will consider fusion, another hypothetical problem of split-
brain cases. In a fusion case, parts of two distinct brains are united in a 
single body and connected appropriately. The two distinct parts can work 
together as a single fully functioning brain. There can be even a case in 
which the parts come from the same brain. Even though our current 
technology does not permit such an operation to be performed successfully, 
as a hypothetical case, it is worth discussing within the scope of thought 
experiments. Accordingly, if we suppose A and B are two distinct 
individuals and both have their brains split into two equal parts, which 
means both A and B have the condition of hemisphere duplication, in both 
persons two parts of the brain are identical with no exception. This 
	 186	
specification allows the two to swap each other’s brain parts. The left 
hemisphere of A’s brain and the right hemisphere of B’s brain are fused 
together and placed into a brainless body C to compound the brain to 
function properly. The psychological features of both A and B persist 
undamaged.  
What should be noted here is that C’s identity stands in a 
relationship with both A and B. In various fission cases I have concluded 
above, half of a brain is may or may not be sufficient for identity to continue 
in a brainless body, regardless of whether there was no loss of psychological 
features in the transplant of either hemisphere. Other non-reductionist 
accounts may not be as strict as the hybrid view. What I suggest, though, is 
that it is clear from both fission and fusion examples that psychological 
continuity holds in virtue of physical continuity by keeping half of the brain, 
yet there is no evidence that C has continuant identity traits with A and B. In 
the fusion case, according to psychological continuity defenders, A’s 
identity could persist as only her left hemisphere is transplanted into C’s 
body, and B’s identity could persist as only her right hemisphere 
transplanted into C’s body. According to the hybrid view, however, we can 
assume that A and B’s brain parts can be perfectly compounded, and the 
reasoning that fusion advocates follows does not seem to acknowledge the 
condition in which A and B’s identity traits are continuous with C’s identity. 
Therefore, there is no theoretical justification to support the claim that after 
fusion both A survives as C, and B survives as C, regardless of whether C 
comprehends the content of A and B’s consciousness.  
I can see one crucial question that arises from this. Is C one person 
or two persons sharing a single body? I have advocated a view according to 
which A’s identity cannot survive as C, and along the same line of 
reasoning, B’s identity cannot survive as C, so both A and B’s identities 
cannot be continuous with C’s identity as one single individual. Not only 
can C’s identity not hold two distinct identities, but also, even in theory, A 
and B cannot share a single body, as they both had their individual lives and 
consciousnesses before the operation. Furthermore, regardless of whether 
A’s identity is continuous with C and B’s identity continuous with C, the 
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result does not entail that C contains two identities instead of one. Thus, 
fusion fails.  
One may object and ask to what extent we can claim that fusion fails 
for cases in which two persons share the same body, such as Siamese twins. 
This example, one may suggest, does not undermine the possibility that a 
single body can belong to two distinct individuals. I still insist on the claim 
that sharing most of the same body does not rule out two individuals having 
their own consciousness and experiences, and as a result will differ in their 
personalities. Given the fact that there is quite a bit of variation in both 
fission and fusion cases and what the essential characteristics of persons 
after split-brain operations are, any feasible idea seems as good as the other. 
As such, there is no burden upon us here to make use of any particular 
example. In fact, the goal here is to be able to find a case in which any of 
those transplant cases can be introduced for the hybrid view. 
However, the hybrid view I suggest cannot adapt any of the 
possibilities have been explored above, neither the option of two identities 
in a single body, nor the possibility of one person’s identity is continuous 
with two people. In the same vein, the hybrid view will not accommodate 
the claim that two hemispheres of the brain permanently remain within two 
distinct persons, and it will not affirm the claim that two persons may be 
combined into an individual at some point. Presently, I have not explained 
why the hybrid view requires numerical identity in split brain cases in which 
the proponents of psychological and biological continuity views seek for a 
plausible way to justify their reasoning. Addressing this matter will allow 
me to demonstrate the acceptance of hybrid view, which does not 
necessarily follow the acceptance of expected results of fission and fusion 
cases. 
The hybrid approach seems promising for several reasons. First of 
all, there is no good reason in theory indicates that we should necessarily 
believe what psychological continuity defenders, such as Baker, Parfit and 
Shoemaker, argue. According to them, if A’s perfectly healthy and 
functional brain – or part of a brain – placed in B’s brainless body, for 
instance, A’s psychological traits are good enough to function in B’s body 
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as A, just as these traits were functioning in A’s body. In that sense, they 
conclude, B is A. When B wakes up after the operation, what she sees in the 
mirror is A in B’s body (for Baker, A’s identity is constituted in B’s body). 
In the meantime, biological continuity defenders, such as Olson, would 
claim that even though A’s fully functioning brain is replaced in B’s 
brainless body, when B wakes up, B does the thinking as the holder of brain 
functions and she thinks that she is B, since, A’s psychological traits are 
only derivative in terms of their functions.  Hence, A is only a donor of B’s 
brain functions.413  
From the hybrid point of view, neither does A’s identity persist in 
B’s body and the post-operation person is A in B’s body (contrary to what 
Baker and Shoemaker suggest), nor does the person who wake up after the 
operation realise that she is B regardless of carrying A’s brain and 
psychological traits (contrary to what Olson suggests). What matters in 
persistence, according to the hybrid view, is the uninterrupted414 continuity 
of both bodily and psychological traits. Therefore, my suggestion is that the 
post-operation person would be C with A’s brain in B’s body. In fact, C’s 
identity has the essential parts of both A and B’s identity, yet C is neither A 
nor B. At this point, one may object that this reasoning leads us to the 
branching problem.415 I think, after all, we are left to choose several options 
among the following mutually possibilities:  
(i) A and B are dead. 
(ii) Neo-Lockeans are right. 
(iii) Animalism is right. 
(iv) The post-operation person is neither A nor B essentially, but 
C.   
Accepting that (iv) is a true predicate does not require (ii) and (iii) to be 
wrong. While (i) may not be true for the hybrid view, but that does not mean 
                                                        
413 I would like to thank Eric Olson for making this point very clear in our meeting.  
414 The degree of interruption is disputable. 415	This is a puzzle when we suppose A’s cerebrum transferred into B’s body, leaving A’s 
original brainless body alive in a vegetative state. After the operation B is psychologically 
continuous with A, but A’s body without a brain will be bodily continuous with A too. The 
problem indicates that if both psychological continuity and bodily continuity are sufficient 
for A’s persistence, then there will be two A’s in one place.  	
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that A and B are still alive. More to the point, by accepting either (ii) or (iii) 
as true, we are left with a very puzzling case of the persistence criterion that 
is unsolvable. The plausible option for us to take is to accept that (iv) is true 
if and only if both (ii) and (iii) are taken to be necessary and sufficient (but 
not sufficient on their own) for the persistence condition.  
 In order to support my conclusions, I draw from hypothetical 
transplantation cases, I would like to mention Wiggins’ reading of 
transplantation, in which he plausibly relates the topic to the notion of a 
guarantee. What a guarantee means in this context is that the natural process 
of a human being from the moment of existence to the point it ceases to 
exist is guaranteed. The nature of the process of coming into existence, 
maturing and finally ceasing to be is sustained and guaranteed by laws of 
biochemistry, physiology and so on. The brain transplantation procedure 
might violet the dependability of the natural process. That is to say, persons, 
namely individuals, as a natural body, may not be said to survive after such 
a procedure takes place. In small procedures, such as heart or liver 
transplantation (even though the transplanted organ is made of an inorganic 
matter), the organic nature of substance is still protected. Brain 
transplantation, however, may endanger this guarantee and undermine the 
collection of the natural process. The threat is also obvious for him; “the 
natural substance has become ‘artefact-like’, something not so much to be 
encountered in the world as putatively made or produced by us, something 
that is really up to us (individually or collectively) not merely to heal or care 
fore or protect but also to repair, to reshape, to reconstruct, even to 
reconceive.”416 
Examples are neither meant to be exhaustive nor precisely accurate. 
We can see clearly that all these add up to a good reason to think that no one 
would accept the possibility that persons are continuous with their post-
operation selves in transplant cases. Although the hybrid view supports the 
claim that persons cease to exist once psychological or physical 
connectedness is interrupted, it does not rule out the possibility of cases in 
thought experiments where both psychological and physical connectedness 
                                                        
416 Wigging (2001) p. 241.  
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still exist, either in a new person or the same person, even for a limited time. 
This possibility applies, for example in the case of duplication with 
teleportation, as Parfit suggests in Persons and Reasons.417  
 
4.4.2.2 Duplication: Is Teleportation a Case of the Continuity of 
Identity? 
In Parfit’s account, there are two major cases in teleportation examples. In 
this section, I will outline my interpretation of his example and scrutinise 
whether Parfit’s duplication cases are compatible with the hybrid view. In 
the first case, we suppose that person A steps into a teleporter in x place, 
pushes a button to activate the machine and steps out of a teleporter in y 
place. In the first teleportation case, the teleportation is achieved by the 
teleporter in x place scanning A’s body, transfers the exact state of every 
particle composing her into information, and transmitting the information to 
the receiving teleporter in y place. As soon as A’s body is transmitted from x 
to y, the body in x place disappears or ceases to exist. At the same moment, 
the receiving teleporter in y place recreates A from the precise nature and 
arrangement of A’s atoms that perfectly matches the information about her 
state recorded an instant ago (or simultaneously) in x place. In Persons and 
Reasons, Parfit explains the case as follows:418  
The Scanner destroys my brain and body. My blueprint is 
beamed to Mars, where another machine makes an organic 
Replica of me. My Replica thinks that he is me, and he seems 
to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed 
the green button. In every other way, both physically and 
psychologically, my Replica is just like me. If he returned to 
Earth, everyone would think that he was me.419 
Following Parfit’s claim, we can call the resulting person AY, and her 
                                                        
417 Parfit (1986) pp. 199-201.  
418 Parfit explains the same case with a similar example elsewhere: “Suppose that you enter 
a cubicle in which, when you press a button, a scanner records the states of all of the cells 
in your brain and body, destroying both while doing so. This information is then 
transmitted at the speed of light to some other planet, where a replicator produces a perfect 
organic copy of you. Since the brain of your Replica is exactly like yours, it will seem to 
remember living your life up to the moment when you pressed the button, its character will 
be just like yours, and it will be in every other way psychologically continuous with you.” 
Parfit (2009), p.21. 
419 Parfit (1986), p. 199. 
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experience of the transition will be continuous. She can perfectly 
comprehend whatever has happened to her and her body by entering the 
teleporter in x place and being transmitted to y place with her unity a 
moment later.  
There are two possibilities for such a case. What Parfit understands 
from the persistence of identity is simply either the case of survival of 
identity or of death. Either, AX dies, and the identity of AX does not survive, 
or AX’s identity survives as AY, and AX is AY. Parfit conceivably argues that 
the procedure would not be a failure. This means, first of all, when AX 
becomes AY she will not die, but continue through some sort of 
transportation process. Secondly, for Parfit, although there is no necessary 
and sufficient reason to believe that AX is identical to AY, AX survives as 
AY, and this is what matters.420  
It remains to be determined whether her identity survives. The 
hybrid view agrees that A is alive and survives after the teleportation takes 
place, and it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that AX is identical to AY, or 
at least that there is a hope for numerical identity, since the human body that 
entered the teleporter in x place was transmitted to y. The human body that 
is created or arranged from the same organic matter (along with the exact 
information is supposedly transmitted from one place to another) in y place 
is the only candidate for being the person who is persistent with the original 
A after the teleportation takes place. Therefore, A has a persistent (and most 
likely uninterrupted) identity. The possibility of persistence does not rule 
out numerical identity. If A’s identity persists after teleportation, A survives 
as AY. In this case, if we suppose that the identity of A in x and A in y is 
transitive, then 
(i) AX is psychologically continuous with AY,  
(ii) AX is physically continuous with AY, and 
(iii) therefore, AX is psychologically continuous with AY in virtue 
                                                        
420 Parfit’s solution is simple. Double success on believing that the transmitted person is 
still alive, and the original person survives as resulting person. Therefore, the transmission 
cannot be a failure. Survival and being identical do not necessarily entail one another. What 
it means is that being identical with a transmitted person is not a necessary condition of 
survival.	
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of being physically continuous with AY.  
As we can see clearly, according to the hybrid view, in the first case of 
teleportation, not only is AX the same person with AY, where those two are 
psychologically and physically connected, but also AX and AY are 
numerically identical. Persistence of identity in this teleportation case, of 
course, only possible through several conditions: (i) AX ceases to exist after 
the transmission takes place, but (ii) non-existence must take place right 
after (or simultaneously) AX becomes421 AY. Even though one might object 
that if AX ceases to exist then becoming is distracted, it makes sense to 
speak of the point at which AY comes to existence without AX’s continuity 
being distracted. (iii) Therefore, AX becomes AY without ruling out the 
initial condition of numerical identity. 
In the second case of teleportation, we suppose that rather than 
destroying AX, the transmitting teleporter only scans the body and transmits 
the data to the receiving teleporter in y place. This process results in two 
living exact duplicates of A, one is AX and the other is AY.422 Although we 
expect AX and AY to be both physically and psychologically continuous and 
to have the same personality characteristics (such as holding the same 
memory, the same intentions, the same beliefs, and being composed by the 
same sort of matter in the same way, and so on), AX and AY will be two 
separate individuals due to their duplications in different places at the same 
time. This second case of duplication is contrary to the notion of numerical 
identity. Undoubtedly, the second notion of duplication fails to be the case 
of a persistent identity, as AY would only be a duplicate of AX, and as soon 
as teleportation takes place, AX and AY’s identities diverge from one 
                                                        
421 The term “becoming” here is not used in a teleological sense. Teleological becoming is 
related to the relation between potentiality and actuality. 	
422 This is how Parfit exemplifies the second teleportation case in Reasons and Persons: 
“Several years pass, during which I am often Teletransported. I am now back in the cubicle, 
ready for another trip to Mars. But this time, when I press the green button, I do not lose 
consciousness. There is a whirring sound, then silence. I leave the cubicle, and say to the 
attendant: “It's not working. What did I do wrong?'  'It's working', he replies, handing me a 
printed card. This reads: 'The New Scanner records your blueprint without destroying your 
brain and body. We hope that you will welcome the opportunities which this technical 
advance offer.” The attendant tells me that I am one of the first people to use the New 
Scanner. He adds that, if I stay for an hour, I can use the Intercom to see and talk to myself 
on Mars. 'Wait a minute', I reply, 'If I'm here I can't also be on Mars'.” Parfit (1984) p. 199. 
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another. Since, they are only qualitatively identical, and this condition is not 
necessary and sufficient for AX and AY to have numerical identity or to be 
one and the same person. Although teleportation is a case in which the exact 
duplicate of the original person with a perfect physical similarity can come 
into existence, duplicates cannot be continuous with each other. Therefore, 
the second teleportation case cannot indicate the possibility of a persistent 
identity, so it fails.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
As is perhaps already clear, the model Langford, Noonan, McDowell and 
Wiggins point out motivates a hybrid approach to our persistence according 
to which we persist by way of the unity of biological continuity and 
psychological continuity. This is an account of what we are is developed 
according to which we are both organisms and persons. How these accounts 
defend the hybrid view hinges on understanding the persistence conditions 
in an original way.  
 After examining animalism and the constitution view I come to 
conclusion that above exposition also sets out their isolated persistence 
conditions, and the significance of these conditions in our persistence as a 
unity. The aim of this chapter has been to emphasize the different strands of 
our identity that constitute it, and their connections with one another.  
 By taking the crucial function of numerical identity into 
consideration, it has been shown how split-brain scenarios fail to be the case 
for a persisting identity – unless, without worrying about the branching 
problem, we classify the person as new that comes into existence after 
transplantation takes place. The idea of a new person coming into existence 
in the hypothetical scenario of a split-brain case is a possible conclusion. 
Personal identity cannot accommodate the possibility of two identities 
placed in one body; equally, the possibility of one identity adopting 
continuity with two identities is ruled out. The proposal here is that we 
cannot accept the possibility of a continuant identity, where two 
hemispheres of the brain could carry on functioning in two separate bodies 
as distinct persons, or two distinct identities could be united into a single 
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unity and composed under one identity as the carrier of two distinct 
identities simultaneously.   
The intention in this chapter was to gain some clarity over cases and 
examine them through the hybrid test. The simple formulation I borrowed 
from the previous chapter “x is both psychologically and physically 
continuous in virtue of being physically continuous with y” should present 
my position on the debate over everyday cases, such as the fetus problem, 
the vegetative state case, the possibility of continuity after certain brain 
diseases like dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, and also split-brain cases of 
thought experiments, such as fission, fusion and duplication. The hybrid 
model postulates an example of continuity in a duplication case, where 
physical and psychological connectedness stands as a strong possibility. 
What differentiates the success of the fetus puzzle and the failure of most 
thought experiments is that in the fetus case we are inclined to think that a 
fetus will grow into a person through time and there is a strong relation 
between the potentiality of a fetus and the realisation of its actuality as an 
adult person. By contrast, in thought experiments transplant cases fail, as 
mostly the individual does not survive after the transplantation takes place.  
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CONCLUSION  
After a careful examination of the historical and contemporary accounts of 
personal identity, finally I come to the conclusion that these accounts can be 
categorised as reductionist and non-reductionist according to their variable 
ways of understanding persistence conditions. Bodily continuity and 
psychological continuity defenders, animalists and constitutionalists are 
gathered under the category of reductionism, as they tend to reduce the 
persistence conditions of personal identity to either one or another notion of 
persons. Whereas, the hybrid view is non-reductionist in nature, and most 
importantly, it does not require identity to be strictly reduced to only one 
continuity condition.  
As I mentioned earlier, at first glance, this thesis seems to deliver 
familiar results to the hylomorphic view we are acquainted with it after 
Aristotle. However, the contemporary followers of the hylomorphic view 
defend their thesis from various angles without explaining how their 
hylomorphism is related to the Aristotelian notion of hylomorphism in the 
first place. What differentiates my interpretation of hylomorphism from 
Toner’s and Hershenov’s is that it seems as if they are defending a dualist 
approach in their treatment of personal identity. Their concern is about the 
relation between the soul and the body of an individual. Regarding the 
persistence conditions, such an approach is willing to take the reductionist 
methodology. Whereas, hylomorphism does not really need the notion of 
soul in order to determine the persistence conditions. Looking from this 
perspective, I agree with William’s exposition that “hylomorphism might be 
better expressed by saying that there was no such thing as the soul at all.”423 
Hence, mental functions, such as consciousness and the continuity of 
memory, are considered in terms of the relations of form and matter. This 
unity seems to be a human being, or/and a person. On the one hand, the 
hybrid theory I defend employs the appeal of hylomorphism as an initial 
step and progresses through the claims of both animalism and neo-
Lockeanism; it entails that we are animals as much as Olson and other 
                                                        
423 Williams (2006) p. 219.	
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animalists concern, and we accommodate the causal relation of 
psychological connectedness in our life. On the other hand, this project 
addresses the difficulties that challenge animalism and neo-Lockeanism. 
Rather than stripping mysticism away from different interpretations 
of hylomorphism, which could be a work of another project, I simply bring 
the idea of hybrid identity to our attention. It may seem as if I use the term 
“hylomorphism” and “hybrid view” interchangeably, yet I have employed 
hylomorphism in order to indicate that from one perspective the persistence 
question of personal identity is a subject of metaphysical inquiry, and 
hylomorphism provokes a reflection on the term “human being” as a natural 
body, which consists of two intrinsic principles. These intrinsic principles 
are manifested as psychological continuity and biological continuity, and 
the hylomorphic unity of these principles is represented with the condition 
of “x is at t1 is the same being with y at t2 iff (i) x is biologically continuous 
with y, and (ii) x is psychologically continuous with y in virtue of biological 
continuity.” This has been a search of a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the persistence conditions, if there were any. This analysis revealed a 
condition obtains in virtue of which the persistence conditions of identity 
hold in any particular case.  
What differentiates my findings from any form of so called non-
reductionist substance dualism is that substance dualism requires a higher 
degree of continuity in immaterial substance. For the sake of generating a 
philosophically acceptable and respectable account, I explicitly tried to 
avoid referring to soul as the only candidate for an immaterial substance. 
Much has been written about this problem. Some contemporary solutions 
have been proposed. Attempts to resolve the issue have been suggested, and 
arguments against the validity of such a possibility stand as real problems 
for the notion of immaterial substance. Like any other non-reductionist, I 
have proposed an alternative way of conceiving substance, in my case in 
Aristotelian terms, as something underlying our being which is the material 
substance itself. This material substance has its autonomy, which may be 
causally dependent on its components, yet from the ontological perspective 
substance is still independent and its persistence conditions are independent 
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from the parts. The causal dependence of persistence is associated with the 
persistence conditions of substance.  
Another aspect that differentiates my findings from other non-
reductionist accounts is that although some non-reductionists use the neo-
Aristotelian notion of hylomorphic unity in their model, my unifying claim 
is similar to what Wiggins endorses as he interprets metaphysics of persons 
as a single, internally consistent theory. This theory enables me to defend an 
idea in which the terms “person” and “human being” — and even the term 
“human animal” — serve as different names denoting a single explanatory 
meaning, without reducing the identity criterion to any particular element. In 
this way, my interpretation of neo-Aristotelian account of personal identity 
has been separated from those who label neo-Aristotelianism as 
“reductionist” or even “dualist”. Since Aristotle was explicitly clear as 
regards the notion of natural substances, that substance does not belong to 
anything apart from itself and “to that which has it, of which it is again the 
substance itself”. The person’s identity, in that sense, persists through time 
only in virtue of the unity that her identity represents. Furthermore, the 
hybrid view shows that the hylomorphic theory is a valuable model to show 
that the subject has a persistent identity, unless a dismissible distraction 
occurs in the person’s body. Therefore, we can assume that a person has a 
persistent identity in her own particular way. 
Perhaps the most challenging issue for any identity claim, who 
defends the idea that the self as an underlying subject has a continuous 
notion, is to maintain the unity of identity when one’s biological and 
psychological connectedness diverge. As a result, there is a theoretical 
necessity that we must convincingly acknowledge the conditions that 
separate (and also unites) the term “person” from (and with) the term 
“human being”.  From the scientific perspective, a human being exists from 
the moment of conception. Yet, by the features of persons that are 
associated with personhood, some suggest that not all human beings are 
persons, as these states are not present from the moment of conception. The 
most unsophisticated form of consciousness, the consciousness of sensation, 
does not appear even in the early fetus state. The determinant feature for 
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personhood is the capacity for consciousness in its simplistic form. 
Therefore, what follows from this reasoning is that for a certain time, a fetus 
is a human being but not a person. Accordingly, where a human being is not 
a person or ceases to be a person is differentiated in two cases. The first case 
involves in the idea that we do not have a causal relation between the early 
stages of existence and later stages in adulthood. The second case indicates 
a terrible brain damage results in being in a vegetative state wherein the 
body may breathe, the heart may beat, or the body may need a life support 
machine. When we are considering the application of the term “person” 
without any mental characteristics, neither a fetus nor someone in a 
vegetative state do not qualify as persons.  
I discerned on which accounts we can defend the view that all 
humans are persons without any further requirements, particularly in 
Chapters 3 and 4. The traditional religious doctrine, for instance, cleaves to 
the idea that individual souls are present at the moment of conception. 
Accordingly, all human beings – including fetuses and ones with an 
irreversible brain damage – have souls, even though they cannot exhibit the 
characteristics of persons. All human beings are persons because they 
possess a soul. If personhood depends on having a soul, rather than other 
characteristics, such as having an organic body and the causal relation 
between mental states at different times, what challenges this reasoning is 
that we may not be able to differentiate properly whether something is a 
person or not at a given time. For that reason, the idea of soul and any 
conclusion derived from the religious doctrine were not of direct interest 
within the limits of inquiry we are considering in this thesis.  
A plausible outlook for the fetus problem and a person in a 
vegetative state cases should indicate certain qualities that we can rely upon 
regardless of any change: A human being is a person iff (i) it is qualified as 
a person according to the certain features of personhood; or (ii) it has the 
potential to develop these features if there will be no distraction in growth 
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(e.g., fetuses)424; or (iii) it has qualified as a person under condition (i) at 
least once (e.g., it could be someone in an irreversible vegetative state) .  
The initial argument of this thesis affirmed the notion of a person 
within a hybrid unity in all circumstances. Undoubtedly, the ethical 
extension of this view is available in the most sophisticated and strongly 
suggested version. Yet, in the present work I limit my inquiry to conduct a 
necessary preliminary discussion before exploring the ethical implications 
of personal identity. The crucial step has been taken, for now, was to treat 
fetuses and those in vegetative states with the same rights that we ascribe to 
persons.425 The hybrid view I defended in this thesis is perhaps better 
understood if we project our analysis to make this argument separately, 
rather than extending the concept of person. As I have claimed earlier, we 
might argue that personhood is a determinant feature that someone has the 
potential to be a person or has been a person at least once attributes someone 
the same essence as persons. Although it does not necessarily follow that 
such entities are persons now, I think we have provided enough reasons to 
consider the notion of a persistent identity over time regardless of the 
objections in which one may target the idea of self and persistence. 
My constructive claim, detailed mainly in Chapters 3 and 4, was that 
the hylomorphic understanding of our continuity through time structures its 
strands from both sides of psychological continuity views and bodily 
continuity views. I claimed that along with the contributions of non-
reductionists, such as Wiggins, Noonan, and McDowell, the hybrid theory –
a person’s identity persists so long as she has the same psychology in virtue 
of having the same biological attributes – stands as a plausible option in the 
pursuit of our understanding of personal identity. Many philosophers in the 
debate abandoned this theory altogether and favour for one side of the 
explanation, regardless of how poorly it might fit with our understanding of 
ourselves in everyday cases, or even in transplant and teletransportation 
cases, as I discussed in Chapter 4. Throughout the thesis, I have claimed that 
                                                        424	However, some may claim that infants who are born with Anencephaly condition may 
not have the potential to grow into persons. This condition may create changes in reasoning 
towards severely disabled people.  
425 Nevertheless, this may be investigated further in a different inquiry.  
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the best balance of fit with these accounts to the merits of the topic is the 
one which does not force us to abandon any crucial part of the explanation. 
In the contemporary discussion, both the psychological continuity and 
biological continuity defenders suggest that we are supposed to be bound to 
one of the sides, strictly speaking, even if a view requires us to accept 
something that is strongly counterintuitive. The hybrid view I evaluate in 
this thesis succeeds in accepting both sides of the explanation without 
omitting any parts.   
 It is also equally clear that neither side of the explanation can be 
rejected. This claim also indicates that answering the question of what we 
are may lead to a paradox. Perhaps, though, the strategy for defining 
persistence can be employed in some plausible ways so as to yield a feasible 
account of identity. In order to avoid the ambiguity of this feature, we must 
highlight one crucial aspect of a being. If we do not presuppose a strong 
connection between several explanations of identity, the fact that our 
empirical judgements track either psychological or bodily continuity only 
when one diverges from another might just as well be taken to show that 
these judgements can come apart from identity, as that identity can come 
apart from the hybrid notion. I implicitly endorsed the intuitions behind 
psychological and bodily approaches, as both can be accommodated by the 
hybrid unity I have been defending. The way hybrid theorists present 
“person” articulates a coherent form of the concept that unities the idea of a 
person as object of biological inquiry and the subject of consciousness. 
Everyone may not be satisfied with this expedient, especially the ones who 
try to disassemble this agreement between the parts, and insist that these two 
sides cannot fit together. However, the intention of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that the concept of person is intrinsically non-reductionist. 
Hence, it is the way of reading personal identity as it is associated with 
ontological dependence, and non-reductionism brings the animalist and neo-
Lockean readings together. The objective of this thesis is to dissolve the 
debate between psychological continuity and biological continuity defenders 
and to defend a method, which establishes a third way between continuities 
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by accepting that both continuity conditions are necessary and sufficient in 
relation to navigating the persistence conditions of personal identity. 
        Finally, I would like to stress that the hybrid view not only takes our 
understanding of neo-Aristotelian theory of substance ontology as a whole 
one step further, but might also spark new ideas in thought experiments as 
to how attributions of moral responsibility apply to persons as moral agents. 
This requires a criterion by which identity remains the same through time. 
This notion will necessarily entail remaining being morally accountable 
through time. The hybrid view might then be useful regarding the future 
conditions of the morality of transplantation and teleportation cases, the 
fetus problem and vegetative state cases. The idea of the possibility of a 
continuant identity in the hybrid view in particular, both in theory and 
practice, is an undeniable attribute of being a person and essential to the 
notion of personal identity, yet the moral conditions of a persistent identity 
exceed the scope of this thesis. Such an inquiry could be an initial concern 
of another project. For now, however, I have concluded that contemporary 
interpretation of substance ontology may yet ground the answer to the 
modern philosophical problem of personal identity. 
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